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Abstract
This thesis concerns the question of what it is for a subject to act. It answers this
question in three steps. The first step is taken by arguing that any satisfactory
answer must build on the idea that an action is something predicable of the
acting subject. The second step is taken by arguing in support of an answer
which does build on this idea, and does so by introducing the idea that acting
is doing something which is an exercise of a particular kind of disposition on
the part of the acting subject. The third step is taken by arguing that the
disposition in question must be of a kind which is exercised in conditions in which
the acting subject thinks they are acting. From this vantage point the thesis
develops many further committments: That action is constitutively subject to
a mode of explanation that mentions the kind of disposition just mentioned;
that any case of acting requires a veridical representation of a means by which
the action is performed; and that a problem about the underspecified nature
of desire ascriptions can be solved by appeal to the conceptual materials made
available by these investigations. The thesis finally develops several objections
to the account it gives, both substantive and methodological, and explains why
these objections ought to be rejected.
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Introduction
The question which much of this thesis is devoted to answering is what it is
for a subject to act in doing something. Perhaps narrower versions of this
question help spotlight its sense and import: What it is for someone to be
acting in walking towards Rome, or in securing an all blue wardrobe, or (more
pertinently to most) in destroying next year’s crops through neglect? We can
also make the question vivid through contrasting pairs of cases: Obviously there
is a di erence, which involves agency, between a stone’s rolling down a hill and
someone’s picking it up — what is it? Or, to state the contrast in a di erent
way: What is the di erence between someone who is acting in dropping a stone
and someone who is doing it unintentionally?
This thesis contains an answer to the overarching action-theoretic question,
with these main three conceptual ingredients: Subjects doing things, their dis-
positions to do them, and (crucially) practical beliefs about things being done.
The core of the answer may be introduced through a short series of questions
(“Q”’s) and answers (“A”’s):
Q1 What is it for a subject, N, to act in Aing?
A1 It is for N to A because N wants to A.
Q2 But what is it for N to A because N wants to A?
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A2 It is for N to exercise a particular kind of disposition.
Q3 But which kind of disposition is it that, when exercised, amounts to an
agent acting in Aing?
A3 It is the kind of disposition such that, in a particular kind of condition, this
subject acts.
Q4 But now what is the condition by which we are to distinguish this kind of
disposition?
A4 The presence of a belief which represents this subject as acting in Aing.
So my answer begins as a platitudinous form of psychologism, but then takes
on the shape of a minority dispositionalism, which then incorporates an insight
about the role of self-awareness in action.
For A1 seems to be the closest thing we have to an action-theoretic platitude.
It is, it seems, a commitment of what gets called the “standard” account of
action, on which someone acts just in case there’s a desire and a belief, and
perhaps some other bit of psychology, which jointly cause an event, and, as will
probably be added, “in a specific way” (Velleman, 1992; Smith, 1994).1 But A1
is more widely acknowledged than this kind of account, which is really just a
particular way of developing it.2
Adding A2 moves us beyond this platitude to a somewhat neglected minority
dispositionalism. For a smallish number of contemporary thinkers, like David-
son (2004, p. 108), Hornsby (2008, p. 5), Coope (2007), and Hyman (2014),
have seemingly attempted to give sense to the platitudinous claim by construing
1I mean that “wants to A” can be taken as rough talk for whatever specific sets of attitudes
such theorists imagine.
2A1 is also seemingly earlier acknowledged than the standard account. As far as I can see,
contemporary figures have been able to derive support for A1-conforming theses from such
diverse historical figures as Aristotle (Coope, 2007), Aquinas (Anscombe, 1963) Kant (Rödl,
2007) and Hume (Smith, 1994), and so all of these authors can, I think, be seen as precursors
to the vague “psychologism” which A1 expresses, though perhaps only Hume, or Hume and
Aristotle, may be seen as anticipating the standard account.
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desire as a disposition, power or capacity, exercising which amounts to acting.
These theorists do however tend to be silent on the nature of the kind of dis-
position they thereby introduce, and accordingly my agreement with them only
extends so far.
Adding A3 and A4 articulates what it is to have and to exercise that kind
of disposition. It does so by pairing two thoughts. The first thought is that
a disposition is to be distinguished through mention of the kind of condition
in which it manifests and the kind of doing which counts as its manifestation.
Hence a desire must be a disposition such that, in some condition, its subject
acts. The second thought, closely associated with Anscombe (1963), often re-
jected by “causalists”, and seldom considered by “dispositionalists”, is that it is
a mark of the fact that someone is acting that they believe it. The thoughts are
paired by making such Anscombian awareness not merely a necessary condition
for someone’s acting, but the condition in which a subject who wants to act
does so. Hence a desire is viewed as a disposition such that, when a subject
believes they are acting, they are acting.
Many questions will arise about this answer to the action-theoretic question,
not least of which are those which probe the circularity of the account. In the
thesis I develop some such concerns briefly and some at length, and try to give
satisfactory responses to them. I also hope to show that the present account
helpfully contributes to a few di cult issues, which concern, for example, basic
action, action explanation, and desire ascription. I describe these objections
and virtues in the following summary of chapters:
The first chapter of the thesis is devoted to (what should be) the platitud-
inous claim that, for N to act in Aing involves, among other things, for N to be
Aing. It provides an account of what it is for N to be Aing on which it is for a
certain kind of predicable to attach to N. It then looks at accounts which try to
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understand what it is for N to act in Aing by introducing a doing on part of an
indeterminate subject, or by introducing a doing on part of N’s body. It argues
that these accounts fail. Predicating an action of an indeterminate subject, or
of a subject di erent from N, cannot do justice to the idea that N is doing the
action. But a di erent and more radical form of account remains, which does
not view an event of Aing as something that is predicable of N, but rather as
something related to N through some two-place predicable.
The second chapter starts by engaging with accounts which are all, it seems,
complicated versions of that relationalist form of account. These accounts try to
understand what it is for N to act in Aing by supposing psychological relations
(that N has various psychological states which represent Aing) and a causal
relation (that these states cause Aing). But so-called deviant causal chain cases
show that these conditions are not enough, and I argue that, in trying to add
extra conditions to complete this form of account, many theorists fall prey
to more or less complicated versions of a fairly simple dilemma: Either the
extra condition is tacitly introduced merely as a condition which defines acting,
making these accounts uninformative, or the extra condition is given its own
sharp edges, but thereby fails to provide the right definition of what it is to act.
The chapter goes on to outline a di erent kind of account, on which for N to act
in Aing is for N to exercise a particular kind of disposition — properly called
a desire —, individuable as the disposition which is exercised in a particular
kind of condition. The chapter ends by suggesting that the condition which
individuates this kind of disposition is the presence of a belief which represents
its subject as acting.
The third chapter starts with the working hypothesis that an account could
be given which said that acting in Aing is exercising a desire to A, where a
desire to A is a disposition to do what satisfies a practical belief in the presence
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of such a belief. It then argues that if a practical belief is construed as a belief
that its subject is acting in Aing, this completes an account of that form. Most
of the rest of the chapter is devoted to unpacking the content which a practical
belief needs to be assigned if the thesis that associates a practical belief with
every action is to survive scrutiny. It emerges that a practical belief which
represents its subject as acting in Aing needs also to represent this subject as
doing something else which causes Aing, and as acting in doing that other thing,
and as doing that other thing in order to A.
The fourth chapter is devoted to extracting three consequences from the
account, which are treated in three respective sections. The first of these sections
describes a consequence for the metaphysics of action: The account makes it
impossible to do an action, without doing another action in order to do it, in the
belief that one is. I consider and reject some arguments which are supposed to
generate a need for introducing actions which nothing is done in order to do, as
well as some arguments which are supposed to generate a need for introducing
actions which are performed without believing another action is done in order
to do it. The second of the sections concerns a set of issues in the explanation
of action. One, raised by Nagel, is of roughly this shape: What sort of insight is
provided by saying an action is done on account of being desired, if its being done
on account of being desired is entailed by its being an action? I argue that we
should learn to live with the idea that “N wants to A” lacks explanatory import
to someone who knows that N acts in Aing. But I argue that mentioning larger
bits of someone’s set of desires (“N wanted to A in order to B”) can provide
insight as to why someone did B or how they wanted to A. This thought ties
in with a discussion in the third section, which concerns a consequence about
attitude ascription: It is commonly supposed that the objects of our desires
are normally revealed right on the surface of our ascriptions, so that “N wants
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to go fishing” ascribes a desire with the simple object, and hence the simple
satisfaction condition, that N ends up going fishing. The section defends this
common supposition against some recent attacks, which turn on the idea that
desire ascriptions are often in some sense incomplete, revealing only part of what
the agent really wants to do. The section shows a way to reconcile the commonly
supposed view with this idea, appealing to the idea that a desire ascription (like
“N wants to A”) sometimes specifies just a part of an instrumental chain of
desires (such as that N wants to A in order to B).
The fifth chapter is devoted to defending the invocation of a belief about
acting in this account of acting. I develop and undermine some complaints,
which rest, for example, on the idea that it is somehow empirically precarious
to suppose that every acting subject must believe that they are acting, or on
the idea that this generates infinitely recursive beliefs which must, because of
their infinity, somehow be out of reach to an ordinary subject. The only really
good objection, I hold, is the one which questions the informativeness of the
form of account which says that for N to act in Aing requires N to believe this
very thing. My response to this serious worry involves contrasting the form of
account which simply says that for N to act in Aing requires a psychological
state which represents N as acting in Aing (proposed by such theorists as Har-
man (1976); Searle (1983); Setiya (2007), and often left unchallenged), with my
preferred form of account, which adds to this that for N to act in Aing requires
psychological states which represent N as acting in doing other things envisaged
to have suitable instrumental connections to Aing. The latter account is better
than the former in roughly the same way that it is better to say that “believing
that p is believing other things which cohere with p” than it is to say “believ-
ing that p is holding p to be true, where ‘holding true’ means believing”. One
di erence between the two forms of account is that the former, worse kind of
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account allows an interlocutor to keep asking one and the same question “what
is this concept of ‘acting in Aing’ which figures in the thought of someone who
is doing that?”, whereas the latter, better kind of account does not allow an
interlocutor to keep asking any single question. And if the account given allows
no single question of the form “what is acting in ...ing?” to be raised more than
once, it does not leave any single question of that form unanswered.
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Chapter 1
Acting in Doing Something
1.1 Introduction
This chapter formulates the action-theoretic question which the two subsequent
chapters are devoted to answering. It formulates this question as follows: What
is it for some subject to be acting in doing something? It o ers a determinate
conception of what it is for a subject to be doing something, on which doings
are a special sort of predicables. It then argues that two types of account of the
nature of action fail because they do not do justice to the idea that actions are
predicable of the subjects doing the actions. The first kind of account builds on
the idea of a deed with an indeterminate subject. It must fail to do justice to the
idea that agents are doers of their actions. The second kind of account builds
on the idea of a deed of a subject, but not the subject doing the action, instead
casting the subject’s body in a primary role. Again, such an account must fail
to do justice to the idea that agents are the doers of their actions. Finally it is
suggested that a more radical form of account remains, which simply does not
accept my way of formulating the problem — does not view the action-theoretic
8
question as a question of what it is for a subject to act in doing something. This
alternative account is likely to proceed, instead, to try to account for relations
which it assumes makes a bit of behaviour, or an event, into someone’s action.
1.2 Doing Things
Action theorists commonly proceed by assuming some capacious notion of hap-
pening within which they seek to delimit action. For example, Davidson worked
with an “ontology of events” and wondered, at times, how an event need be re-
lated to a subject to be that subject’s action (Davidson, 2001a, p. 43). In
sympathy with Davidson, though not always in explicit agreement with his doc-
trines about events, many have started with the apparently narrower notion
of a “bodily movement” and asked what makes some bodily movement into
someone’s action (Smith, 2012, pp. 387-389). Some have started, instead, with
the di erent, very broad, but basically unelucidated notion of “doing some-
thing”, and asked what makes it the case that a subject is doing something
intentionally (Setiya, 2007, pp. 23-24).
Aligning with this practice, and particularly with Setiya’s example, I will
seek to circumscribe a notion of acting within a more capacious notion of doing.
But I hope to take less for granted than is usually done about the nature of
the capacious notion of my choice. Hence in this section I’ll say something,
hopefully uncontroversial, yet informative enough to delineate what it is to be
doing something. In the next section, I pose the question of what it is to be
acting in doing something.
On the face of things, at least, we can circumscribe the topic of doing some-
thing through the following distinction: There is, on the one hand, how things
are, and on the other, what things are doing. How things are includes such things
as that something is red, or that someone is at the top of a hill. What things
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are doing includes such things as that something is turning red, or that a spider
is making a web. The applicability of this distinction presupposes that being
in some way and doing something are alike in so far as both are predicables.1
But if the distinction is marking anything more than a verbal di erence, it must
be possible to make some sense of the suggestion that these predicables are of
distinct kinds. In this section I want to take seriously both these suppositions:
Doings are predicables, and they are predicables of a distinct kind.
We want an answer to the question “what is it for something to be doing
something?”, as I suppose we would like an answer to the question “what is it
for something to be in some way?”. But we should be careful which type of
answer we wish for. It seems incredible that there should be a reductive answer
to the question about being, and I think we should be similarly incredulous in
the case of doing.2 Given that, what can be said about what it is to be doing
1In OED-influenced language, we may say that a predicable is something that we may
truly or falsely a rm or deny of a subject. This definition conveniently obscures whether
predicables are linguistic predicative phrases used to say that individuals are such-and-such,
or concepts through which we may think of individuals as being such-and-such, or ways in
which individuals can be such-and-such. It is tempting to say our topic is metaphysical, not
linguistic or conceptual, since it is tempting to say our topic is running, biting, nailing and
sinking, etc., and not so much “running” and “biting”, etc., or concepts of running or biting.
But this is somewhat premature, since one can define a type of linguistic predicative phrase
as one which concerns things that things are doing (which seems to me to be pretty much how
we learn to use the phrase “verb phrase” — except that stative expressions like “loves Adam”,
“is green”, “equals five” and “believes that everyone is equal” are then shoehorned into that
linguistic category on grounds of surface similarity), or define a type of concept as one which
concerns things that things are doing (and I have no hold of how to define a type of concept
except as concerning some type of situation). Given these possibilities of aligning linguistic or
conceptual distinctions with metaphysical ones, there does not seem to be anything necessarily
wrong with conducting the investigation in an overtly linguistic mode, or by talking very much
about “concepts”. Such ways of proceeding, though sometimes unattractively indirect, seem
at points to be the only ways to avoid extremely cumbersome phrasing. For example, when
below I speak of when it is licensed to “move from” claims about events to claims about
doings, I do not exactly mean when that would be sanctioned by English as it happens to
be spoken, or even as it should be spoken, but that it would be sanctioned by the kind of
metaphysically felicitous English I am trying to speak. It would seem somewhat unattractive,
and would probably invite some blank stares, if I always opted for phrases like “for someone
to be doing something is for that something to be happening”, though I do sometimes opt for
phrases which are only slightly less convoluted.
2For an example of a claim which might be interpreted as a reductive account of the former,
consider logical atomism’s idea that states of a airs are somehow “made of” “simple” “objects”
(Wittgenstein, 1922, §2.0272). For an example of a somewhat analogous claim about doing,
though it probably isn’t intended to be reductive, consider Hornsby’s (2012) idea that doings
are somehow “made of” a “stretch” of a given type of “activity”. If construed as reductively
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something? I think we’ll do best by taking for granted that what things are
doing are predicable on a par with how things are, and exposing a feature that
encompasses and is peculiar to what’s in the first category. Using “N” as a
stand-in for any subject, and “Aing” as a stand-in for any predicable of doing,
I think we have such a feature in the following:3
Doing: For N to be Aing is for N to be Aing for a stretch of time, after which
N will either have A-ed, or failed to
This feature is most clearly exemplified in cases like the following, which I take
to be paradigmatic: Something is sinking to the bottom of the ocean, or someone
is making an omelette. If a subject is doing either of these, this subject is bound
to be doing so for a time, and once such a subject has stopped doing either,
it is bound to either have succeeded in doing it (the thing having sunk to the
bottom of the ocean, or the cook having made the omelette), or failed to (as,
for example, if the sinking thing got caught in the fin of a dolphin, so that it
never sank, or if the omelette was scrambled, so that it was never made).
Not all cases are like the paradigmatic ones above. But on closely considering
these other cases, we’ll discover that they too yield to Doing. A large class of the
cases which need to be considered are those commonly called “activities”, which
include things like walking, skiing, and deteriorating. Of these doings, it has
been observed that we can never truly say things like “this person was walking,
but never walked”, or “their skills kept deteriorating, but never deteriorated”.
And this seems to show that a subject cannot end up failing to have done one
explaining what it is for something to be in some way or doing something, these accounts will
be simply ba ing. No amount of harping on sets or arrangements of primitively understood
objects seems to tell us what it is for something to be red, just as no amount of thought about
quantities of primitively understood “event goo”, will seem to tell us what it is for something
to be rolling down a hill.
3The rest of this section owes a lot to the relatively small number of philosophers who have
made distinct contributions to action theory by reflecting unusually closely on the notion of
doing something, with a special focus on the imperfective aspect, including Mourelatos (1978);
Falvey (2000); Rödl (2007); Thompson (2008); Hornsby (2012).
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of these things. But as soon as we see this, we also see that the subject doing
an activity must end up having succeeded in doing it. For it seems we can
always say “this person was walking, and ended up having walked”, and the
like. Hence activities don’t, after all, evade our thesis about doing. And now it
seems that we can easily characterise activities in a way which makes explicit
how they conform to our thesis about doing: If a subject is Aing, where this is
an activity, then this subject has already A-ed.
There seems to be a di erent kind of doing, commonly called “achievement”,
which shares the above feature of guaranteed success, but for a di erent reason.
For we can never say that someone is, say, hitting the ground, or outliving
their arch enemy, and yet doesn’t end up having hit the ground or having
outlived this enemy. But the explanation we just employed for activities is
not available here, as it hardly follows from the fact that someone is outliving
their arch enemy that they have outlived this enemy. The explanation which
brings achievements under the heading of doings, while preserving their feature
of guaranteed success, is not far o , however. For though outliving someone
doesn’t require having outlived them, it does seem to require future success in
so doing. And this seems to be a general feature of achievements. So we may
say that if a subject is Aing, where that is an achievement, then although this
subject hasn’t A-ed, it will have A-ed.4
4Maybe we could say that someone is performing the literally Sisyphean task of rolling a
stone up a hill, though, of course, if it is literally Sisyphean, they could never end up having
rolled it up that hill. Like activities and achievements, such doings still conform to the claim
about doing, since after the time during which someone is doing such an impossible thing,
they will have failed to do it. A possibly di erent type of case, discussed by Rödl, is that
of staying healthy. Rödl says this is an “infinite end” in the sense that when it comes to
staying healthy, “the contrast between pursuing and having got does not apply” (2007, p.
36). Perhaps this means that if one is staying healthy, one has already stayed healthy, and
then I suppose the case would fit in with activities like running, walking or skiing. A di erent
way of understanding staying healthy might be by saying that the idea of succeeding in doing
it finds no real application after the time during which one has been keeping it. But then it
seems possible to understand staying healthy as on a par with the literally Sisyphean task of
rolling a stone up a hill — a doing that is guaranteed to end up in failure, but has not yet
done so.
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Some have proposed to explain the nature of achievements by saying that
they take no time, or (if that is di erent) by saying that, when it comes to those
doings which are achievements, the question of how long they go on finds no
application. Ryle takes the latter stance:
We can ask how long it took to run a race, but not how long it took
to win it. Up to a certain moment the race was still in progress;
from that moment the race was over and someone was the victor.
But it was not a long or short moment. (Ryle, 1949, p. 302)
If the Rylean account of achievements is true, then it won’t be possible to bring
these under the scope of Doing, since that thesis requires that a doing has a
durative character, whereas Ryle seems to say that achievements lack durative
character. One possible way of for me to accommodate achievements, as Ryle
construes them, would be to change the letter of Doing so that it did not require
all doings to go on for a time, but only that they go on at a time. This would
accommodate the Rylean account, and preserve much of the spirit of Doing,
as I do not think that much of what I’ll say in this chapter hinges on whether
achievements are taken to take time or not. (The crucial distinguisher is the idea
of success and failure.) But Ryle’s account seems implausible to me, whereas
Doing seems in order. Below I say why I want to persevere with a durative
conception of achievements:
There are two interpretations of the Rylean account of achievements. On
one interpretation, no one is ever doing an achievement, although lots of things
have done achievements. On another interpretation, something can be doing
an achievement, but not during any particular span of time, so that perhaps
achievements are temporally point-like. I am not sure that there is a sensible
and coherent way to make sense of such non-progressive or non-durative doings.
But even if there is, it simply seems correct to me that someone can be winning
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a race during a time up until the point where they have won it, or that someone
can be outliving their enemy during a time which lasts until they have outlived
them. If so, Ryle’s account, on either interpretation, must be false. Mourelatos
(1978, p. 417) seems to share my view, and supports it by citing linguistic
evidence. But to me such evidence seems less secure than the view it is meant
to support; Mourelatos’s view reads like common sense to me, and does not
seem problematic in any clear sense.
I have hinted that activities and achievements can be understood as somehow
derivative of paradigmatic doings. Defending that claim is not strictly necessary
for defending the above thesis about doing. But the claim would help undergird
the thought that all doings, including these ones, make up a smoothly unified
category. So here is a development of the hint: When a subject’s paradigmatic
doing (such as that N is walking to school) is presented with the presumption of
ultimate success (“N is arriving at school — any hour now!”), then it is presented
as an achievement. When a subject’s paradigmatic doing is presented as to be
already partially successful (in a limited sense which sets the bar for success
so low that it is guaranteed by what is currently happening) it is presented as
an activity. (“N is walking towards school, and has walked towards it for quite
a while now!”). So activities and achievements are not so much special doings
that cannot fail, but paradigmatic doings presented with a view to future or past
successes. Attributing achievements is attributing paradigmatic doings with a
presumption of future success, attributing activities is attributing paradigmatic
doings with a view to recent partial success.5
5This view does not clearly address, for example, cases where something is standing still.
For where is the paradigmatic doing, capable of both succeeding and failing, in a case where
someone is standing still? Perhaps it is a good enough answer that the subject is standing
still for a time that extends to some indeterminate point in the future, which will either be
reached while still standing still or not, so that that episode of standing will either succeed or
not. This answer makes it a fuzzy question, perhaps, in what conditions this doing succeeds
or fails. But it defends the idea that someone who is standing still counts as doing that only
because there is something — standing still for ‘a while’ — which they will have succeeded
or failed to do in the future. Admittedly some might feel a need to question this method for
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The above defends the thought that Doing encompasses all doings. Now it
is time to defend the thought that Doing describes something that is peculiar to
doings. This is quite straightforward. It is not so much the bit about durations
which sets predicables of doing apart from those of being. For putting aside frail
specimens like “green at this point-like moment in time” or “presently winning”,
every predicable which applies to a thing does seem to apply to it during some
stretch of time. But the notion of progress leading to success or failure — Aing
until having A-ed or failed to — finds no application in cases where a thing is
blue, dead, sad, knock-kneed, or where someone believes Jordan is on Jupiter.
If something is, say, blue, but then stops being blue, then it did not succeed in
being of that colour, nor fail to. It just was blue, and then wasn’t.
A hurdle, briefly hinted at in note 1, is that several psychologising phrases,
like “believes ...”, “loves ...”, etc., have the look and feel of verb phrases, but do
not seem to report doings on a par with the others we haven noted. This presents
a di culty to those who want to make their distinctions from a linguistic point
of view, since much of what we want to say about other verb phrases does not
apply to these.6 But since we have not defined what it is to be doing something
as being the subject of a verb phrase, distinguished by some syntactic test, we
have the advantage of not needing to say that believing, loving and the rest are
things subjects can be doing, in our preferred sense.
Nevertheless, it might be thought that something needs to be said about the
surface similarity between “N is running to school” and “N believes the school
is near”, and the corresponding surface di erence between these two and “N is
red”, which does not assimilate believings and lovings to doings. I think all that
is needed is to emphasise the relative unimportance of grammar. It certainly is
accommodating the case. But let’s leave this potentially complicated matter at this, since,
again, the above thesis about doing requires only that all doings, including activities and
achievements, involve doing something for a time after which there’s either been success or
failure in doing it.
6See Mourelatos (1978) in this connection.
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possible, and might have been more frequent, for the language of doing to be
adopted to report facts of being, and vice versa. What we express by saying
“N is running to school”, we might, if convenance allowed it, have expressed by
saying “N is presently a to-school runner”. What we tend to express by saying
“N is red” we might have expressed in a Heidegger-evoking verbalisation, such
as “N is redding”. It seems to me that “N believes Jordan is on Jupiter” is
similar to such potentially misleading uses of language. The expression adopts
a form which suggests that N is doing something to report some very di erent
sort of fact about N.
The trouble is that we are not sure what we should say it does report. Is
it that N is in some way, as when we say N is red? (Is believing being in a
state?) Or should we say that knowing, loving and understanding belong in a
category all of their own, beside the categories of doing and being? To these
questions I have no answers, except the feeble answer o ered above: Psycho-
logical predicables are unlike doings and like ways of being in the specific way
that ongoing engagement leading to success or failure finds no application with
them.7 (In the following chapters I will sometimes speak of psychological states,
but only because “psychological predicables” sounds particularly linguistic, and
is anyway quite non-standard. I do not think anything in my discussion will
hinge on using this form of expression.)
It should then be noted that just as, in general, there is such a thing as
bringing about or maintaining the having of a property (keeping oneself rich, of
the colour green, or unwounded), there might be such a thing as bringing about
or maintaining these psychological predicables (maintaining love, or bringing
about belief in God). But making oneself believe in God, if that is possible,
is something di erent from believing in God, and only the former can properly
7See Vendler (1957); Mourelatos (1978) for more detailed expressions of uncertainty con-
cerning psychological verbs.
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be called something which one is doing. All of this is of some relevance to
the question of whether and in what sense it is impossible to “believe at will”
(Hieronymi, 2009; Setiya, 2008a). For it gives us a simple argument for this
attractive but elusive thesis, and assigns it a modicum of clear sense: If acting
is doing something, and believing isn’t doing something, no one can act in
believing — though it is left open whether someone can act in maintaining a
belief.
I’ve said that for something to be doing something is for a special kind
of predicable to attach to that thing. I want to proceed from that thought
to pose the question of what it is to be doing something that is an action,
or to be acting in doing something. As I briefly hinted earlier, many who are
working in action theory prefer to speak not of things doing things, but of events
(or “activities”, “doings”, “behaviours” — the important shared feature is the
seeming quantification over items). These theorists try to proceed from there
to ask questions of the sort: “What does it take for an event to be someone’s
action?” As a gesture of pre-emptive diplomacy, I want to note that it seems
possible to introduce a notion of event which is entirely parasitic on the notion
that something is doing something, and thereby reconciles these questions. For
we can say that what it is for there to be an event of Aing, as such theorists are
liable to say, is for something or other to be Aing. Put in other words, thinking
of an event just is thinking of what something is doing in a way which abstracts
from the doer. Assuming this notion of an event, we can move frictionlessly
from claims about what things are doing, like “the toothless wolf is eating the
last grape”, to claims about events taking place, like “the last grape is being
eaten”, and from claims like “there is an event of the last grape being eaten” to
ones like “something is eating the last grape”.
The assimilation is helpful because it allows us to provisionally translate the
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work of the kind of action theorist who speaks merely of events, into our adopted
language of subjects doing things. Where they say “there’s an event of ...” we
may say “something is doing ...”. To boot, it allows us to translate their apparent
talk of types of event, like “movement” or “oil-painting”, into talk of types of
doing, like “something’s moving” or “someone’s painting in oil”, and finally
their talk of events which — in a sense they often don’t try to articulate — are
associated with a particular type of material substrate, like “bodily movement”
or “fungal spore spreading” into talk of movement done by subjects which are
bodies, or spore spreading done by subjects which are fungi.
1.3 Acting in Doing Things
If something, “N”, is doing something, “A”, then there are these two possibilities:
N is acting in Aing (where as far as I understand them, this phrase is getting
at the same thing as Davidson’s (2001a) “Aing intentionally”, Setiya’s (2007)
“doing something intentionally”, and Velleman’s (1992) talk of “when someone
acts”). Or N is merely Aing, and not acting in Aing. The question that will
occupy us for a while is the nature of the first possibility: What is it for N to
be acting in Aing?8 Given what was just said about viewing events as doings,
I think this question should be seen as a clearer way of articulating commonly
8A note on the use of variables: This question is clearly not asking about some particular
subject what it is for it to act in doing things, or about some particular type of thing that
can be done when it constitutes acting. Rather, “N” is used as a stand-in for any subject,
and “A” for anything that N is doing. So the question requires an answer in the form of a
general specification of what it takes for the world to be one in which a given subject is acting
in doing a given thing which this subject is doing.
If there is a general answer like that, it will, of course, answer all specific questions which
can be generated by replacing the variables with a specific subject and doing, such as “what
is it for the gardener to be acting in misreporting their work time?”. It will also answer
intermediate questions which can be generated by just narrowing the variables, as in “what
is it for a non-human animal to be acting in moving its limbs?”. Questions about specific
things, or ranges of things, acting in doing specific things, or ranges of things, will then come
out seeming directly dependent on the main action-theoretic question posed. To answer them
we’ll need to know whether the specific subject or kind of subject mentioned is standing to
the doing or kind of doing mentioned in the way that subjects stand to doings when they are
their actions.
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posed questions like “which events are actions?”, or “what is it for something
that happens to be some subject’s action?” — clearer, at least, than these
questions are when posed in the absence of any determinate conception of event.
Building up to a full answer to the above question, I want to defend a partial
and very platitudinous-sounding answer, missing which seems to lead a lot of
people astray. The partial answer is that for N to be acting in Aing is, among
other things, for N to be Aing.
1.3.1 Acting Without Subjects
Many theorists give theories of acting in which they speak of “events” without
introducing subjects as the doers of these events. If I understand these accounts,
they say that for N to be acting in Aing is a matter, at least, of some event, A,
happening. But they do not say that it is N that does it.
It is worth noting that such a theory could be defended in one very non-
committal way and at least one very committal way. The basic and non-
committal idea just is to avoid speaking of N as Aing in the account of what it
is for N to be acting in Aing, adopting, instead, Cluedo-esque talk of “the Aing
that occurred or is occurring” or “that episode of Aing”. Thus far, someone pro-
posing this approach might still agree with me that things that are happening
are things subjects are doing, and accordingly it would be an add-on to such a
theory, and would make it much more committal, to deny this, and opt, instead,
to introduce a di erent conception of what it is for something to be happening
— perhaps by introducing an ontology of individual, unrepeatable, historical
events in the manner of Davidson. Such further moves lead to restrictions
and complications in how the action-theoretic question is asked and answered,
some of which generate challenges to their proponents. But the possibility of a
noncommittal view shows, I think, that it would be a mistake about scope to
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argue against, for example, Davidson’s specific commitments about actions and
events, thinking oneself thereby to undermine the whole idea of accounting for
N’s acting in Aing without predicating Aing of N.
A di erent objection, due to Thomas Nagel, seems to be of that wider scope.
For he quite directly says that an account which only mentions a subjectless “flux
of events”, can’t provide for the idea that actions are “assignable to individual
agents as sources” (Nagel, 1986, p. 110).9 Nagel embroiders his objection as
follows:
[M]y doing of an act — or the doing of an act by someone else —
seems to disappear when we think of the world objectively. There
seems no room for agency in a world of neural impulses, chemical
reactions, and bone and muscle movements. Even if we add sen-
sations, perceptions, and feelings we don’t get action, or doing —
there is only what happens. (Nagel, 1986, p. 111)
I think Nagel’s objection is correct on a natural if somewhat pared down reading.
But Nagel does not explain why, and says things which might mislead us as to
why.
Obviously the above quote is more an expression of disbelief in accounts
of the above form than an argument against such accounts. Failing to see
much of an argument in Nagel’s surrounding comments, others have confidently
asserted that all that is missing from the targeted account is some mention of
the (probably psychological) states of the agent implicated in the event which
9His suggestive but brief comments have been picked up by Hornsby (2004; 2008), Coope
(2007) and Velleman (1992). Hornsby thinks the objection is fatal to a number of theories of
what it is to act, whereas Velleman thinks it only encourages some additions. But as Hornsby
(2008, pp. 7-8) brings out, Velleman only seems interested in the same problem as the others
near the start of his article, where he presents the Nagel-evoking thesis that if we merely tell
a story in which “an intention causes bodily movements” we will wrongly represent things as
if “nobody — that is, no person — does anything” (Velleman, 1992, p. 461). Soon after this
Velleman seems to slip into asking and answering what looks like a very di erent question,
concerning “that which distinguishes human action from other animal behaviour” (Velleman,
1992, p. 462).
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is the action. “Agents are not left out[...] when the relevant events consist of
the agent’s being in certain states”, says Davis (2010, pp. 33-34). And Bishop
concurs:
Accepting that intentional actions have active mental causes cer-
tainly dispels the charge [of] ‘leav[ing] the agent out of the picture’.
(Bishop, 2012, p. 61)
Davis and Bishop seem to suggest that there is no problem of disappearing
agents once we supplement the kind of account Nagel targets so that it amounts
to something like this: “for N to be acting in Aing is for Aing to be happening
(where this doesn’t entail of anything in particular that it is Aing) due to the
fact that N is in psychological state X”.
It seems obvious that Nagel would not be satisfied with this. If his problem
was simply with the lack of mention of an agent in the targeted accounts, it
would, of course, be solved once an agent was mentioned, but then what would
be the point of raising it? He also clearly says that mention of psychological
items can’t solve his problem. It would then be surprising if the problem was
such as to be solved by combining mention of an agent with mention of some
psychological states (fuzzily envisioned to “belong” to that agent). But all this
does little to alleviate the fact that Nagel does not explain how his problem is
distinct from the one his targets claim to have overcome.
A further obstacle to understanding Nagel is that his comments on the issue
are liable to distract us from the problem and towards his diagnosis of it. Nagel
thinks the problem is generated by a larger di culty of his interest, which
concerns how to combine “the perspective of a particular person inside the
world with an objective view of the same world, the person and his viewpoint
included” (Nagel, 1986, p. 3). More specifically, his diagnosis seems to be that,
by taking an “objective” perspective, we can only discover a subjectless “flux of
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events”, whereas agents who are acting in doing things can only be discovered
through another, “subjective” perspective. The targets of Nagel’s criticism may
be forgiven for trying to transform these unwieldy concerns into something they
know how to respond to, though they should not get a pass on the fact that
they thereby seem to solve a problem not worth raising.
We should hold out hope for a way of explaining Nagel’s problem without
becoming engrossed with his diagnosis. For it seems quite clear that what Nagel
says about perspectives does not elucidate the centre of the problem, which, to
remind ourselves, is really just why a subjectless flux of events (perhaps circum-
scribed by saying it involves psychological states “owned” by a certain subject
and standing in certain causal relations to certain events) couldn’t felicitously
be identified with an agent’s participation in their action. The thoughts “if I
view the world third-personally, I only discover a flux of events” and “if I view
the world first-personally, I discover agents who are acting in doing things”, do
little to defend or explain the thought that “a flux of events can’t constitute an
agent who is acting in doing something”. We may be encouraged by this to cut
past talk of perspectives: Rather than saying the problem concerns giving an
account of “subjectively encountered facts about subjects who are acting” which
mentions only things in “an objectively encountered reality of neural impulses,
muscle movements, and other things that happen”, we may just say it concerns
giving an account of facts about subjects who are acting in terms of subject-
less facts about events. How should this simplified version of the problem be
undergirded?
As a first step towards defending Nagel’s pessimism, suppose, as we seem-
ingly can’t congruently deny, that for N to be acting in Aing requires N to be
Aing. If this simple thought is true, then no account which fails to entail that N
is Aing can be a true account of what it is for N to be acting in Aing. But now
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one may wonder how an account the point of which it is to avoid saying that
N is Aing, in favour of speaking subjectlessly of events, is supposed to defend
this implication. The trouble is that there does not seem to be any entailment
running from such facts as that N is in some psychological state which causes
Aing to be happening, to such facts as that N is Aing
I earlier registered doubts that it would be possible to give a general reductive
answer to the question of what it is for something to be doing something, but
that is not quite at issue here. The present proposal is weaker in that it only
requires one-way relations of entailment from the theorist’s favoured causal-
psychological facts to facts about the doings of subjects. But the apparent
distinctness and fundamentality of the notion of doing things still makes it hard
to overcome the feeling of a gulf. As Nagel and some of his followers — especially
Hornsby — keep saying,10 a bunch of states and subjectlessly identified events,
however large, and however causally related to each other, seem to be hopeless
materials for building up to the idea that agents are the doers of their actions.
The trouble is that Nagel and his followers are of little help in explaining why
this need be hopeless, as most of what they say on the matter just repeats the
basic conviction.
So what is the completing step to defending their pessimism? My argument
is flat-footed, but hopefully therefore readily acceptable: Since, in general, talk
of a subject, a feature, and some causal relationship between the subject and
the feature, can’t entail that the subject has the feature, mention of N, Aing,
and a causal relationship between N and Aing can’t secure that N is Aing.
The general point is readily illustrated: “Here’s N”, “There’s thinness”, and “N
brought the thinness about”, hardly entails that N is thin, and adding features to
N or complicating the causal relationship between N’s features and the resultant
thinness hardly improves the prospects of securing the entailment. (Note that
10Especially in Hornsby (2004, p. 12).
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it doesn’t matter to this flat-footed argument whether we think of thinness as
an entity with a life of its own, and hence not as a predicable, or, instead,
as a predicable, though without predicating it of anything determinate.) Why
should things be thought to be any di erent when it comes to what subjects are
doing?
1.3.2 Acting Without Agents
Other theorists give accounts of what it is for N to be acting in doing things in
which, seemingly, they accept the idea that things do things, since they often
refer to what N’s body is doing, though they avoid mention of what N is doing.
I don’t know whether the preference for body talk is the reason for the neglect
of agent talk, or if, rather, some doubts about the permissibility or usefulness
of speaking of N as doing things in an account of what it is for N to be acting
in doing them leaves these theorists with N’s body as the only eligible-seeming
subject on which to pin the things that, after all, seem to happen when subjects
act.11
This approach to action is not always explicitly stated, and some theorists
seem to vacillate on the matter. But there are clear and prominent instances.
One is Danto’s declaration that “an action [is] a movement of the body plus x,
11I can think of other rationales for this kind of proposal, but none is very complete or
very good. I o er some here: Perhaps the idea is that a focus on the activities of bodies
makes room for a certain kind of conjunctive analysis, discussed by Ford (2011), which would
otherwise seem impossible: Saying that N acts in Aing just in case N’s body moves plus p can
seem more plausible than saying that N acts in Aing just in case N is Aing plus p, since there
are some things a subject can’t help but act in doing (reading silently, or buying a house), so
that there seems to be no room for a separately describable condition fit to make these into
actions. By focusing on N’s body, we may hold out hope for such an analysis, since there’s
quite certainly nothing a body can do which on its own guarantees that someone is acting in
doing anything. (See footnote 13 for hints on why this motivation is problematic.) Another
possible motivation lies in the vague thought that an action must begin somewhere, and that
that somewhere must be in the agent’s body, which I don’t think is a good thought. (We’ll get
back to issues about basic action in chapter 4.2.) Still another apparent reason for preferring
bodies is a commitment to a form of “causalism” on which causation can only have e ects
that are bodily movements, and not, for example, instances of waiting. (But it is not clear
why a form of causalism which requires that should itself command adoption.)
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[...] and the problem [...] is to solve in some philosophically respectable way for
x” (Danto, 1981, p. 5). Searle has o ered the beginnings of an account of action
on which a “successfully performed intentional action characteristically consists
[in part in a] bodily movement or state of the agent” (Searle, 1980, p. 47), and
does not say much to discourage the impression that he thinks every intentional
action consists in a body’s movements. Finally, Michael Smith (2012, p. 387) is
a proponent of what he thinks of as the popular thesis that for N to be acting in
Aing is for N’s body to be doing something, and for further conditions to apply,
as he endorses what he unquestioningly calls “[t]he standard story’s answer [to
the question of what acting is]”, which “is that the di erence lies in the causal
etiology of what happens when a body moves” (Smith, 2012, p. 387). And
though I take Smith to represent a larger movement, I will focus on his writings
on the topic, as he is an especially clear and steadfast proponent of the present
kind of account.
Interestingly, Smith does not only say that for N to be acting in Aing is a
matter of N’s body doing something. He also restricts the bodily happenings fit
to constitute N’s actions to movements. This restriction is, I think, a natural
response to a di culty which the present kind of theory faces. But it brings in
di culties of its own. After a theory like Smith’s is revised so as to avoid both
kinds of di culty, I think it will be fairly apparent what is really wrong with
his kind of theory.
To see the temptation of introducing a restriction to movement, start by
noting that if we tried to make up a theory saying “for N to be acting in Aing is
a matter of N’s body Aing and ...”, then we would have a theory which said that
for N to be acting in doing N’s taxes is, among other things, for N’s body to
be doing N’s taxes. The problem with saying this is not that it is linguistically
alien and unpalatable to common sense. The problem is that as long as we
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regard N’s body as a subject in its own right, separate from N, this claim does
not seem capable of meaning something that might be true.12 (Obviously my
objection does not go through if the opposing side identifies N’s body as just
N — the subject acting in doing the taxes, in this case. But that would mean
reverting to the di erent kind of theory which says that for N to be acting in
Aing is a matter of N Aing.)
If we don’t want to end up with such disappointments again, we must note
that there are only so many things it makes sense to say a body is doing.
Bodies, considered as separate from acting subjects, can move, or be still, or
sweat, or fall, or burn, and a number of other things, but not do taxes or try
to take revenge. Taken on its own, this observation does not require a theorist
like Smith to say that a body needs to move in action, but such a restriction
can seem natural, since (a) perhaps it it is thought to provide some informative
contribution to an analysis of what acting is, and (b) movement seems to include
very much of what a body can do, and because (c) bodies do seem to move quite
often when subjects are acting in doing things.13
There is a straightforward objection to Smith’s restriction to bodily move-
ment, but it seems possible to adjust Smith’s kind of theory to accommodate
the restriction. The objection is that someone can act in playing dead, which
doesn’t seem to involve movement, so that an account which tries to under-
stand action through the notion of a bodily movement must fail.14 Smith’s
12It does mean something that might be true to say that a body is falling or sliding — the
point is not intended to apply for all possible things a subject can be acting in doing.
13This kind of theory ignores the complaint that in trying to circumscribe agency, “it will
be a mistake to look for the fundamental description of what occurs — such as movements of
muscles or molecules — and then think of intention as something, perhaps very complicated,
which qualifies this” (Anscombe, 1963, p. 29). Though I am sympathetic to this conclusion,
it is very di cult to make out Anscombe’s argument for it. Some of what I say below is,
however, provoked by some of what Anscombe says in that argument.
14Hornsby (2004, p. 5) makes essentially this criticism, but in a way that saddles Smith-
esque theories with doctrines about “events” and “actions” which it seems to me these theories
don’t need to subscribe to, or always do subscribe to. I might, like Hornsby, also have appealed
to actions in the category of “omissions”: If, for example, I decide to not get out of bed today,
not getting out of bed is my action, and nothing is illuminated about it by calling it a kind
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own response to this objection is that the notion of bodily movement he has in
mind is very broad, and includes things we would ordinarily say don’t involve
movement. I find this manoeuvre unhelpful. It defends Smith’s thesis simply
by making it unclear what he means by “movement”.15 But it does not seem
necessary to engage in prolonged discussion over what Smith means, or over
what “movement” can be allowed to mean, since someone proposing Smith’s
kind of theory seems free to move beyond that notion. Bodies can’t do taxes,
but can do more than move. For all I can see, Smith might just as well have
claimed: “For N to be acting in Aing is a matter of N’s body moving, or being
still”. This, further, seems equivalent to saying “For N to be acting in Aing is
a matter of N’s body doing something”, if move or be still includes all a body
can do. Perhaps Smith’s proposed stretched notion of movement is meant to
coincide with these broader notions. In any case, this move obviously overcomes
the simple objection from still action. But it leaves us with a theory like this:
Smith-inspired: For N to be acting in Aing is for N’s body to be Xing, and
for a further condition C to apply (where C is a condition concerning a
causal relationship between N’s psychology and the Xing that N’s body is
doing).
of “movement”. I do not choose this example because I do not want to engage with what I
think of as the mistaken view that acting involves movement though omission is a kind of
“non-action” , which still can be done intentionally (as briefly suggested by Sartorio, 2009,
p. 513). Su ce it to say that by “action” I just mean this general category of “things that
are done intentionally”. Once that category is properly elucidated, there will, I think, be no
further need to give an “account” of the subclass of things that are done intentionally and
also involve movement, just as there is no special need to give an account of the subclass that
involves melting things with the body heat of one’s hands.
15Smith says such complaints rest on an “uncharitable interpretation of what the standard
story has in mind when it talks of bodily movements”, and suggests the interpretation that
“any orientation of the body counts as a bodily movement, even the orientations involved in
leaning motionless against a wall, or lying still on a bed, or relaxing on a couch” (Smith, 2012,
p. 389). Davidson (2001a, p. 49) has similarly said that we need a “generous” conception
of a bodily movement to make good the proposal that actions are bodily movements. But if
in a spirit of generous charity, we try to stretch the idea of an “orientation of the body”, or
of a “bodily movement” to include these passive actions, I do not think we will be left with
anything but the notion that the bodies in question are doing something or other. Luckily for
Smith and Davidson, this claim seems available to them for all they’ve said.
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The resulting story is familiar, though we have left behind the usual restriction
to movement: For N to be acting in typing is for N’s psychology to cause
N’s body to do certain (typing) movements, whereas for N to be acting in
resting is presumably for N’s psychology to make N’s body stay put (in the
way characteristic of resting).16 The obvious and familiar problem for the view
concerns which causal-psychological relationship an agent is supposed to have
to what their body is doing just in case they are performing an action. In
answering this question, proponents of Smith’s kind of theory must reckon with
counterexamples involving deviant causal chains. In the next chapters I will
return to questions about how the relation between an agent’s psychology and
what happens needs to be construed to exclude such counterexamples.
My present objection is di erent from concerns about deviant causal chains,
and similar to my objection in the last section. For it again presses on the
claim that if N is acting in Aing, N must be Aing. How can facts of the rough
shape that N’s body is caused by various psychological states on part of N to
do something, entail such facts as that N is doing something? In general it
seems that whatever claims we make about what one thing is doing have no
bearing on what any other things are doing. If a tornado is passing through,
nearby dominoes may or may not be falling over. That a tornado is passing
through in such a way that one domino is falling over hardly entails of any other
domino that it is falling over, or of any other thing that it is doing anything.
So how are we suppose to extract from the fact that a desire makes a body do
16Since not just any bodily activity can contribute to just any action, such theories must
seemingly also introduce some restriction on which movements on part of a body can constitute
which actions. To provide such a restriction, a theorist of the present type might try to adapt
a suggestion from Davidson (2001a, p. 51) — who is not a theorist of this type — and
say that N’s body’s Xing (moving an arm, say) can constitute N’s acting in Aing either by
being identical to it (if someone is acting in moving their arm), or by causing it (for example,
if someone is acting in communicating some message by moving their arm). It is not clear
whether this suggestion can be adapted with much success. (For example, how can we identify
a body’s activities with a distinct subject’s actions?) But here I am ignoring this elaboration
and these resultant questions.
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whatever movements seem typical of playing the piano that an agent, viewed as
something distinct from the body, is playing the piano, or doing anything much
at all?17 (Even unintentionally — since maybe it’s a case of desire-triggered
sleepwalking.) If, as seems generally true, no fact about what one thing is doing
entails any fact about what another thing is doing, an account with the shape
of Smith’s must fail to provide for the idea that an agent does the things which
this account calls the agent’s actions.
1.3.3 Agents Doing Actions
A theory of what it is for N to act in Aing can avoid introducing the idea that
N is Aing either by wholesale refusal to introduce any subject as the doer of
anything that happens, as our first kind of theory did, or through refusal to
introduce N as the doer of the things that are N’s actions, as the second kind
of theory did.
My objections to both kinds of theory hinged on the idea that, if N is acting in
Aing, N must be Aing, and on the seemingly necessary failures of these theories
in providing for this thought. It seems that, to provide for that thought, we
must allow ourselves both to predicate doings of subjects, and, moreover, to
predicate them of the N who acts. Once my objection is in view, it can seem
obvious: How could one provide for the idea that N is Aing in a theoretical
mindset where one refuses to predicate Aing of N? What is less obvious is that
there are two quite di erent sources such a denial might have.
Table 1.1 outlines four kinds of account of what it is for N to act in Aing,
divided according to whether they do or do not allow mention of N, and to
whether they do or do not allow predication of doings to mentioned subjects:
17With properties, it is normally accepted that they are exclusive of their bearers, so that
part of what it is for a thing to be red is for it to be red regardless of which colours or other
properties other things have. I am suggesting that we should take the same kind of attitude
towards what things are doing.
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Allowing mention of N ... Not allowing mention of
N ...
... allowing mention of
what mentioned subjects
are doing
N is Aing N’s body is Xing (where
Xing ”= Aing)
... not allowing mention
of what mentioned
subjects are doing
N is F and A is happening N’s body is F and A is
happening
Table 1.1: Four ways of restricting answers to the question: “What is it for N
to act in Aing?”, with four corresponding types of answer.
The lower-right kind of account might be the one which Nagel targeted to
start with. In that case, Nagel’s worries about disappearing agents really had
two sources: That the subjects of action tend not to be introduced in accounts
of what it is for them to act, and that, in general, the active contribution of
substances — the fact that things do things — often fails to be introduced in
such accounts. (I am not sure that I can see that both attitudes can be explained
by a single commitment to a “third-personal” methodology.)18
Now my entire critical engagement with the upper-right, the lower-left, and,
by extension, the lower-right kind of account, hinged on the idea that for N to
be acting in Aing requires N to be Aing, in the sense I have assigned to that
latter expression. It might now be questioned whether this is true, since if not
I have no case. But I’ll argue that if someone does not a rm that agents do
their actions, in the sense that their actions are predicable of them in the sense
I started out discovering, their theory must take on a particular relationalist
18Bishop argues that the “concept of action[...] seems essentially to involve agent-causation”
whereas “agent-causation has no place[... in a] ‘scientific image’ of the world [as] a vast array
of events and states of a airs related according to laws of nature” (Bishop, 2012, p. 55). If
“agent-causation” means that agents do their actions, this brings out, I think, that it is not so
much the third-personal perspective, but a certain contemporary view of nature which tries
to understand it without the idea that things do things, which generates the second kind of
action-theoretic commitment. The first seems to be generated in a di erent way, which Nagel
and some of his followers sometimes gesture at: The things we want to identify as the sources
of action (which are not mere bodies) disappear when we view the world third-personally.
Whatever the reason is for which these subjects are thought to disappear, it seemingly applies
whether or not we adopt the just-ostended “contemporary” view of nature.
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shape. And it will be the subject of the next chapter to undermine prominent
instances of that form of theory.
1.4 Two Approaches
I argued that, if someone gives an account of what it is for a subject to act in
doing something, which does not introduce the idea that the subject is doing
the thing in the sense which I started out presenting — the sense of progressing
towards success or failure in doing it — then this theorist will find themselves
unable to secure that idea by talking, for example, about what an agent’s body
is doing, or about happenings which are not thought to be doings on the part
of a specific subject.
But what if a theorist would opt to look for an account of what it is for N
to act in Aing, without committing to a rming that this requires N to be Aing
in the sense I have sketched? If a theorist does not take on such a commitment,
they seemingly cannot be criticised for failing to do justice to it. But then
such a theorist cannot take the question “what is it for N to act in Aing?” as
presupposing that N is Aing, as I have taken this question to do. They must
then construe this question as bearing a somewhat di erent sense.
How might such an action theorist get their inquiry o  the ground? What
question could they seek to answer, if not one which presupposes that a subject’s
actions are predicable of this subject, in the way that other doings are? Though
I have no indisputable argument for the following conjecture, it seems that the
main alternative approach — perhaps the only stable one — is as follows: First,
observe that there are things that happen. Second, conceptualise these as events,
where perhaps this means that they are individuals, as Davidson thought. Now
pose the action-theoretic question in this way: What is the relation between an
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agent and an event which makes it into their action?19
Inspired by the early Davidson, a number of philosophers have pursued such
questions, attempting to specify the nature of action by presenting a special
kind of relation thought to be exemplified only and wherever some event is an
action. Hence such a theorist attempts to understand what it is to act, not
by predicating actions of subjects, but by introducing some or other two-place
predicable, relating a subject and their action, now considered as an individual.
Or, as sometimes happens, such a theorist might abandon or disregard the
Davidsonian assumption about events being individuals, thereby introducing
something like a relation (if indeed this makes sense) between a psychological
fact about a subject and a fact about what they are doing. Since it is the invoked
relation that is supposed to do the work in explaining the nature of action, such
a theorist can seemingly remain non-committal about just how to understand
the fact about doing figuring at the far end of the invoked “relation”.20
19The original motivations for thinking of actions as individuals related to subjects are
not overtly action-theoretic, and are no longer in much focus. One important motivation for
viewing actions as events, where these are considered as particulars, stems from Davidson’s
concern with providing an account of the structure of sentences like “Sebastian strolled through
the streets of Bologna at 2” on which it can be shown they entail ones like “Sebastian strolled
through the streets of Bologna”. Davidson says the real structure of the first sentence is that
“There is an event x such that Sebastian strolled x, x took place in the streets of Bologna, and
x was going on at 2” (Davidson, 2001a, pp. 166-167). Based on further comments (Davidson,
2001a, p. 175), it seems that we are here supposed to view “Sebastian strolled x” as introducing
Sebastian, a two-place predicate (of strolling), and an event (a stroll). Henceforth I will not
be concerned with stating or criticising the kind of conception of events as individuals which
would be needed to make sense of this semantic suggestion. But just to say something about
why Davidson’s line might lead to a blind alley, I want to point to the oddness of thinking
that, whenever we would ordinarily say and think that a subject is doing something, this
is really a matter of the subject and an event (for which we can find no clear application
for the question “which one?” — an embarrassment that Davidson (2001a, pp. 309-310)
acknowledges) being related through some two-place predicable. This suggestion is somewhat
analogous to a suggestion which the reader might more readily recognise as degenerating:
That “this thing is red” specifies of the thing mentioned that it is related in a special way to
a special individual, namely redness. Just as we want to ask, of Davidson’s account, what an
event (considered as an individual) is supposed to be, and how it is supposed to be related to
a subject just in case it is their action, we want to ask, of the present account, what a colour
(considered as an individual) is supposed to be, and how it is supposed to be related to a
subject just in case it is red.
20The issue of just what can figure as a relatum in the kind of relation that such an action
theorist needs is very large. For an extensive discussion, see Stein (2014). I suspect, however,
that the discussion in the next chapter is going to be neutral on the question of whether
relations, and particularly causal relations, should be thought to hold between individuals or
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Either kind of relationalism is to be contrasted with a form of account which
rather views a subject’s actions as directly predicable of this subject, in the
same way as any doing is predicable of the subject doing it, and which must
hence find a di erent way of explaining the di erence between acting and merely
doing. The next chapter is devoted, first, to criticising the predominant form of
the above form of relationalism, and, second, to working out an account of this
di erent shape, immune to the illnesses that a ect such forms of relationalism.
something like facts.
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Chapter 2
Doing What’s Wanted
2.1 Introduction
This chapter has a negative part and a positive part. The negative part goes
as follows: A family of prominent accounts endeavour to explain the nature
of acting in terms of a specific kind of causal relation between wanting and
acting. Each account must say more than this about the nature of acting, since
deviant causal chain cases show that the supposed kind of causal relation can
exist where no one acts. Each account tries to introduce an extra condition to
make up for this di erence. All fail, since each faces a version of the following
dilemma: Either the extra condition is simply understood as that which makes
up the di erence between deviance and action, in which case invoking it is
not informative, or the introduction of the extra condition makes the proposed
account come out false.
The positive part of the chapter is devoted to reformulating the problem of
deviant causal chains is an instance of a more general problem of distinguish-
ing exercises of dispositions from happenings which mimic such exercises. The
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chapter warns against a false start which attempts to cut out deviant cases
by introducing a generic conception of exercising dispositions, while otherwise
clinging to something like Standard Causalism. It recommends, instead, that
each kind of disposition that might be exercised needs to be understood through
individuating the specific kind of condition in which it is exercised. In line with
this recommendation, the chapter outlines an account of acting as exercising
a kind of disposition to act in conditions where the acting subject has a belief
which represents this subject as acting.
2.2 Actions as Causal Relata
I take for granted that Velleman is right to say that the following outlines a
popular, causalist theory of acting:
There is something that the agent wants, and there is an action that
he believes conducive to its attainment. His desire for the end, and
his belief in the action as a means, [...] causes the corresponding
movements of the agent’s body. (Velleman, 1992, p. 461)
This outline of a theory says that acting is what happens when (a) a subject
“wants something” such that the subject believes something “conducive to its at-
tainment”, and (b) these states (together) “cause” something to happen, which
(c) “corresponds” to these psychological items.
What Velleman says is a mere outline because it does not convey anything
very determinate about (a), (b), or (c). A more determinate understanding of
(a), (b), and (c) is, however, implicit in the popular theory Velleman outlines,
and which I will call “Standard Causalism”. For theorists who endorse Velle-
man’s formulation do tend to have more specific conceptions of at least (a) and
(b), which, whether or not theorists explicitly think so, force a particular con-
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ception of (c) too. In the following three sections, I make explicit these ways of
understanding (a), (b) and (c) that are implicit in Standard Causalism.
2.2.1 Psychology
On the nature of wanting something to happen such that one believes something
conducive to its attainment, we can comfortably allow that standard causalists
are divided along many axes,1 as long as we see that they must all endorse the
following: Whatever it is to want something and believe something conducive to
its attainment, it is to be in some state which, first of all, can potentially cause
something to happen, and which, second of all, can correspond to what happens.
This much is needed just to consistently maintain the rest of the standard
causalist theory. For simplicity, and to maintain verbal compatibility with others
who have introduced the same simplification, I will henceforth often refer to this
state of wanting to do something such that one believes something conducive
to its attainment simply as a state of wanting to ..., making the reference to an
instrumental belief about what’s wanted tacit. For further simplicity, I will not
engage in any of the possible and actual disagreements about how a standard
causalist should conceive of these psychological states. So I will not wonder, for
example, whether they are states of the brain, or whether, if not, they must be
conceived dualistically. My upcoming argument will just concern the relation
between such states and what happens, which Standard Causalism thinks makes
these events actions.
1One axis of division is the question of whether the desires required for action constitute
a belief-distinct kind of attitude (Smith, 1987, pp. 55-57) or are just a special kind of belief
(Setiya, 2007, pp. 49-51). In the main text I assume that I can stay neutral on this question.
If these states are not distinct, it would be unavoidable to refer to believing while desiring
as a single state. But even if they are distinct, it still seems possible to think of them in
conjunction as making up a single state, analogous to someone’s (single) state of believing
that p while believing also that q.
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2.2.2 Causation
Then what is it, according to Standard Causalism, for a desire to cause what
happens? Davidson famously appealed to “the ordinary notion of cause” in
stating his claim that desires cause actions (Davidson, 2001a, p. 9).2 Disreg-
arding “ordinary”, calling it the notion suggests that the appeal is to some one
general notion of something making something else happen, so that whatever it
is for a desire to cause an event, in the sense that the theory requires for acting,
it is the same sort of thing as is exemplified when the weakness of a branch
makes a sloth fall, or when the attack of a bowling ball breaks a chair, or when
a mistake concerning ginger determines which words appear in a restaurant’s
review.3 General as it is, this notion of causation must seemingly be applicable
also when someone’s desire makes something happen which is not an action,
as when someone missteps, shakes, or feels sad because they have a desire that
is shameful. Though this supposed idea of causing is still obscure, we know
something about which extension it must have: It applies not just where desires
cause actions, since it can apply also where non-desires cause non-actions, and
where desires cause non-actions.4
2In the main text of this section I do not present the motivations for this view. One
commonly stated motivation is that only the present kind of causal theory will allow us to
reduce actions to a scientific worldview which requires that everything be explicable in terms
of such causes. This motivation seems quite weak to me as it stands, since it is quite hard
to bring out why a scientific worldview that requires the present kind of causalism should
itself be required. In the next footnote, I gesture at a di erent, and I think more pressing
motivation, due to Setiya. In the following section, I present a close cousin of Davidson’s
original argument for the claim.
3In phrasing things in the above sort of way, “a desire makes ... happen”, etc., I perhaps
suggest an answer to Davidson’s (2001a, pp. 151-162) and Stein’s (2014) questions about
whether causers and causees are individuals (desires, events, etc.) or something like facts (that
N wants to ..., that ... happens). Much of my language suggests the former over the latter,
but, as was hinted in note 20 on page 32, if it is possible to work out an alternative conception
according to which causation is a “relation”, of sorts, between facts, not individuals, it seems
that my upcoming discussion, including the criticisms, will apply equally to that conception.
4Setiya explicitly endorses a claim which, I think, comes down to a version of the present
one, when he says that “what it is to act for a reason is a matter of psychological causation,
in a sense of ‘cause’ that also applies to causal deviance” (Setiya, 2011b, p. 131).
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2.2.3 Correspondence
Finally, what, on Standard Causalism, is it for a desire to correspond to what
happens? The basic and vague idea must be that acting requires that the state
of wanting to ... represents the kind of thing that happens, since seemingly
someone can’t act in watering flowers if they don’t have psychological states
that represent what they are doing as a case of that.5 But how, and how
strongly, should we conceive of this notion of representing “the kind of thing
that happens”? There seem to be two interesting options, one weaker and one
stronger:
Weak Correspondence Condition For someone to act in Aing, it is neces-
sary that this someone has a desire that represents N as Aing
Strong Correspondence Condition For someone to act in Aing, it is neces-
sary that this someone has a desire that represents N as acting in Aing6
Importantly, the weak correspondence condition is satisfied even in some cases
where a subject doesn’t act in Aing. For Someone can have a desire which
represents them simply as watering flowers, and be doing that, and still not act
in watering flowers (— perhaps there’s no water left in the heavy vase they are
using but they’re unwittingly sweating an implausible amount onto the flowers
in lifting it).
The strong correspondence condition does not leave room for this possibility.
For it says that subjects who act represent themselves as acting, and not just as
being engaged in activities in the way that non-agents can be engaged in activ-
ities. Because of this, people who do not act cannot satisfy the condition (with
respect to the specific non-action in question): If one doesn’t act in watering
5This condition on action is of course crucial to Anscombe (1963) and to such followers of
Anscombe as Setiya (2007).
6The second condition is stronger since representing oneself as acting in Aing entails rep-
resenting oneself as Aing.
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flowers (as in the sweating example), psychological states that represent one as
acting in watering flowers can’t correspond to what happens.
Which of these conditions is intended by Standard Causalism? This ques-
tion is generally ignored by those who endorse the theory. This might make
us think that theorists are free to endorse either. But in fact I believe it can
be shown that Standard Causalism lacks motivation on the stronger condition,
so that reasonable standard causalists must have in mind something like the
weaker condition. To see this, consider what, to a standard causalist, is sup-
posed to motivate introducing a causal condition alongside the correspondence
condition. An argument congenial to Davidson’s classic complaint against pure
“correspondence theories” of action suggests itself:7
A person can A, and have a desire that corresponds to what they
are doing, and still not act in Aing. Because of this, there must
be some condition, apart from Aing and having such a desire, that
is necessary for a acting in Aing. Our best bet for specifying the
missing necessary condition is as follows: It is necessary for acting
in Aing that a desire which corresponds to what they are doing also
causes the agent to A.
Ignore the tempting question over whether this argument is valid.8 Note instead
that, if the premise with which it starts is false, it can’t support its conclusion.
Then note, as I have just argued, that on our second conception of correspond-
7The argument I have in mind is the one that starts with the premise that “a person can
have a reason for an action, and perform the action, and yet this reason not be the reason why
he did it”, and his subsequent attempt to distinguish acting for the reason had by appeal to
the “idea that the agent performed the action because he had the reason” (Davidson, 2001a, p.
9). It is somewhat reinforced by the subsequent suggestion that this introduction of a causal
condition “alone promises to give an account of the ‘mysterious connection’ between reasons
and actions” (Davidson, 2001a, p. 11).
8For brief presentations and dismissals of some non-causalist accounts of the “mysterious
connection”, see Davis (2005, pp. 79-80). For what seems to be a quietist “account”, see
Dancy (2000, p. 163). Setiya (2011b, p. 144) briefly questions Davidson’s inference but
suggests a di erent route to its conclusion.
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ence, the premise is false. We must infer that, on the second conception of
correspondence, the argument doesn’t support its conclusion.
Hence in so far as a theorist wants to rest their standard causalism on an
argument like the above, which crucially mentions the inadequacy of the cor-
respondence condition, they cannot also appeal, in their standard causalism, to
the stronger conception of correspondence, which crucially makes such corres-
pondence su cient for acting. Such a causalist must hence intend either the
first conception of correspondence, or (at least) some intermediate conception of
correspondence which still allows that desires can correspond (in the intended
sense) to what happens when what happens isn’t a case of acting.
Since a standard causalist thinks that causation by desire is insu cient for
acting (since they appeal to a general notion of causation), and since a standard
causalist introduces causation by desire on the basis that representation by
desire is insu cient for acting, such a theorist must think, at least, the following:
Standard Causalism If N acts in Aing, then N has a desire that represents
N as Aing (in a sense such that N can A and represent N as Aing without
N’s acting in Aing) and this desire causes N to A (in a sense such that
this desire could cause N to A without N acting in Aing).
And this formulation adds some determinacy to Velleman’s characterisation of
Standard Causalism as a theory which defines action in terms of correspondence
to and causation by desire.
But of course a simple conditional does not give us an account, but just
implications of acting. A first pass at providing an account would be to simply
replace the above conditional with a biconditional.
Naive Standard Causalism N acts in Aing just in case N has a desire that
represents N as Aing (in a sense such that N can A and represent N as
Aing without N’s acting in Aing) and this desire causes N to A (in a sense
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such that this desire could cause N to A without N acting in Aing).
It straightforwardly emerges that on Naive Standard Causalism, acting is con-
forming to two conditions, each of which, on its own, is insu cient for acting.
Below I will argue that Naive Standard Causalism is undermined by cases
involving “deviant causal chains” (hence I call it “naive”). Going further, I will
argue that attempts to preserve the heart of the account by introducing qual-
ifications to the right of the above biconditional fail, since these qualifications
will either point uninformatively right back to the idea of acting for their sense,
or simply make the resulting account false.
2.2.4 Hopeless Deviance Problem
The standard counterexample to Naive Standard Causalism employs the idea of
a “deviant causal chain”. Here is as good an example as any of a deviant causal
chain:
A climber might want to rid himself of the weight and danger of
holding another man on a rope, and he might know that by loosening
his hold on the rope he could rid himself of the weight and danger.
This belief and want might so unnerve him as to cause him to loosen
his hold, and yet it might be the case that he never chose to loosen
his hold, nor did he do it intentionally. (Davidson, 2001a, p. 79)
Davidson’s climber falsifies Naive Standard Causalism since this climber has a
desire that represents letting go, and causes letting go, in just the way Standard
Causalism understands these conditions, but still this climber does not act in
letting go.9
9I ignore the possible but unpopular suggestion that Davidson’s nervous mountain climber
does act in letting go. Claiming that seems analogous to claiming that people in Gettier
cases know what most people would say they truly but accidentally believe. Of course the
unpopularity of these suggestions doesn’t undermine them, so that one might still wonder how
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The only conceivable way of improving on Naive Standard Causalism while
still building on the foundation of Standard Causalism is by introducing ad-
ditional conditions with the aim of excluding cases like the mountain climber
while still including all genuine cases of acting. There has not been a shortage
of attempts, and below I present three prominent ones. I argue that a single
and fairly mechanical procedure undermines each, which just involves asking:
“What is it for the extra qualification to apply?” and then noting how each
account seems forced to answer this question either by saying something that
is uninformatively circular, or something that is not circular but clearly fails to
separate acting from deviantly doing.
Before proceeding to discuss these attempts at completing Standard Caus-
alism, it is perhaps worth engaging with a kind of quietist view which says
that there is a mode of causation that is definitive of the desire-caused events
which are actions, without thereby committing to specifying what constitutes
that mode of causation. Setiya has at one point proposed that such a retreat is
open to a standard causalist. For before going on to attempt a specification of
the right kind of causation, he has said this:
[N]othing I say below turns on the claim that we can explain what
“deviance” is in an illuminating way[...]. My point is metaphysical:
the intentionality of action consists in psychological motivation [...],
and motivation consists in a certain kind of e cient causation. It
does not matter whether we can explain this kind of causation to
someone who lacks the concept of intentional action. (Setiya, 2003,
p. 348)
they could be undermined. Though I do not pursue it, I imagine that there is an argument
to be made against both of the above suggestions which involves questioning whether the
requisite ideas of acting or of knowing can have the connections with related ideas (including
a connection with the idea of acting for a reason in the case of acting, and the connection with
the idea of being justified in believing in the case of knowledge) without which they seemingly
would be quite di erent and alien notions of “acting” or “knowing”.
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For the purpose of showing further examples of this kind of retreat, we may note,
as Setiya hints, that Davidson can seem to go along with some such thought, on
the one hand committing to the “incomplete and unsatisfactory” account that
“an action is performed with a certain intention if it is caused in the right way by
attitudes and beliefs that rationalize it” (2001a, p. 87, emphasis added), while
on the other hand expressing “despair of spelling out [...] the way in which atti-
tudes must cause actions” in such cases (2001a, p. 79). (But Davidson’s rueful
wording signals that, even if he contemplated such a retreat, he did not consider
it entirely satisfactory.10) Goldman might be taken as a clearer proponent of
Setiya’s kind of retreat, since he endorses an account in the standard style while
saying that he doesn’t “think it is fair to demand of a philosophical analysis
that it provide” action’s characteristic mode of causation (1970, p. 62). (But
as Goldman suggests that the relevant analysis might one day be provided by
scientists, he too apparently registers some need to provide such an analysis.)
Perhaps Goldman, Davidson and Setiya have never whole-heartedly pro-
posed such a retreat. Despite what’s said in the above quote, Setiya has always
endeavoured to state what makes causation non-deviant, and anyway did not
keep the above passage when adapting the associated paper for a book (Setiya,
2007). But it is worth bringing out what makes such a retreat unsatisfying, so
as to remove the appearance that it is optional for a standard causalist to try
to spell out what non-deviant causation amounts to.
As Setiya presents the proposal, the idea in it seems to be to say that a
specific kind of causation is involved only in those cases where subjects act,
10Davidson’s later stance seems more clearly pessimistic about Standard Causalism, saying
that “the concepts of event, cause, and intention are inadequate to account for intentional
action” and apparently being unmoved by other philosophers’ attempts fill in the gap using
additional notions (2004, p. 106). In the light of this later pessimism, what’s said in the main
text may be viewed as a transient intermediate development in Davidson’s thinking: A wish
to endorse something like Standard Causalism coupled with inability to see how such a theory
could be brought home. Or it may be viewed simply as a somewhat roundabout way of saying
that a theory along standard causalism’s lines can provide no account of acting, though it can
provide necessary conditions for acting.
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without saying what that kind of causation is. The proposal seems to rest on
some prior and general way of dividing causation into kinds. If we take for
granted that there is some clear way of doing this, the proposal still does not
tell us which kind is pertinent to action. If, instead, we suppose that we’re in the
dark about how to distinguish kinds of causation, the proposal becomes hard to
distinguish from one according to which there is some condition or other such
that, when it obtains, causation by desire amounts to action. In either case,
the proposal seems to come to giving an account of acting, which claims some
extra condition is required for acting, but to then say that no specification of
the extra condition is needed, and that the account is still in order.
But how could an account be in order if it merely appeals to the existence of
some extra condition, without endeavouring to state the condition? Developing
the hint in the quote from Setiya, it might now be suggested that there are two
kinds of account, one metaphysical, and another which we might dub “concep-
tual”. It might then be suggested that a conceptual account must be capable of
explaining its target concept to someone who lacks it, whereas a metaphysical
account need not be capable of this. Finally it might be suggested that if the
present account of acting is merely metaphysical, then because it is not subject
to the demand of being capable of providing someone with its target concept, it
escapes such complaints as I tried to press — complaints of being an inadequate
account.
Now there are two ways of developing Setiya’s hint further. Assume that
a metaphysical account need not be capable of explaining its target concept
to someone who lacks it. Must such an account be capable of explaining its
target concept at all? If it does, then we should consider whether the account
which Setiya seems to o er does provide explanation. It does not seem to do
so. For even when granting that a metaphysical account need not be capable of
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explaining its target concept to someone who lacks it, the presently proposed
account does not even seem capable of explaining its target concept to someone
who has it: I think I know what acting is, but I do not think what Setiya says
allows me to understand the idea there’s a special kind of causation which never
exists in deviant cases, and always exists in action — indeed I doubt that there’s
such a special kind of causation, if causation is construed along relational lines.
Now assume, instead, that a metaphysical account need not be capable of
explaining its target concept. It might be that when Setiya says that it “does
not matter whether we can explain this kind of causation to someone who lacks
the concept of intentional action” (Setiya, 2003, p. 348), he takes it as given
that, if we can’t explain it to someone who lacks the concept, then we can’t
explain it at all, since the only respectable kind of explanation of a concept is of
the sort that could equip the explainee with it. This assumption is very large,
since it seems to amount to the thought that an explanation of a concept must
take a reductive route — must show a way of constructing the concept out of in-
dependently available materials.11 But the assumption is also very troublesome
when considering the present suggestion for a merely metaphysical account. For
if it is assumed that a philosophical account, when it is merely metaphysical,
need not provide any insight, elucidation or explanation of its target concept,
then what reasonable standard could there be by which to measure it, and what
could be the point of providing a merely metaphysical account? The thought
that explanation need not be involved in metaphysical accounts makes it very
hard to understand the idea that they make up a species of account.
All I want to suggest by the previous is that there does not seem to be a
stable way of maintaining an account without trying to state all the conditions
which this account introduces. Hence a standard causalist must take a more
ambitious line than the above and essentially quietist one: They must attempt
11I will return to this question, in a way, in chapter 5.3.
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to say what makes an action nondeviant, and may not just say that something
does. Next I discuss some prominent attempts to do this.
Begin with Setiya’s own suggestion, that in action, a desire “not only causes
but continues to guide behaviour towards its object”, and that “[i]t is this con-
dition that fails in Davidson’s example” (Setiya, 2007, p. 32). The suggestion
obviously raises the question: What is it for a desire to continuously guide be-
haviour in the intended sense? An uninformative answer would be, for example,
that “for a desire to continuously guide behaviour is for the desire to take part
in the production of an event in such a way that that amounts to acting”. There
are variations of this answer, which still are uninformative, including more con-
voluted answers which specify continuous causation as the kind of causation
that is “characteristic” of actions and not of cases like the mountain climber’s.
They are uninformative because they do nothing to identify the required kind
of continuous guidance, except as a feature which is a mark of actions and not
of deviant cases.
Here is a di erent kind of answer, which is informative: A desire continuously
guides what happens just in case no break or pause is involved in the unfolding
of the event. This is no good, since we can easily imagine a version of Davidson’s
mountain climber who deviantly lets go but does so quickly and smoothly, so
that there is no such break or pause, and since we can imagine versions where
similar pauses (hesitations, momentary stumblings, slips and mistakes) occur
though the climber does act.12
12If someone should respond that there is a specific kind of break that is always present in
deviant cases, so that it is a mark of acting that there is no break of that kind, then something
elucidating must be said about this kind of break, which does not invite the same objection
about uninformativeness as was just raised. One problem for such a response is that, when
there is a type of doing, A, acting in doing which requires that there is no interruption, pause,
breakdown or hiccup of type X, there will very often be another type of thing, B, acting in
doing which requires that there is a break of type X. To illustrate this, we may suppose that
there is a kind of break absence of which is a mark of a climber’s acting in letting go. Maybe
it is necessary that the rope doesn’t unexpectedly slip out of their sweaty hand. We can easily
see that a saboteur could be acting in ensuring that the rope does slip out of the climber’s
hand in just the way considered (by greasing the rope or taunting the climber, perhaps). This
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Next there is a proposal of Mele’s (1992), which introduces “proximate caus-
ation” in place of Setiya’s “continuous guidance”. Sehon’s (1997, pp. 199-202)
persistent attempts to clarify this notion have shown that it encounters a similar
dilemma between uninformativeness and falsity.
For to decide whether a desire proximately causes an event, say, of letting go
of a rope, we need some criterion for whether the things intuitively happening
“in between” the desire and the letting go, such as nervous shakings, constitute
a separate and interfering event or are part of the agent’s letting go. What
then is it to be a separate and interfering event? We could of course say that
interfering events are those that do not contribute to, or are not part of, the
agent’s action. But again, this move would make it uninformative to say that
such proximity is required in action.
On the other hand, we may try to decide by some independent criterion
whether a desire proximately causes what happens. Mele (1992, pp. 201-202)
apparently makes this simple suggestion: For some bit of psychology, A, to
proximately cause an event, C, is for A to initiate the “physiological chain”
that constitutes C (Mele, 1992, pp. 202). This formulation makes obvious the
problem with Mele’s proposal, (observed by Sehon, 1997, p. 201), which is that
for all we know about what it is for an event to initiate some physiological
chain, this condition does not seem to ward o  the deviant outcomes we have
been concerned with. If a desire causes nervousness which causes, for example,
some bit of bodily movement, then there is every prospect for claiming that
the nervousness and the movement together constitute a “physiological chain”,
initiated by the desire, and Mele’s observations on the matter do little to tell us
seems to show that, to work, the present response needs to relativise the kind of break that
makes for deviance to the thoughts or plans of the acting subject. But that would seem to
require a departure from Standard Causalism, since it would seemingly amount to introducing
a notion of acting according to plan, or of correspondence between thought and action, which
itself excludes deviant cases.
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why they should not so count.13
I now move on to a more sophisticated way of accounting for deviance, which,
on closer inspection, falls prey to the same simple form of criticism. Authors
like Peacocke (1979), Bishop (1989) and Smith (2012) have said that in deviant
cases, there is something accidental about the causal connection between desire
and event. And they have tried, to various extents, to explain the contrast
between deviance and action as a contrast between what non-accidentally hap-
pens and what accidentally happens. Peacocke has gone furthest in trying to
express what the requisite notion of non-accidentality comes to. He has emerged
with the notion of di erential explanation. If I understand Peacocke’s notion of
di erential explanation, and the way in which it is supposed to apply to action,
his proposal is as follows (and I will ignore that Peacocke prefers stating his
theory in terms of intentions rather than desires, since in this context nothing
seems to hinge on their possible di erence):
Di erential Explanation For a given desire to di erentially explain a given
bit of activity is for there to be a true law of nature which poses a suitably
robust explanatory relationship between a kind to which the desire belongs
and a kind to which the activity belongs. (Peacocke, 1979, pp. 63-71)14
Peacocke’s discussion of what makes for such an explanatory relationship between
kinds is quite involved, and therefore hard to readily assess. The rough idea
seems to be that two kinds stand in this robust explanatory relationship just in
case there is a true law of nature which contains a function, in mathematical
13Sehon goes further than I do in engaging with the possible epicycles that might be tacked
on to Mele’s suggestion, including prohibiting a list of abnormal circumstances, requiring
“normal circumstances”, and requiring “continuous causation” (Sehon, 1997, pp. 201-203).
The first two ideas seem fairly obviously ine ective in their own right, meeting with standard
objections about the infinity of the requisite lists, and the futility of attempting to say what
normal circumstances are. The last I have already criticised.
14See Sehon (1997) for what I think is the clearest discussion of Peacocke’s notion of di er-
ential explanation. My understanding of Peacocke is greatly indebted to Sehon, but as will be
seen below I will endeavour to provide a criticism di erent from Sehon’s, targeting the stage
in Peacocke’s theory where he introduces the notion of realisation.
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style, to the e ect that, if there is an occurrence of the first kind, there is, or
will be caused to be, one of the second (Peacocke, 1979, p. 66). There are more
shades and puzzling features to Peacocke’s view than this, but it is, in fact, not
necessary to treat the notion of di erential explanation at much length, since
my upcoming criticism does not concern whether desires di erentially explain
the events that are actions. For in fact Peacocke does not make this claim, but
makes the relationship between di erential explanation and causation by desire
more complicated. This further bit of complication is my target.15
For imagine that, on discovering the di erential explanation conditino, Pea-
cocke were to suppose this:
Causalism plus Di erential Explanation N acts in Aing just in case N has
a desire that represents N as Aing (in a sense such that N can A and
represent N as Aing without N’s acting in Aing) and this desire causes N
to A (in a sense such that this desire could cause N to A without N acting
in Aing) and that N has this desire di erentially explains that N is Aing
The problem with such a proposal is the Davidsonian commonplace that there is
no suitably robust explanatory relationship which could make the above thesis
true. For example, there does not seem to be any robust explanatory relation-
ship between wanting to turn on a light and a light being turned on, because
of the multifarious opportunities for weakness of will, conflicts of interest, con-
fusion, lack of knowledge about available means, not to speak of physical mal-
function, sudden death, simple temporary disinterest, or procrastination. The
results of this seems disappointing: Even if the condition that N’s desire dif-
ferentially explains what N does could rule out deviance (a claim we have not
15An advantage of this criticism is that it would seem just as applicable if Peacocke had gone
for some other account of the sought-after, non-accidental dependence of action on desire. So
the criticism would have applied just as well if Peacocke had attempted to account for such non-
accidental connections by saying that in them, the occurrence of an action counterfactually
depends on the presence of desire, or if he had said that actions but not deviant outcomes are
predictable by appeal to the presence of a desire.
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even considered), it could not figure in a satisfactory account of action, since
the resulting account would make the relationship between wanting and acting
more mechanical or sure-fire than it plausibly is.16
The points in the previous paragraph are familiar to Peacocke. They seem
to be the reason why he adds the following twist to his theory: It is not such
facts as that N wants to A that must di erentially explain N’s Aing when N is
acting in doing it, but rather such facts as that N is in some physiological state,
which in turn realises N’s desire.17 And for a brain state to realise a desire is
for the desire and the brain state share causes and e ects (Peacocke, 1979, pp.
116-124). Hence in so far as Peacocke’s account is meant to solve the problem
of deviant causal chains, it seems fair to represent it as follows:
Peacocke’s Causalism N acts in Aing just in case N has a desire that rep-
resents N as Aing (in a sense such that N can A and represent N as Aing
without N’s acting in Aing) and this desire causes N to A (in a sense such
that this desire could cause N to A without N acting in Aing) and there is
a brain state which di erentially explains N’s Aing, and this brain state
shares causes and e ects with N’s aforementioned desire
Several theorists have queried the idea of di erential explanation that Peacocke
introduces, but I think a clearer objection can be made by shifting attention to
the idea that a brain state shares causes and e ects with a desire. For suppose
that we have isolated some brain state which — whatever precisely this amounts
to — stands in Peacocke’s di erential explanation relation to some event. We
then immediately face an issue which seems to come to an insurmountable prob-
lem: How is Peacocke’s theory supposed to tell us when a brain state shares
16Of course someone might endorse a version of Peacocke’s claims that does not model
the requisite robust dependence of action on desire on a mathematical function. But the
problem is that we have no clear grasp of such an alternative model, much less of how it could
contribute to solving the problem of deviant causal chains.
17See Bishop (1987); Sehon (1997); Peacocke (1979, pp. 69-70) for further discussion of
realisation.
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causes and e ects with a desire, so that we can go on to declare that this theory
has the result that the event is an action? Peacocke does not seem to give us a
clear answer to this question.18
I believe the reason why Peacocke does not answer it is that he can’t. For
this question raises the previous kind of dilemma again, although in a more
roundabout way. On the one side, we could say things like “the brain state
shares causes and e ects with a desire when the event it di erentially explains is
an action”, or more convolutedly, “the brain state shares causes and e ects with
a desire when it shares causes and e ects with the kind of psychological state
such that, when it causes an event (and other conditions, like the di erential
explanation condition, hold), the event is an action”, but these answers do not
contribute to an informative account of non-deviance.
The alternative is to come up with an action-independent way of getting hold
of desires, and to check whether any desires we thus get hold of share causes
and e ects with Peacocke’s di erentially explanatory brain states. Our options
are many. We could identify desires, with Lewis (1966; 1972), as theoretical
entities that fit folk-psychological platitudes about desiring. We could identify
them, with Humeans like Sinhababu (2009), as a kind of felt emotions. Or we
could identify them, with functionalists, as those states of the organism which
tend to produce certain outcomes on certain stimuli (Levin, 2013).
The list of possibilities obviously goes on (including combinations of the
above and any further proposals), but it does not seem to matter which pos-
sibility we pursue. For it seems perfectly possible for there to be cases where a
brain state di erentially explains what happens in Peacocke’s sense (whatever
precisely di erential explanation entails), and where, in addition, this brain
18At a key moment in laying out the idea of realisation, Peacocke says that “any causes or
e ects of a human being’s having a belief, desire or intention will be causes and e ects of his
brain’s being in a certain state” (Peacocke, 1979, p. 118). This says nothing about what it
means for some desire to share causes and e ects with some brain state, and thus it does not
answer our question, but presupposes an answer to it.
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state shares causes and e ects with any such independently specified “desires”,
but where, still, what happens does not amount to acting.
For example, we could imagine that Davidson’s mountain climber lets go of a
rope, and a brain state di erentially explains this, and that brain state perfectly
realises some emotion (by the standards of Humeans, the felt emotion is exactly
like that felt when wanting to act), or that it perfectly fits the folk-psychological
profile for desiring to let go (by the standards of the folk, the behaviour is just
what they expect of someone “wanting” to let go of a rope), or that it perfectly
instantiates a functional state thought to realise such a desire (the agent is in
just the sort of state — a functional state of nervousness, as it were — that
would tend to produce such an outcome in the present kind of condition), or
— why not — that all of the above conditions hold, as we might have done
all along, depending on how we imagined Davidson’s mountain climber. The
climber still might not act in letting go of the rope.19
What can be learned from the fact that Setiya’s, Mele’s and Peacocke’s
accounts fail in similar ways? There is a temptation to argue from the fact
that a single and fairly mechanical kind of objection seems to undermine these
accounts, to the conclusion that it is impossible to come up with a successor
account which avoids the objection. But though the failures are suggestive, no
such general pessimistic conclusion seems to follow from the failures of a few
attempts, nor does an inductive argument along the same lines seem convin-
cing.20 In the end I am not sure how to give any sort of conclusive argument
19Sehon (1997, p. 211) notes, I think, that Peacocke doesn’t do anything to show this sort
of case to be impossible.
20Wilson attempts to argue directly from the failures of extant versions of Standard Caus-
alism to the failure of any possible successors. His argument can seem inductive, since he says
that “the evidence points to more than infelicity or incompleteness in the various causalist
proposals – it points, that is, to a global breakdown in the whole project of reduction” (Wilson,
1989, p. 258). One weakness of such an argument is that any reasonably short discussion is
bound to introduce only a few causalist proposals, so that we might say that the inductive
base is weak. Another weakness is that even a big inductive base would give meagre reason
for favouring the “hypothesis” that there are zero true versions of Standard Causalism over
the hypothesis that there is one, which of course is all that any sensible standard causalist
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for such pessimism.
So I propose, instead, to challenge those who think that there must be
some such account. Why think that? Given the failures of extant proposals,
I do not know of a better argument than one which proceeds, somewhat in
Davidson’s style, from a lack of good alternatives. But this means that the
existence of a good alternative would leave us little reason to believe in a second
coming of Standard Causalism. This makes it seem dialectically unavoidable
to double check whether a satisfactory alternative couldn’t be developed. So
let us continue building on the alternative suggestion from the first chapter,
which does not proceed by invoking relations, but tries, instead, to explain the
di erence between those doings which are actions and those which are not.
2.3 Acting as Exercising a Disposition
As Frankfurt (1978, p. 162) has pointed out, the question of what it is for a
subject to act, as opposed to merely doing something which is similar to acting
(as happens in the mountain climber example), seems analogous to the question
of what it is for a spider to move its legs, as opposed to doing something which
is not but mimics such leg movement (as happens if someone manipulates its
legs with strings). Frankfurt does not do very much to answer either question,
but suggests that, since both concern contrasts between “instances in which
purposive behavior is attributable to a creature as agent and instances in which
this is not the case” (Frankfurt, 1978, p. 164), both questions ought to be
answered by appeal to some general way of elucidating such contrasts.
Though Frankfurt is not explicit on this point, there seems to be a multitude
of further examples of the same kind of question, concerning the same kind of
contrast. Setiya (2011b, p. 137) suggests several questions which seem to be
will claim.
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on a par with Frankfurt’s, including the question of what it is for a flower to
bloom, as opposed to doing something which isn’t but mimics blooming (as
happens if something forces its petals to open).21 Despite Frankfurt’s talk of
“creatures” and “purposiveness”, such questions do not even seem limited to
the activities of life forms. For as Alvarez and Hyman (1998, pp. 243-245)
emphasise, some seemingly analogous contrasts seem to apply to the activities
of the inanimate, inviting such questions as what it is for iron to rust, as opposed
to doing something which isn’t but mimics rusting (as I suppose would happen
if, through some odd process, bits of iron get gradually replaced by bits of rust).
Frankfurt’s brief pronouncements suggest that some one general strategy
might be developed to explain how such things as acting, moving, blooming
and rusting might be distinguished from their decoy counterparts. And his hint
is that in the former but not the latter cases, behaviour is “attributable” to
the subject in question. But taken on its own this hint does not provide much
insight. For the most natural interpretation of it is that, in the former but not
the latter cases, the pertinent subject is doing something. And while it is true
that, in moving its own legs, a spider is doing something, it seems equally true
that our manipulated spider is doing something: It must at least be yielding to
the strings that force its legs to move.
It might now seem tempting to reply that self-movement is a doing of a
di erent kind than manipulation-yielding, and to suggest that by circumscribing
the former, their contrasting natures might be elucidated. And it is true that
these are di erent kinds of doing, discernible in all manner of ways: A spider’s
own movements have a typical causal history (inside the spider’s body), typical
outcomes (pursuing the spider’s goals), and occur in typical settings (ones not
involving strings pulling the spider’s legs), and these things are not typical of
21Setiya (2011b, p. 154, n. 18) acknowledges complementary suggestions by Thompson
(2008) and Alvarez and Hyman (1998).
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the considered sort of spider manipulation. But this is far from showing that by
describing a combination of such symptoms we could fashion a clear and general
criterion, including all sorts of self-movement, and excluding all possible odd
ways of manipulating a spider’s limbs.22 And this latter suggestion seems much
less credible. The mistake in it seems, by the way, analogous to the mistake of
supposing that those doings which are an agent’s actions are to be distinguished
by some clear-cut overt mark, in the way that a facial expression’s being sad
might be.23
Neither will it do, I think, to try to answer any of our four questions by
appeal to some notion of being active, as opposed to being passive. Alvarez and
Hyman (1998, pp. 243-245) may be right when they suggest that non-deviant
mountain climbers, like rusting pieces of iron, are agents of the pertinent out-
comes, whereas their mimicking counterparts are not. But if this suggestion is
to explain these contrasts, then of course something needs to be said about this
sense of agency. This notion must go beyond the mere notion of doing something,
since every considered subject is doing something in every considered case. But
as before, the notion cannot simply be defined by trying to characterise some
overt mark which distinguishes these “agential doings” from “mere doings”. And
its proponent cannot fruitfully fall back on the Frankfurtian rhetoric of attribut-
ability, saying that a subject’s being active in producing an outcome is a matter
22Similarly, we may say that for a piece of iron to rust (as opposed to meticulously having
a thin outer layer replaced with rust particles) is for a specific chemical process, presumably
involving iron and oxygen, to occur in that piece of iron. Similarly, we may say that for a flower
to bloom is for some process involving saps and light and I don’t know what to drive its petals
apart in a way that presumably runs along the lines of its recent evolutionary predecessors.
But again these observations do not seem to help us make up a clear criterion which answers
to the Frankfurtian challenge.
23Here I am alluding to Anscombe’s (1963, p. 30) attempt to undermine the suggestion that
acting is to be distinguished by some characteristic, in the way that a sad expression might
be. The way in which this suggestion arises in Anscombe’s discussion is of course di erent
from the way in which it arises in mine, and Anscombe has a sophisticated but somewhat
obscure strategy for undermining this suggestion, which I do not pursue here. All I am saying
is that the suggestion Anscombe wants to undermine is analogous to the suggestion that a
spider’s self-movement is constituted by some very general notion of movement plus some
further characteristic of such movement.
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of that outcome being attributable to this subject, since this is the notion we
started out needing to elucidate.
In their talk of being active, Alvarez and Hyman do however make multiple
appeals to the notion of a power, and the associated notion of exercising a
power. Hyman has later suggested that the deviant causal chain problem “is
not a problem about desires in particular, [but] about dispositions and powers in
general” (Hyman, 2014, p. 18). The suggestion seems to be that we can identify
the elusive notion of something’s being active in producing an outcome — and
thereby, I think, the Frankfurtian notion of this happening being attributable to
this subject — by saying that the subject in question possesses a disposition,
and that the outcome in question is the exercise of that disposition. This line
is, I think, promising. But Hyman does not make explicit what this notion of
exercising a disposition comes to.
In making sense of this suggestion, we face an immediate hurdle in that
there seem to be two main ways of developing it. On one understanding, the
idea would be that the simple generic notion of exercising a disposition applies in
each of the four cases we’ve been concerned with, and none of the corresponding
mimicking cases, thereby neatly explaining the elusive relationship which exists
between an agent and their action but which is not exemplified in deviant out-
comes. On another understanding, the generic notion of exercising a disposition
is not enough to explain this relationship. For on this second understanding,
we need, for the case of action as for each other case raised, to appeal to the
idea that what happens is an exercise of a particular kind of disposition. I want
to pursue this latter approach. But first I want to say what is unsatisfactory
about the first.
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2.3.1 Exercising a Disposition
Someone might think that, because the problem of distinguishing acting from
deviantly doing is an instance of a more general problem of distinguishing exer-
cising a disposition from doing something that mimics that, all that is needed to
solve the former problem is some general conception of exercising a disposition.
Such thoughts seem to be suggested by some passages in the writings of Mele
and Thalberg,24 and may be reinforced by reading a brief pronouncement on
part of Setiya (2011b).25 The sort of theory resulting from such a thought would
24Given the provisional way in which the points are made, it is time-consuming and po-
tentially unproductive to pin the below form of account to these authors. But here I make
the beginnings of an attempt at such an interpretation. Mele, drawing some inspiration from
Thalberg (1984), proclaims that “causal accounts of what it is for an action to be intentional
(unlike causal accounts of what it is for an event to be an action) cannot be falsified by way-
wardly caused nonactions” (Mele, 1992, p. 224, n. 4). Mele’s suggestion is clearly that there is
some one general notion which precludes deviance but which may be innocently presupposed
in an account of acting (or, in his corresponding terms, acting intentionally). It is less clear
what Mele means by “action”. But given Thalberg’s sparse comments on the matter, it is
at least reasonable to think that it is some notion of what happens being due to the acting
subject — still in a sense that a theory of intentional action can comfortably take for granted:
[T]he causal theory we are talking about presupposes that we can at least in
practice usually di erentiate, among episodes of human behavior generically
speaking, those special cases of behavior which rank as action. When someone’s
body moves, we are normally able to decide whether they moved their body.
(Thalberg, 1984, p. 249)
This notion of agent-due behaviour might, if only because it is so vague, be identified with the
notion of being an exercise of a subject’s disposition. If it is not identified with that notion, I
do not understand which notion it might be.
25Setiya there sketches a proposal which seems structurally similar to Mele’s and Thalberg’s.
This time, feeling reasonably confident about the intent of Setiya’s formulations, I have opted
to make some terminological adjustments to avoid confusion:
[O]ur question is not whether [...] we can say what it is for the flower to open
its petals (rather than having them opened by something else or by accident)
in terms that do not presuppose its doing anything. The point is that doing
something is a completely general topic in the metaphysics of agency whose
generality is obscured by the restriction of ‘agency’ to rational agents. Call it
‘agency’ or not, there is such a thing as the exercise of a power or capacity by an
object, inanimate or otherwise, about which we can ask: can this be explained
in other terms? Someone who answers no, and therefore helps himself to the
idea of [exercising a disposition], may nonetheless insist on a reductive account
of what it is to [act]. This would be a causal-psychological theory of [action]
without a causal theory of [exercising a disposition]; and it is the kind of the
causal theory defended here. (Setiya, 2011b, p. 137)
But Setiya does not seem to think that this meaningfully contributes to solving the problem
of deviant causal chains. He rather seems to think that it contributes to solving Velleman’s
version of the problem of disappearing agents. However, even on this count I find the usefulness
of this two-factor view dubious. As I have argued in footnote 9 on page 20, Velleman’s question
can be disambiguated into two questions. Neither seems very well answered by the present
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have the following shape:
Standard Causalism + Dispositionalism N acts in Aing just in case N has
a desire that represents N as Aing (in a sense such that N can A and
represent N as Aing without N’s acting in Aing) and this desire causes N
to A (in a sense such that this desire could cause N to A without N acting
in Aing) and N’s Aing is an exercise of a disposition on part of N
The problem with this proposal is that, because the invoked notion of exercising
a disposition is generic, the account makes no real headway with the problem
of deviant causal chains. A subject can apparently exercise some disposition to
A, and conform to standard causalism’s conditions with respect to their Aing,
and still not act in Aing. Davidson’s climber example seems to show this with
just slight elaboration, since it conforms to standard causalism’s conditions, and
since, in addition to this, letting go of a rope because of a nervously loose grip
apparently amounts to exercising some disposition to let go of such ropes.26
suggestion. If Velleman’s question is read as Nagel’s concern about identifying an agent
within a flux of events, bringing in the agent and their capacities might be a promising start
for answering it, but it is not clear how this suggestion, on its own, can explain in what
sense agents are the doers of their actions (though perhaps it can explain some more general
sense in which agents are doers). If Velleman’s question is supposed to concern “that which
distinguishes human action from other animal behaviour” (Velleman, 1992, p. 462), then it is
not clear how Setiya’s introduction of the generic idea of exercising a disposition answers it,
since humans and animals alike seem to exercise dispositions in acting.
26Analogous remarks seem applicable to the other considered cases. The generic idea of
exercising a disposition is not much use, on its own, in saying when a spider moves its own
legs, since even if someone manipulates a spider’s legs with strings, the spider’s resulting
movements may be described, in a contrived but basically kosher manner of speaking, as
an exercise of some disposition on part of the spider (like the tensility of its legs). Lewis
(1997, p. 155) apparently would take the contrary view that, in such a case, it is not the
spider’s dispositions that are manifest, because the spider’s “intrinsic causal bases” are not
involved. Lewis does not give an argument for this restriction, and it is not so clear to me
what an intrinsic causal base is supposed to be. Below I ignore Lewis’s view on the matter,
but hold out some hope that Lewis’s dispositions might be identified simply as a subset of my
dispositions — as those which, for some more or less principled reason, are judged to be more
deeply grounded in the features of their subjects.
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2.3.2 Exercising a Kind of Disposition
Our first thought was that acting, like blooming, involves exercising a disposi-
tion. But our second realisation was that the mimicking counterparts of acting
and blooming involve exercising dispositions as well. Hence it can seem that
the first thought does not contribute to separating acting and blooming from
their mimicking counterparts. But there remains a possible way of drawing out
the di erence between the first pair of notions and the second pair, which still
makes a fundamental appeal to the notion of exercising a disposition.
For having noted that there is some sense in which, say, the nervous moun-
tain climber who deviantly lets go of a rope exercises a disposition (and even a
disposition to let go), it still seems irresistible to qualify this, and say that, al-
though the nervous mountain climber does exercise some disposition (subserved
in part by their nervousness), they do not exercise the kind of disposition which
is exercised in action. Similarly, it might be that a manipulated flower exer-
cises some of its propensities, but it does not seem to exercise the same sorts
of propensities that are involved in blooming. And similar observations seem to
apply for the other considered cases.
So let’s conjecture that, although we cannot understand what it is to act by
pairing the generic notion of exercising a disposition with further separate no-
tions, we can understand it as exercising a disposition of a kind. The conjecture
is that, for some kind of disposition, exercising it is acting. Analogously, suppose
that blooming, moving and rusting are exercises, respectively, of three further
kinds of disposition. In a way, this gives a rather direct answer to Frankfurt’s
problem of telling
the di erence between what goes on when a spider moves its legs
in making its way along the ground, and what goes on when its
legs move in similar patterns and with similar e ect because they
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are manipulated by a boy who has managed to tie strings to them.
(Frankfurt, 1978, p. 162)
For it answers this question, not by distinguishing the overt characteristics of
the two kinds of leg movement, but by saying that what goes on when a spider
moves its legs is an exercise of a particular kind of disposition on part of the
spider — a disposition which is not exercised (and perhaps not even present)
in the case where someone manipulates the spider’s legs with strings. Similarly,
to Frankfurt’s question of what the di erence is “between the sort of event that
occurs when a person raises his arm and the sort that occurs when his arm goes
up without his raising it” (Frankfurt, 1978, p. 162), we may answer that the
first kind of raising but not the second is an exercise of some pertinent kind of
disposition on the part of this person.
But as direct as the above answers to Frankfurt’s questions might be, they
are also incomplete. Completing them requires expressing, for each case of the
above sort, which kind of disposition it is that is exercised in one case and not
in the other. That requires, in turn, a serviceable conception of how to divide
dispositions into kinds, and equally a serviceable conception of what it means
for those dispositions we’re concerned with to be exercised. But there is, at
least, a readily available way to divide dispositions into kinds, which may with
slight elaboration be supplemented with a conception of what it is to exercise
a disposition of some kind. To see this, start with a widely held view of the
nature of dispositions, largely due to Ryle (1949). The view is as follows:
Vague Conditionalism For N to be disposed to A in condition C is for N to
be the type of subject that, if condition C obtains, N will A.
There are, of course, many debates about the nature of dispositions. But most
of the disagreements embodied in these debates should not, I think, be con-
strued as concerning the truth of Vague Conditionalism. Theorists working on
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dispositions tend to take it for granted, as a starting point of their enquiries,
that “[s]tatements ascribing causal dispositions or powers are somehow linked
to (strict or strong) conditional statements” (Martin, 1994, p. 2), that (in other
words) “disposition ascriptions have something to do with conditionals” (Fara,
2005, p. 46), or that “there is some connection between dispositional properties
and counterfactual conditionals” (Choi, 2008, p. 795). This is not enough to
show that all endorse Vague Conditionalism. But I think it can be shown, at
least, that one especially prominent and deep disagreement about dispositions
can be understood as a debate between parties who accept Vague Conditional-
ism:
Some, like Choi (2008), account for a thing’s dispositions by appeal to
straightforward conditional facts about what the thing would do if a given
condition obtained. So they seem to think that dispositions correspond to ex-
ceptionless generalisations concerning what subjects would do in some possible
conditions. The viability of Choi’s theory is not my present concern. My point
is only that a theory like Choi’s is not a rejection of Vague Conditionalism, but
just a particular way of understanding that thesis, which views its apparent
conditional as an actual and straightforward conditional.
One apparently compelling ground for questioning Choi’s kind of view is
that a thing can have a disposition, and that the condition associated with
the conditional can obtain, although — perhaps because there are preventing
circumstances — the subject with the disposition remains inert (Fara, 2005, p.
61). But having claimed that straight conditionals won’t do, such a theorist will
be likely to introduce something which is very much like a conditional except in
allowing for such cases of inertia. Someone might, for example, say that having
a disposition is being such as to do a pertinent thing when some condition
obtains unless there are abnormal or interfering circumstances. Or it might be
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suggested that having a disposition is being such that, in most possible cases
where a condition obtains, the subject with the disposition will go on to do
a given thing. Each such proposal can be seen as a way of endorsing Vague
Conditionalism, while trying to improve on Choi’s understanding of the force
of the apparent conditional that figures in this thesis.
Fara’s own approach is more sophisticated. It proceeds by introducing ha-
bituals, such as are employed when we say that a certain bird migrates during
summer or that someone eats two portions when there’s dinner (Fara, 2005, p.
66). Someone else might have stopped there, simply identifying the fact that
someone has a particular kind of disposition with the idea that some habitual
is true of them. Again, this would be a way to conform to Vague Conditional-
ism, elaboraing on it in yet another way. But Fara does not stop with such an
account. To him, a subject that has a disposition must not only make such a
habitual true, but must make it true in virtue of possessing some intrinsic prop-
erty (Fara, 2005, pp. 69-70). Whether or not the resulting account is deemed
plausible, it seems that it, like the previous suggestions, is a way or providing
sense to, rather than a way of refuting, Vague Conditionalism, this time viewing
its apparent conditional as constituted by a habitual claim which sets certain
extra demands on the subject which it is about.
Hopefully this brief excursus is enough to provide some assurance that Vague
Conditionalism is an uncontroversial thesis about dispositions. In any case,
assuming this thesis a ords us with information about what it is to exercise a
kind of disposition. For assume that a Rylean, conditional-esque statement, is
true of a subject. Perhaps it is true of a piece of glass that, if struck, it will
shatter. We may then say that this piece of glass is disposed to break when
struck, and thereby that it possesses a certain kind of fragile disposition. Now
what is it for this piece of glass to exercise this kind of fragile disposition?
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Minimally, the antecedent of the Rylean conditional must obtain (the piece of
glass must, in fact, be subjected to a strike, or — depending on just how the
details of the account are worked out — have been struck), and the consequent
must of course be true as well (the piece of glass must be breaking).27
Since we have proposed to define each of the four kinds of doing we are
presently concerned with as exercises of pertinent dispositions, this means that,
if something is doing any of these things, then a pertinent Rylean conditional
(exceptionless or not), must be true of the subject doing it, and, further, the
antecedent of that conditional must obtain. So if a spider is moving its own
limbs, then such a conditional must be true of the spider (perhaps the condi-
tional is that the spider is such that if it perceives such-and-such event with
relevance to its spider interests, then it will move its limbs), and the antecedent
of that conditional must be true as well (things must be such that the spider
does perceive an event of that type).
This defends the idea that spider movement is di erent from spider manipu-
lation, since now we can see that the former but not the latter requires a Rylean
conditional to be true of the spider (a dead spider, not such that it would move
if the perceptual condition obtained, could of course still be manipulated with
strings as a live one might be), and that the former but not the latter kind of
movement requires that the condition associated with this disposition obtains
(a spider which did not register its web as being shaken could still be made
to move as if in response to such shaking, but could not exercise the pertinent
disposition).
And we may extend this approach by introducing similar Rylean conditionals
27A di cult issue remains over whether, if a piece of glass is disposed to break when struck,
it could be struck and break without exercising the pertinent disposition. If that is possible,
then exercising that disposition could not be given a straightforward definition in terms of
possessing it, being struck, and breaking. But this need not concern us here, since we are not
trying to give an account of what it is for some disposition to be exercised, but rather assuming
the notion of exercising a kind of disposition, and examining what this notion entails.
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in the hope of capturing each further kind of exercise, thereby distinguishing
each further kind of process from its decoy counterpart:
Movement For a spider to move its own legs is for it to exercise a disposition
to move its legs when an associated condition obtains (plausibly that the
spider perceives such-and-such)
Blooming For a flower to bloom is for it to exercise a disposition to bloom
when an associated condition obtains (plausibly that there is some light
for some length of time)
Rusting For a piece of iron to rust is for it to exercise a disposition to rust
when an associated condition obtains (plausibly that the iron encounters
oxygen)
The parentheses contain suggestions for how to state the condition associated
with each kind of disposition. There is room for debate about how to sharpen
or adjust these. Here I am more trying to illustrate an approach to answering
Frankfurtian questions than provide a very full and fine-grained answer to each
Frankfurtian question that might be raised. (After all, this is not a thesis about
what it is, for example, for something to be rusting.) The general approach
is to identify each kind of process as the exercise of a kind of disposition, and
each kind of disposition by appeal to an associated condition, thereby exposing
how, because mimicking counterparts of these kinds of doing do not require
these dispositions, nor that the associated conditions obtain, they are di erent
in kind from these doings.
Assume, now, that an answer along these lines could be given for the case
of action, so as to finally show what distinguishes someone who is acting in
letting go of a rope from someone who deviantly happens to let go of it, and
also someone who is acting in raising their arm from someone whose arm is
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raised by some external force, and any other case of acting from any other such
mimicking case which someone might come up with. Acting must hence be
understood as the consequent of a conditional of the kind which describes a
disposition. The consequent of the conditional must simply be that someone
is acting. But what condition could plausibly figure as the antecedent of such
a conditional? Inspired by Anscombe, but also, in a way, by the Davidsonian
tradition, I propose the condition that the subject who is acting believes they
are acting. Hence the proposal takes on the following shape:
Acting For N to act in Aing is for N to exercise a disposition to act in Aing in
conditions where N believes that N is acting in Aing
Somewhat in line, for example, with Coope (2007), I propose to call the kind
of disposition named by Acting a desire. In one swoop this will defend the
attractive thought that someone lacking in dispositions to do something could
hardly be said to want to do it, and the nearly undeniable thought that a desire
can only give rise to an action in the presence of a belief that represents the
wanted course of action (Hyman, 2014, p. 4). I think that calling the presently
described kind of disposition a desire is useful in more ways, both for making
the dispositionalist account seem more familiar than it might otherwise, and for
underpinning more philosophical instincts about the nature of desire and the
way it comes together with a belief to produce an action.28
Aside from any further suspicions one might have about the truth or use-
fulness of Acting, it is quite clear that it solves the problem of deviant causal
chains when this problem is construed as a Frankfurtian problem of distinguish-
ing acting from happening to do something which is similar to acting, but is
28I suspect, for example, that the issue of whether and how weakness of will is possible can
now be fruitfully viewed as a question of whether a desire’s condition can obtain without the
desire being exercised (without, that is, the agent acting on it), making this into a specific
instance of a more general problem of whether and how it is possible for any disposition’s
condition to obtain without the disposition being exercised (something known as “masking”
in the literature on dispositions).
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not that. For now we may say not only that acting is exercising a particular
kind of disposition, unlike doing something which mimics acting, but that acting
requires a subject to want to act, and also to believe that they are acting, as
hardly seems necessary in the mimicking cases. An unconscious subject, lacking
a desire to let go of a rope, could still let go of a rope in the way that the
nervous mountain climber deviantly does, but could not act in doing it. A con-
scious subject, wanting to perform an action of letting go of a rope, but unaware
of doing so, could not act in letting go of a rope, but could let go of it in the
deviant way.
This solution to the Frankfurtian problem is just another instance of the form
of solution sketched for the other cases. The general form of such solutions is
to say that, because a certain kind of doing only counts as happening when
it is an exercise of a certain kind of disposition, and therefore only where the
condition that triggers this disposition is satisfied, occurrences which do not
place such requirements are not of this kind. But each concrete proposal for
how to individuate a disposition might be questioned. For example, does a
spider that is moving its own legs really have to have a disposition the triggering
condition of which is somehow perceptual? I will ignore such questions as they
pertain to spiders and the rest. But in the next chapter I will argue, in support
of Acting, that the present kind of disposition, and the present kind of condition,
are constitutive of action. In the course of so arguing I will also endeavour to
clarify the belief condition which gives sense to Acting.
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Chapter 3
Doing What’s Believed
3.1 Introduction
The starting point of this chapter is the following pair of thoughts: Acting
is exercising a desire, and a desire is a disposition to do what practical belief
represents in the presence of such a belief. It argues that these thoughts can
only be defended by adopting a third: Whatever a practical belief represents
its subject as doing, it represents this subject as acting in doing it. This third
thought comes with a methodological moral: Because practical belief figures in
any satisfactory account of action, and because action figures as the object of
practical belief, there can be no account of action which is not circular.
We then need to say something about the object of practical belief that
goes beyond the bare claim that it represents its subject as acting in doing
what they’re doing. My method for drawing out further commitments about
the object of practical belief is considering various objections to the bare claim,
and showing how it needs to be understood for these objections to miss their
mark. This results in the three claims that practical belief is imperfective, in
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that it represents its subject’s action as ongoing, and causal, in that it represents
an ongoing action as a matter of doing something which causally contributes
to it, and part-homogeneous, in that it represents these causally contributing
happenings as further actions.
3.2 Practical Belief
Our attempt to understand action through desire, desire as a special kind of
disposition, and this kind of disposition through its association with a belief
about what’s done, has led us to the claim that whenever an agent acts in doing
something, they are aware of doing that (Anscombe, 1963, p. 25). In order for
this belief condition to make good on this dispositionalist account, the condition
needs to be developed in such a way that no one can act without satisfying
the condition, and so that no one can satisfy the condition, and exercise the
associated disposition to do what is represented by the belief that figures in it,
without acting. What sort of belief could have this dual role?
I propose that, to complete the dispositionalist account, it is both required
and helpful to introduce, in the role of a desire’s condition, a belief that repres-
ents its subject is acting in Aing. This condition clearly provides for the need
to make exercising a desire without acting impossible. For of course no one can
verify a representation of themselves as acting without acting, and hence no one
can exercise a disposition to verify such a representation in its presence without
acting. This is how the account maintains the advantage of making counter-
examples in the style of deviant causal chain cases impossible. (Unwitting or
deviant watering of flowers can’t correspond to a representation of someone as
acting in watering flowers, and hence can’t amount to exercising the kind of
disposition at issue)
But is it really true that, in acting, a subject must believe they’re acting?
68
After all, it has appeared false to a number of philosophers that a subject must
even believe they’re doing whatever they’re acting in doing. And at any rate,
just what does it mean to say that, to act in doing something, a subject must
believe they’re acting in doing it? This pair of questions can be combined into
a challenge: What is it to believe someone is acting in doing something, such
that anyone who acts believes this about themselves? This is the question I
want to answer in this chapter. I will do it by considering several objections to
the claim that a belief about acting is a precondition for acting, all apparently
built on top of counterexamples, and by showing a way to think of the object
of a practical belief which allows the thesis to avoid the counterexamples.
Before going on to do this, I want to say why it is necessary. Does the emer-
ging account require introducing the idea, not only that some understanding
of what one is doing is necessary for acting in doing it, but also that, if one is
acting in doing something, one must believe this very fact? I think the answer
to this question must be positive. It is true that some other kind of belief, which
doesn’t represent its subject as acting, might have the feature of being omni-
present in action. But because it is always possible to have such a belief and
verify it without acting,1 it will always be possible to exercise a disposition to
satisfy such a belief in its presence without acting. For that reason we could not
rework our dispositionalist account to be founded on any such weaker condition.
Sensing that, in introducing a belief specifically about acting, we have aban-
doned some implicit methodological constraint, someone could now pointedly
ask why we should not go further, by doing without a belief condition and bak-
1It should be obvious from previous lines of investigation that we can’t reform the weaker
belief condition in such a way that satisfaction of such a belief will be su cient for action,
since, for example, there’s no way of Aing that seems so much as necessary for acting in Aing
(except the “way” of Aing which is acting in Aing), and since seemingly no kind of causal route
from a belief about Aing to Aing which will guarantee acting (since attempts to formulate
a su cient condition by talking about causal relations (in an action-independent sense) are
either false or versions of the mysticism-exemplifying claim that acting is distinguished by an
unknown feature that is specific to acting).
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ing the relevant constraints into our desire condition, or by taking the reverse
approach and leaving desire out of the picture. Taking the first line, one might
say that a desire is a kind of disposition to act, whatever the condition is in
which a desire manifests.2 This claim, bare as it is, seems true to me, and is a
consequence of the account I favour. But on its own it gives us no hold of which
kind of disposition it is that manifests in action. The account I favour allows us
to say that it is a kind of disposition which is exercised when its subject believes
they’re acting.
Suggesting, instead, the second line, someone could say that to act in Aing
is to think one is acting in Aing in a case where this belief is true. As is quite
obvious, this is also a consequence of my account. But without the introduction
of desire, this account o ers no answer to the question of what it is for a subject
to be such as to verify such a belief. My preferred account is in a position to
give at least this answer: For such a belief to be true is for the agent to be
disposed to do what the belief represents in conditions where the agent has that
belief (hence wanting to do it), and for this disposition to be exercised (hence
doing what the agent wants to do).
My account elaborates on these simpler accounts but shares their circularity.
If it is true, it seems that no further elaboration will extinguish the circularity.
For it does not seem possible to get hold of the relevant kind of belief without
specifying its object, which reintroduces acting into the account, or the relevant
kind of disposition without specifying what constitutes exercising it, which also
reintroduces acting.3 Is this, in itself, an objectionable feature of the account?
2Of course on any concrete version of this theory, the condition “parameter” would have to
be filled in. Perhaps a proponent would say that desire is a disposition to act in a conditions
where one is in some specific kind of neural state, or in conditions in which one has some belief
about the good of doing something, or in which one would enjoy doing it. Such accounts seem
to have counterexamples — are robots, the bad, and the stoic somehow banned from acting?
A deeper but more elusive issue with these accounts is that, rather than explain what is
involved in acting, they seem to just introduce elements alongside every action with no clearly
elucidated, nor clearly elucidating, conceptual connection to it.
3This point seems to be Wilson’s (1989, p. 275).
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It seems rash to object to the account on grounds of some general prohibition
against circularity. But is there a good objection that targets the more specific
circularity of accounting for acting by introducing a belief about acting?
Some wariness about this specific kind of circularity seems to tacitly con-
strain many theorists who write on action, since very few openly endorse or
consider accounts with this shape. One of the few who does openly consider a
proposal like this is Peacocke:
Perhaps then it may be said that there can never be a perfect match
with a given intention to f in these deviant cases, because the in-
tention to f is the intention that one should f as a result of one’s
possession of this very intention via a nondeviant chain. (Peacocke,
1979, p. 57)
But Peacocke immediately objects to this on the following alluring but unclear
grounds:4
In these examples the reason that the token actions do not match
such intentions is simply that they are produced by a deviant chain.
The suggestion gives no clue about what it is for a chain to be
deviant. (Peacocke, 1979, p. 57)
Reformulating Peacocke’s thoughts, we may express his o hand suggestion as
an attempt to exclude deviant causal chain cases by saying that to act, it is
necessary that one veridically represents oneself as acting (and not as deviantly
happening to do something), and his subsequent remarks as an objection to the
4Before this, Peacocke presents a di erent complaint, which I ignore in the main text. It
is that “such a view wrongly involves ascribing to anyone with intentions use of a distinction
between deviant and nondeviant chains of which he may never have dreamed” (Peacocke,
1979, p. 57). Of course whether or not an agent may have dreamed of such a distinction
depends on what the distinction amounts to. If, as Peacocke thinks, knowing that di erence
is a matter of knowing what di erential explanation is, there is ample reason to think agents
don’t know it. But if, as I think, the only sound distinction to know of in this vicinity is that
between acting and doing something which is not acting, but which is perhaps similar to it,
then there seems to be no di culty about saying every agent knows it.
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e ect that, because acting figures in this condition (as something represented)
the account does not tell us what it is to act.5
The objection could be read in two ways. On one reading, the objection is
that this account of acting in terms of a belief about acting could, but does not
say enough to characterise the object of that belief. But then this objection
seems to just be an especially pointed way of asking the question which this
chapter is devoted to answering: What could it be to believe that one is acting,
such that such a belief is a necessary constituent of the fact that someone is
acting? On another reading, which has not yet been considered, the objection
is that if there’s an account of acting which introduces a psychological state
specifically about acting, then this account can’t characterise the object of that
state, or at least can’t do it fully. And of course this would mean that this
account couldn’t say what acting is, or couldn’t do it fully. If it is good, this
objection is fatal to the present account.
Although there is something compelling about the second objection, which
concerns the informativeness of the present form of account, I believe that a
discussion of the first kind of objection will put us in a better position to answer
it. Grasping a determinate account of acting which introduces a belief about
acting will, that is, be helpful in staving o  the concern that no such account
could be informative. Hence in this chapter I bracket the ponderous concern
about informativeness, and consider only the first kind of concern: What might
the object of a practical belief be, such that someone who is acting could not fail
to have such a belief? My method for answering this question will be to consider
5Wilson similarly objects to such ideas by saying that “[e]ven after we have been told that
a state of intending refers to itself, we still do not know what state[...] is purportedly referred
to” (Wilson, 1989, p. 279). This objection to what Wilson calls “self-referentially” is tied up
with the assumption that beliefs are tokens of language of thought sentences. Setiya (2007,
p. 46, n. 38) rejects that extra assumption, and suggests that this helps to avoid Wilson’s
objection. But at its core, Wilson’s objection seems to be the same as Peacocke’s, and hence
rejecting Wilson’s largely Fodorian conception of psychology seems to be an unsatisfying way
to respond to it.
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some purported ways of showing that a practical belief has no necessary place
in action, and to refine the belief condition in such a way that these attempts
miss their mark.
3.3 Practical Belief is Imperfective
In this section I want to argue that, although someone who is acting in doing
something must believe they are acting in doing it, they need not therefore
believe they will ultimately be successful in doing it. The discussion can be
started by considering one aspect of Anscombe’s work on the matter.
Anscombe strives to define acting as the object of an attitude she calls “prac-
tical knowledge”.6 She discovers a dilemma: On the one hand, practical know-
ledge is supposed to be knowledge of what a subject does — of something that
happens (Anscombe, 1963, pp. 52-53). On the other hand, reflection on failed
actions, such as one where someone is ordering the building of a house but their
orders are swiftly disobeyed — suggests that someone can have such knowledge
of their action even though nothing much actually happens (Anscombe, 1963,
pp. 55-56).7 I paraphrase the resulting dilemma as follows:8 How can the atti-
6In the subsequent text I do not draw very much on Anscombe’s account of practical
knowledge, partly because when this account is clear, it tends to be negative and roundabout,
whereas when it is positive, it tends to be obscure. For example, the main negative claim,
which seems to have attracted the most attention, is that practical knowledge is not based
on prior evidence Anscombe (1963, pp. 88-89). This does not tell us very much about how
we should conceive of practical knowledge, or what it is based on, or how it is based on it —
questions that have become focal to that just-mentioned attention. The main positive claim
seems to be that practical knowledge is “the cause of what it understands” (Anscombe, 1963,
p. 87) — which (similarly to the account which starts this chapter o ) does not seem to tell
us very much about what it is that is understood and caused by such knowledge.
7A minor remark on exegesis: The way Anscombe poses the problem can make it seem
as if she thinks that the problem stems from the simple view of knowledge as factive, and
that her solution is to suggest that the kind of practical knowledge that a subject has of what
they are doing is non-factive. But she never clearly defends such claims in her treatment of
practical knowledge, so this reading ultimately seems unwarranted.
8I bracket Anscombe’s seeming and connected thesis that where the object of practical
knowledge does happen, this practical knowledge does not require observation of it. Contrary
to a common way of approaching Anscombe’s view of practical knowledge, I will focus, in
this chapter, more on the shape of the objects of practical knowledge than on questions
concerning how such knowledge is (non-observationally? non-inferentially?) based on its
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tude involved in acting be one of knowledge if it does not require the reality of
its object (Anscombe, 1963, p. 82)?
The force of the dilemma is readily felt: Isn’t there a vivid sense in which
someone always knows the action they’re doing, even if unbeknownst to them
things are going very badly? How then can their knowledge survive such total
but unknown misfortune in bringing it about? But it is not clear just what its
incompatible lemmas are supposed to be. McDowell, for example, is “not sure
what to make” of the dilemma Anscombe seems to express (2010, p. 430), and
Haddock (2011, pp. 167-168) gives voice to some uncertainty about which parts
of Anscombe’s various interjections are attributable to Anscombe’s o cial self,
as opposed to being spoken by an imagined interlocutor.
I want to start by o ering a quite straightforward interpretation of Anscombe’s
concern, on which it roughly amounts to the following question: How can acting
require an attitude that accurately represents what one is doing if one might
ultimately fail to get it done? It is true that the present interpretation hardly
exhausts Anscombe’s anxieties on the matter of practical knowledge. But it is
possible to attribute to Anscombe a desire to resolve the question just stated.
And in any case, stating and resolving the above straightforward question will
force us to appreciate the imperfective nature of practical belief, thus helpfully
clarifying a more elusive and di cult version of Anscombe’s concerns, developed
recently by Setiya.
To more clearly appreciate the force of the initial, simple question, consider
first the below pair of theses:9
Practical Belief: If N is acting in Aing, N has a true belief that N is Aing
object (Haddock, 2011), and on related questions of how basing knowledge on something not-
necessarily-currently-real can be rational (as opposed to a form of wishful thinking) (Paul,
2009b,a; Setiya, 2008b, 2009, 2011a).
9I will speak of true belief where Anscombe speaks of knowledge — the di erence between
these attitudes will not, I think, matter to Anscombe’s dilemma, nor to its solution.
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Failure-tolerance: N can act in Aing even if N will not end up having A-ed
As can be read straight o  this pair of theses, they are not inconsistent unless
“N is Aing” is silently interpreted in such a way that it entails “N will end up
having A-ed”. Only then does one of the theses say that acting requires true
belief in a kind of fact which, according to the other thesis, need not exist where
someone acts. But there is no apparent reason to silently interpret things in this
way, as, on the face of things, believing that one is doing something is di erent
from believing that one will end up having done it. If, after realising this, we
slightly adjust Practical Belief to try to capture the intuitively felt dilemma,
we will of course generate what looks like a real inconsistency:
Practical Belief*: If N is acting in Aing, N has a true belief that N will end
up having A-ed
Failure-tolerance: N can act in Aing even if N will not end up having A-ed
Practical Belief is consistent with Failure-tolerance, but Practical Belief* seem-
ingly must be inconsistent with it. A straightforward reconciliation of this latter
pair of theses hence seems impossible. But someone who, for some reason or
other, favours Practical Belief * might try to resolve the tension simply by re-
jecting Failure-tolerance. As I’ll soon argue, this is misguided, since simple
observations about the possibility of failing to complete an action undermine
Practical Belief*, and give at least provisional support to Failure-tolerance. This
will leave those who are attracted to Practical Belief* the option of modifying
this thesis to accommodate Failure-tolerance. Again this will be seen to be a
misguided move. All this will leave us with Practical Belief as the only plausible
way of defending the omnipresence of practical belief in action.
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Rejecting Failure-tolerance in Favour of Practical Belief*
Straightforward cases, which do not involve especially unfortunate epistemic cir-
cumstances, can seem to undermine Practical Belief *, and provide some support
to Failure-tolerance. For example, we may imagine that someone is building a
house in the ordinary way, with some sensory or testimonial feedback. Such a
person may be acting in building a house, although they have not yet built a
relevant house. There may not even be a foundation in place. And of course
it is then possible that the building will end in failure. Plans can change, and
foundations can be sucked into swampy grounds, ruining builders. So for this
particular case, at least, something along the lines of Failure-tolerance must
be true. Such common-sensical points, noticed and insisted on by a number
of philosophers (Falvey, 2000; Setiya, 2011a; Thompson, 2008), seem to falsify
Practical Belief *, and seem to lend at lest partial support to Failure-tolerance.
Though the interpretive issue is hardly straightforward, it can seem that
some of Anscombe’s own examples in her discussions of practical knowledge are
intended to defend Practical Belief* from such points. In one of these examples,
someone is aware of having erected a house by giving orders, but hasn’t gotten
any feedback about how the building is going, and in fact unbeknownst to them
their orders have been disobeyed, and nothing has gotten done. Here Anscombe
can seem to claim that there is practical knowledge of the fact that a house
has been built, although at the same time, no house has been built (Anscombe,
1963, p. 82). This claim can seem designed to make way for Practical Belief *
even if something like Failure-tolerance is true, at least for some cases. For if
someone can have practical knowledge of what has happened without it having
happened, then it is not far o  to add that they can know of an action they will
have performed without things being such that they will have performed it. But
the resulting, “non-factive” notion of knowledge or true belief seems incoherent
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to me,10 and thus I find it hard to believe that Anscombe is, in fact, proposing
some such conception of practical knowledge, still less that she wants to define
action as the object of that kind of knowledge.
Rejecting Practical Belief* in Favour of Failure-tolerance
But could some other similarly perfective attitude be definitive of action in the
way that Practical Belief * fails to be? As far as I can see, there are three
possible axes along which to vary Practical Belief * in the hopes of providing
an account of the kind of understanding of what one is doing which defines
action: First, one could try to think of a di erent type of perfective attitude,
and introduce some version of the claim that a subject acts in Aing just in
case they hope, or intend, or have some other kind of attitude directed towards
successful completion of Aing, where whatever attitude is invoked is true or
veridical or satisfied. Second, one can try to come up with qualifications to
the object of practical belief, introducing something like the claim that so that
acting in Aing is having a true belief that one will have A-ed relative to some
circumstances, or at least that success is possible. Third, one can shift the
object of practical belief, introducing something like the claim that acting in
Aing requires having a true belief that one will end up having X-ed.
The first kind of proposal does not seem to improve on Practical Belief *.
For the simple argument against this thesis did not seem to turn on any of the
possible di erences between true belief, knowledge, hope, desperate hope, or
vague hunch. As long as these attitudes are construed as veridically representing
the fact that their subject will end up having done the action they are currently
10Anscombe herself notes the possible retort that “it is a funny sort of knowledge that
was still knowledge even though what it was knowledge of was not the case!” (Anscombe,
1963, p. 82). I suppose the thought behind the retort is that knowledge cannot be properly
understood if we try to construe it as a non-factive attitude. As far as I can see, subsequent
parts of Intention, which are meant to articulate Anscombe’s notion of practical knowledge
more fully, do not really address this kind of objection.
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doing, then, as before, those cases which seem to conform to Failure-tolerance
will threaten the omnipresence of such states in action.11
The second kind of proposal does not fail in an immediate way, so let’s
consider it. The idea in it is that although true belief that one will end up
having A-ed isn’t necessary for acting in Aing (as is shown by the fact that
any action can be truncated), true belief that one will end up having A-ed if
conditions are such-and-such is thus necessary:
Practical Belief**: If N is acting in Aing, N has a true belief that N will end
up having A-ed provided that p
But this thesis seems no more true than its predecessor. Firstly, it seems that
an agent can act in doing something without being fully aware of what is needed
for success. Someone might, after all, start doing something while pretty unsure
about how to get it done. A possible response to this is that this uncertainty does
not preclude belief. The suggestion would be that, even if there’s uncertainty,
someone who is doing an action must have some idea of what will result in
success.
But consider the following more sophisticated objection: Whatever an agent
thinks will be su cient for success can turn out to not be su cient (“oh, this
lever isn’t connected”), in which case a responsive agent can come to form new
beliefs about what will be su cient (“oh, there’s another one”), all while con-
tinuously acting in securing the end “through an alteration in envisaged subor-
dinate means” (Thompson, 2008, p. 105, n. 12). In such cases, where things go
11If we relax the requirement for veracity, then is there a perfective kind of belief or hope
that is necessary for acting in Aing? We may try the mere suggestion that “For N to act in
Aing requires N to have a belief that N will end up having A-ed”. If such a belief is such as
to require the absence of very much doubt about whether its subject will go on to A, it is
quite obviously falsified by cases like the one where Davidson imagines himself to try to be
making ten carbon copies, since after all it seems true that in this case he does “not know,
or believe with any confidence” that he is succeeding (Davidson, 2001a, p. 92). The question
of whether some appropriately meek hope of future success is necessary for acting in Aing is
more di cult (Setiya, 2008b, 2009). But as long as the attitude in question is not understood
as necessarily veridical, it will be very hard to see how it could contribute to completing an
account of what it is to act.
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well though not according to initial plans, there seems to be no condition of the
form “I will end up having A-ed, provided ...” which is necessarily both believed
and true throughout someone’s acting in Aing. If there is no such condition,
then there is no value assignment to “p” which can make Practical Belief **
true.12
Someone could then say that while the agent might not necessarily have the
right idea of which specific conditions will facilitate success, an acting subject
must know that there are some such conditions. I think that proposal must take
something like the following shape:
Practical Belief***: If N is acting in Aing, N has a true belief that N possibly
will end up having A-ed
It is hard to doubt that whenever someone acts in Aing, they know they may (in
some weak sense of “may”) end up successful in their endeavour. And I will not
try to come up with a wild counterexample to undermine this thesis (involving,
I suppose, someone who is acting in doing something which is absolutely certain
not to succeed, or someone who is acting in doing something which seems so
di cult that they think it is totally impossible to carry it out).
Rather I want to object that, even if this attitude is necessary in action, it
does not help provide for an account of what it is for a subject to act, since it is
not specifically characteristic of action (the passive can have the same attitude)
and does not in any core way seem to be related to action (the passive can satisfy
the attitude merely by being such that they might have successfully done the
action in question). As it turns out, a version of this leniency objection applies
to all subsequent proposals too.
Consider the third and perhaps more interesting kind of revision, which shifts
the object of practical belief, as below:
12Again, replacing “belief” with “hope”, “intention” or “knowledge” does not yield a di er-
ent conclusion.
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Practical Belief****: If N is acting in Aing, N has a true belief that N will
end up having A-ed or X-ed (where X is di erent from A)
This seems to encapsulate Davidson’s (2001a, p. 50) view of the matter, on
which acting in ensuring the future welfare of one’s children entails not know-
ledge that one will manage to do that (since the uncertain goal may even be
beyond one’s death), but rather knowledge that one will have taken pertinent
legal steps with one’s lawyer, or put one’s signature on a piece of paper, or that
one will have done something else, where presumably what is thereby done has
some privileged connection to the action in question.13
Practical Belief **** seems true to me. If someone is acting in doing some-
thing, like walking to school, they must apparently believingly have done many
further things (walked to school, or taken on shoes, moved their body, or ...). If
Anscombe’s builder is acting in building a house, they seemingly must be aware
of some past successes along the way to building, such as just ordering people
to build, or making a plan to build, or deciding to build, or whatever else might
have been involved in the project thus far. These humdrum observations seem
to vindicate the thesis in question. But the fact that past success is cheap is
also what makes trouble for it, since, again, someone can know of past successes
in doing things along the way to Aing even after having given up the whole
project. Similarly to the last proposal, this one constructs a notion of practical
belief that is too promiscuous to be definitive of action.
Having agreed that some of the above proposals give us a too strong belief
13For of course it is plausible that not just anything could figure as the “something else”,
or the X, mentioned above. I would say, maybe in agreement with Davidson, that it is some
X taken as a means to Aing that necessarily figures in the thought of someone who is acting
in Aing. Davidson would say, probably in disagreement with me, that acting in Aing requires
knowledge of some Xing, where the Aing that happens is identical to the Xing known. This
adds to Practical Belief **** Davidson’s recurring idea that actions are individuals that can
come under many descriptions, and can be known under one but not another. But I don’t
think we need to concern ourselves with any such additions to Practical Belief ****, since these
don’t seem to help build a defence to the upcoming di culties about the temporal character
of such knowledge of Xing.
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condition, whereas others make it too weak, the present kind of theorist might
suggest that the di culties are due to a too binary conception of belief. They
may then adopt a suggestion due to Setiya (2008b, p. 391), on which it is not
all-out belief, but some comparatively high level of confidence in future success,
which is definitive of action. (It is not clear that Setiya’s suggestion is made in
the spirit of defending the present kind of theorist, who views practical belief
as oriented towards future success, but this suggestion might be retrofitted to
suit them.) Consider, then, the following thesis:
Practical Belief*****: If N is acting in Aing, N has a higher level of confid-
ence that N will end up having A-ed than N would otherwise have, and N
will end up having A-ed
As emerges in a debate between Setiya and Paul (2009b), making such a claim
true requires careful curating of which type of situation to fit into its “otherwise”-
clause (Setiya, 2009, p. 131). Should “otherwise” be taken to refer to what
things were like right before the agent started acting, or to what things would
have been like if everything were mostly similar except the agent weren’t acting?
But rather than engage in this discussion, let’s provisionally grant that on some
such careful interpretation, Practical Belief ***** is true.
Even then, there seems to be no reason for thinking that such a compar-
atively high confidence in future success should be thought to be something
definitive of action. An alcoholic might have more confidence that they will end
up having relapsed in a situation involving the presence of alcohol than “other-
wise”, on most of the interpretations of “otherwise” we can think of. But even if
the alcoholic will relapse, they might not yet be, and hence the kind of attitude
described by Practical Belief ***** does not seem to embody the specific kind of
understanding an agent has of what they are doing at the time of action, much
less a kind of attitude through which acting might somehow be defined.
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Reconciling Practical Belief and Failure-tolerance
What seems to emerge from the previous discussion is that, in trying to define
action as the object of practical belief, we need to think of the belief in question
as thoroughly imperfective. When N is acting in Aing, N believes that they
are Aing, where this is not to be understood as a piece of knowledge, belief, or
comparatively high confidence concerning any past or future success in doing A
or anything else. But as also emerged, this does not mean that these attitudes,
oriented towards future or past successes, have no place in an account of what it
is to act. Perhaps some belief about past success, some anaemic hope of future
success, and even some comparatively high confidence in such success, are all
preconditions for action.
Practical Belief and Failure-tolerance may now seem to be neatly and un-
problematically compatible. For endorsing them allows us to say, for example,
that someone who is acting in providing for the future welfare of their children
must believe that they are doing that, although such welfare may not ulti-
mately have been provided. Similarly, it allows us to say that someone’s acting
in pumping poison into their neighbours’ well requires their awareness of such
pumping, which can exist even if, due to bad piping, no poison will arrive at
the intended destination. So the above discussion gives us a direct answer to
the initially worrying question of whether and in what sense a practical belief
could be true even if nothing were there to verify it: In a straightforward sense,
practical belief does require its object, since it is only true if its subject is on
the way to Aing, or engaged in Aing, or in the process of Aing, or, for short,
Aing. But there is something notable in the vicinity that a practical belief does
not require, since as such it is not a belief to the e ect that its subject will end
up having A-ed.
But there is a subtle complication. In chapter 1.2, I observed that where
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a subject is doing an achievement, future success in doing it is guaranteed. If
someone is, say, walking all the way to school, then they must end up having
walked all the way to school. If, now, we take an achievement, and suppose
that a subject is acting in doing it, we have the makings of a challenge to
Practical Belief. This seems to be precisely the sort of challenge that is pursued
by Davidson:14
It is a mistake to suppose that if an agent is doing something in-
tentionally, he must know that he is doing it. For suppose a man is
writing his will with the intention of providing for the welfare of his
children. He may be in doubt about his success and remain so to
his death; yet in writing his will he may in fact be providing for the
welfare of his children, and if so he is certainly doing it intentionally.
(Davidson, 2001a, pp. 91-92)
Davidson also provides this di erent example:
[I]n writing heavily on this page I may be intending to produce ten
legible carbon copies. I do not know, or believe with any confidence,
that I am succeeding. But if I am producing ten legible carbon
copies, I am certainly doing it intentionally. (Davidson, 2001a, p.
92)
It seems clear that, in both cases, the challenge rests on supposing that the
subject is doing an achievement. For the reason why the will writer doesn’t
know that they are providing for the welfare of their children must be that this
requires that (in the future) these children’s welfare ends up being provided
for. And the reason why the carbon copier doesn’t know they are producing ten
14As before, the di erence between knowledge and true belief is not pertinent, and Dav-
idson’s talk of doing something intentionally may be translated into talk of acting in doing
something.
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legible carbon copies must be that this requires them to end up having produced
ten such copies.
We seemingly cannot make such challenges by using doings which are not
achievements. For what is the problem about saying, for example, that the
will writer believes they are pressing very hard on the paper with the intention
of producing ten carbon copies? Equally, there seems to be no Davidsonian
problem about saying that someone who is acting in walking towards school
(and hence doing an activity) believes they are walking towards school, or that
someone who is acting in walking to school (and hence doing something of the
paradigmatic sort), must truly believe, or know, that they’re doing that. The
Davidsonian doubt is more like the doubt that someone acting in walking all
the way to school in time for the first lesson (and hence doing an achievement)
must believe they are doing that. And the reason for Davidson’s doubt – similar
to the doubt attaching to the previous two achievements – seems to be that it is
not clear that someone doing such an action must be in a position to accurately
predict that they will be successful in carrying it out.
Having noticed that Davidson’s challenge seems to stem from his registering
how achievements require future success for present engagement, and a concern
about saying that an agent is necessarily able to predict future success, we may
express his challenge in the form of the following more abstract argument:
Achievements For some of the things N can be acting in doing, believing N
is doing it requires believing N will end up having done it
Non-prediction For all of the things N can be acting in doing, N can be acting
in doing it without believing N will end up having done it
Non-belief (C) For some of the things N can be acting in doing, N can be
doing it without believing N is doing it
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This abstract version of Davidson’s argument has the troubling conclusion that,
after all, it is possible to be acting in doing something without believing one is
doing it. Since the argument seems valid, we must find a way to reject one of its
premises if we’re to stick with Practical Belief. But on reflection, both premises
are more vulnerable to criticism than Davidson makes apparent.
A very straightforward way of responding to the argument would be by deny-
ing its first premise. This denial might be grounded by the simple suggestion
that achievements are not, as such, things that someone can be acting in doing.
The suggestion would be that no one is ever, as such, acting in winning a race,
even if, perhaps, it is possible to be winning a race, or at least to have won it
(and, though it might seem like a strange claim to take on, it might even be
true that someone can, after the fact, have been acting in winning a race). If
achievements are understood as things which no one can be acting in doing,
then even if believing one is doing an achievement (like winning a race) entails
believing one will end up having done it (ending up, therefore, having won it),
this will not cause any trouble for Practical Belief. A di erent way of grounding
a denial of the first premise would be reverting to the more or less Rylean line
(back in chapter 1.2 on page 13) on which nothing is ever doing an achievement.
If someone should object that this response leads to a too restrictive con-
ception of action, it is worth noting that, wherever someone might be tempted
to say that someone is acting in doing an achievement, it seems very possible to
say, instead, that they are acting in doing something which, if things go well, will
result in them having done an achievement. Hence instead of saying someone
is acting in winning a race or in securing the favour of their uncle, we may say
that they are acting in participating in the race — perhaps very successfully
or ferociously — and may therefore end up winning it, or that they are acting
in blandishing their uncle, and may well therefore end up securing the uncle’s
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favour. And this way of describing these proceedings is really no less natural
than that which it would replace. It is arguably more natural than it.
A somewhat less straightforward response to the Davidsonian argument
denies Non-prediction. The response would have it that, where someone is
acting in doing an achievement, they do have a predictive, true belief about
future success, although in other cases such a predictive belief is not required
for acting. This response to the argument is friendly to Practical Belief —
it merely adds to this that, because sometimes subjects act in doing achieve-
ments, something along the lines of Practical Belief* must also be true of those
cases. But the response seems to come at the cost of needing to qualify Failure-
tolerance. For once some actions are counted as achievements, we will have to
make room for the idea that, for some of the things a subject can be acting in
doing, present engagement does entail future success. This is not, however, a
very great cost, as a properly restricted version of Failure-tolerance must still
be true: Present engagement in an action does not, as a general matter, entail
future success in doing it. That is the moral of the case of the builder, and of
a large number of ordinary cases of acting, and this is still seemingly enough to
undermine Practical Belief* in its fully general guise.
So once we note that the Davidsonian challenge is limited in scope, and rests
entirely on the idea that achievements can be actions, this challenge is blunted.
For we may either construe achievements as a special case of action, making
special provisions for this kind of forward-looking action, without compromising
Practical Belief, or else we may simply rule out the claim, on which Davidson’s
entire challenge rests, that achievements can be actions, and find other ways
of talking about an agent’s participation in bringing about an achievement. If
either response is workable — and on the surface both seem to be — Davidson
is unsuccessful in undermining Practical Belief.
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3.4 Practical Belief is Causal
But having construed practical belief imperfectively, so that it does not require
its subject to be successful in whatever it undertakes to do, and having realised
the limits to the Davidsonian challenge, there is still, I think, a further challenge
to Practical Belief, which rests on a further kind of counterexample. The chal-
lenge, which I think might be traceable to Anscombe, is expressed by Setiya,
who at leastmostly formulates it in imperfective language, and apparently thinks
of it as arising outside the case of achievements:15
Consider a [...] case of recent paralysis in which, at a certain point in
my recovery, I am cautiously but not irrationally optimistic: I think
that I might be able to clench my fist. Once again, things happen
to work out. I clench my fist, and I do so intentionally. Still, given
my doubts, I do not believe that I am clenching my fist — perhaps
I cannot feel it, or see it, and I am not at all sure of my ability.
(Setiya, 2008b, p. 390)
Let’s not construe this as an instance of the simple challenge we started with, as
the language in it suggests that the belief in question concerns something which
the subject is doing, not their future success in doing it. And let’s not construe
“clenching” as a verb of achievement. That would seem to turn Setiya’s worry
into an instance of the Davidsonian objection above, but Setiya’s challenge
seems distinct from it. Rather, let’s take it in the straightforward way in which
it seems to be intended: Someone is acting in holding their fist closed for a
while, or perhaps in moving their fingers towards their palm, where this is the
sort of undertaking that can end up having failed or succeeded in the future.
15Like me, Setiya accepts a version of Anscombe’s contention about the role of practical
belief in action, and wants to develop it in the face of various counterexamples. But as has
already been seen, his way of developing it to avoid the counterexamples is quite di erent
from mine.
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Setiya seems to suggest that even when we understand the case in this way,
there is reason to doubt that this subject believes they are doing the action in
question.
But it should be noted that, once practical belief is construed imperfect-
ively, such examples do not in any simple and straightforward way disprove
Practical Belief. The fist clencher my not think that they are going to succeed,
nor that the clenching is going particularly well. Even so it is hard to deny that
this subject, if they are acting in clenching, must have some kind of awareness
directed towards the fact that they are clenching their fist. Setiya seems right
to think that there is some intuitive pull to the idea that a subject like this
can act in clenching although, due to some epistemic misfortune, they don’t
believe they’re clenching. But it is not at all clear what it is in the case that
is supposed to support this intuition. What is the reason for thinking that, in
a case like the one described, someone can act in clenching without believing
they are clenching?
I think that the line of thinking which is supposed to bring us to doubt that
the paralysis victim believes they are clenching has the following shape:16 If it
is true that, wherever someone is acting in doing anything, they have a practical
belief which represents them as doing that, and if we are to take seriously that,
for example, Setiya’s paralysis victim is acting in clenching their first, then we
must say that this agent has a true practical belief which represents them as
clenching their fist. But if we also take seriously that this agent does not believe
that their hand is moving in the way that is characteristic of such clenching,
then the content of the agent’s practical belief (which we are supposing is true)
can’t be that such movements are happening. But then we may ask, what is
the object of this agent’s practical belief about clenching their fist, if not (at
16Unless I’m mistaken, this or closely related trouble was discovered by Anscombe (1963,
p. 51).
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least something that requires) that such hand movements are taking place?17
It seems to be this type of challenge which is supposed to provide a reason
for doubting Practical Belief. And of course examples of this sort of challenge
could be multiplied. They are in Intention: Someone acts in pumping poison
into their neighbours’ well, but they have doubts about the piping and hence
can’t vouch for the poison’s progress, so in what sense do they practically believe
they are pumping poison? Or someone is building a house by giving orders, but
isn’t sure whether their orders are being implemented, so in what sense do they
practically believe they are building a house? If we insist that Practical Belief
is true, then we seem committed to finding some general way of answering such
questions. And if it turns out we can’t provide such answers, then that would
at least give some indirect support to Setiya’s troublesome intuition, putting
Practical Belief into serious question.
Anscombe warns against two very direct but deeply problematic responses
to such questions: The first pronounces that the real object of practical belief is
just that, in some very interior sense, one wills something to happen, where belief
in this willing doesn’t require any belief that hands, tables, tongues, money or
anything else moves or does anything else (Anscombe, 1963, pp. 51-52). The
second, more obscure, but for many purposes similar suggestion, is that thinking
one is acting in doing something is all there is to acting in doing it (Anscombe,
1963, p. 52).
As Anscombe notes, both accounts are troublesome. Both seem to make
practical belief infallible (the former by regressively “pushing back” the object
of the belief so that apparently nothing could interfere with it, and the latter by
17It seems that it is “the di culty of this question” (Anscombe, 1963, p. 51) which ulti-
mately leads Anscombe to the idea that knowledge of what one is acting in doing is di erent
from knowledge of what one is doing in some non-action-involving sense (Anscombe, 1963, pp.
88-89), possibly, but not clearly, with the addition that these two “knowledges” have di erent
objects. (But as will soon emerge, the object of practical knowledge is not a mere willing or
something entailed by belief in it for Anscombe.)
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analytically legislating such infallibility). Relatedly, both result in a too narrow
conception of the types of action a subject can do, since they make subjects
unable to act in doing anything we might vaguely describe as “world involving”,
like calling an ambulance, taking a walk, or clenching a fist. The quite ponderous
worry which underlies both of these, which is di cult to put into clear language
but is worth pointing towards, is that both seem to make the object of practical
belief void: It is something which can hardly be distinguished from nothing.
Our question hence becomes: What could the object of a practical belief be
if, on the one hand, it is not a kind of process which — in unusual circumstances,
perhaps involving paralysis or lack of sensory feedback — its subject might not
believe is happening, nor a special kind of process belief in which is somehow
guaranteed, like a purely interior episode of willing, or something mysterious
the reality of which follows from belief in it?
For the beginnings of an answer to this question, consider that, where
someone acts in doing something, there will tend to be other things they are
doing which in some intuitive sense are phases, parts or stages of that com-
paratively large project.18 If someone is clenching their fist, this may involve
the phases, say, of making an e ort to clench, muscle flexing, finger movement,
palm encounter, and keeping one’s hand clenched. For present purposes, the
most important feature of such phases is that they need not temporally coin-
cide. From a temporal point of view, they can happen in sequence (someone
clenches their fist by moving their fingers halfway to their palm, and then the
other half of the way) or overlap (someone is baking by putting the oven on
while kneading a dough) or fully coincide (someone is lifting a heavy stone by
18We should not be tempted to think that there is a particular number of phases for every
case where someone is acting in doing something. It is no more or less justified than the
above to say of this fist clenching that it involves some fingers moving halfway towards the
palm, and the rest of the way, and resting in that palm (making for three phases), or just
that the subject is making an e ort to clench, and clenching (making for only two phases), or
that the subject is making an e ort for a few moments, and making an e ort for some further
moments, and starting to clench, and keeping at it (making for four phases).
90
struggling with their arms and legs).19
This seems to show that acting in Aing is being in some phase or other, but
not necessarily all, of Aing. But of course then believing one is acting in Aing
should amount to believing one is in some phase or other, but not necessarily all,
of Aing. This immediately suggests a response to our problem, since it allows
us to say that a practical belief which represents its subject as clenching their
fist can exist even though this subject does not represent themselves as moving
their hand, so long as this subject does represent themselves as flexing their
muscles, or holding their hand clenched, or as doing something else which is a
phase of their clenching their fist.
Any more radical putative counterexamples, where subjects do not even
believe they are in some phase of their action, seem to fall to the ground, since
there seems to be no reason for saying that such subjects are acting in doing
what they’re doing. If we try to imagine that Setiya’s paralysis victim is totally
in the dark about whether any phase of clenching is happening, it just seems
misguided to claim that this subject is somehow acting in clenching, even if this
subject hopes that their hand moves and it does.
This solution to the problem obviously rests on some conception of what it
is for something that happens to be a phase of a given action, which though
somewhat intuitive, has not been elucidated. This conceptual issue might be
pressed in a sceptical manner, by presenting a putative counterexample to the
thesis and asking why the account should not apply to it. Next I will do this in
a way that prompts the introduction of one criterion for phasehood.
Imagine two paralysis victims, L and M, who decide to try to clench their
respective fists without being sure whether their respective paralyses have worn
o . Imagine that L succeeds and M fails. We’ve said that if L believes that L is
19For a more in-depth account which seems to lend support to mine, see Stout (1996, pp.
46-62) on processes.
91
acting in clenching in the sense that L is in, say, the e ort phase of clenching,
and L is in the e ort phase of clenching, then L’s practical belief is satisfied,
and L is acting in clenching. So we have given the following rationale for the
claim that L has a true practical belief, even in a case where L does not believe
their hand is moving:
• L believes L is acting in clenching in that L is in the e ort phase of
clenching
• L is in the e ort phase of clenching
• So L is acting in clenching
Now for all we’ve said and all we can think to say, it seems possible for M to
believe just the same sorts of things that L believes, and hence M may believe
that M is making such an e ort too. And isn’t it possible for M to be making
an e ort to clench their fist just as much as L, though M unfortunately fails? If
we go along with this, we have a problem, since if we go along with it, we can
readily construct the same rationale as above for M’s case:
• M believes M is acting in clenching that M is in the e ort phase of clenching
• M is in the e ort phase of clenching
• So M is acting in clenching
And if we accept this rationale, trying utterly unsuccessfully to clench is su -
cient for acting in clenching, and then we are seemingly back, or at least on the
way to, a version of the sort of view we just declared undesirable. If we are not
to accept it, we are committed to finding some as-yet-unelucidated di erence
between L and M which shows us why M isn’t acting in clenching. I said I don’t
see why M couldn’t believe what L believes. But could it be that L but not M is
in the e ort phase of clenching? A defence of this answer requires some criterion
92
for phasehood. And I propose the following: For something that happens to be
a phase of an action requires that it causally contributes to that action.
On this criterion, the reason why M isn’t in the e ort phase of clenching is
that, whatever M is doing, and whatever beliefs M has, M is not doing anything
that causally contributes to their clenching their fist. This criterion gives our
account the right implications, in that, on the one hand, it allows people to
count as acting in Aing even if they aren’t sure that they have entered some
particular phase of Aing, whereas, on the other hand, it does not allow people
to count as acting in Aing if they don’t truly believe they are doing something
which causally contributes to their Aing. I do not see how our account could
have these implications without containing a causal criterion, since I do not see
any non-causal but pertinent di erence between cases like L’s and cases like
M’s.20
3.5 Practical Belief is Part-Homogeneous
I wondered: if the kind of practical belief constitutive of acting in Aing rep-
resents its subject as acting in Aing, is it possible to go beyond this schematic
specification of the object of that belief? So far, I have argued that it must rep-
resent its subject as Aing, in a sense such that Aing is being in some phase of
Aing, where being in some phase of Aing turns out to require doing something
that causally contributes to Aing. In this section I want to argue that believing
one is acting in doing something involves believing not just that one is doing
further things that broadly enable, promote, or result in it, but also that one is
acting in doing the things that thus contribute to it.
20See Wolfson (2012, p. 330) for some claims which anticipate some of the present claims in
a very rough way. The main di erences between Wolfson’s claims and mine seems to be that he
favours the notion of something’s culminating in something else over my notion of something
causally contributing to something else, and that he seems to view what is on the far end of
the culmination “relation” as a perfective fact about what something has successfully done,
rather than viewing it as another imperfective fact.
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We may sum up the our developing hypothesis as follows:
Causal Practical Belief: For N to believe that N is acting in Aing requires N
to believe that N is Xing in a way that causally contributes to N’s Aing.
It may seem that, if there were nothing to the belief of the sort “N is acting in
Aing” but a belief of the sort “N is Xing in a way that causally contributes to
their Aing”, then we would have in this observation the makings of an exhaust-
ive account of the object of practical belief, which would roughly just replace
the above “requires” with “is”. It may also seem that such an account would
dissolve our earlier anxieties about the circular shape of our account preventing
an informative account of the object of practical belief, since now we would be
in a position to say: A practical belief just represents its subject as doing things
which cause things, where all this is expressible in action-neutral terms!
But the vague kind of account imagined is really ambiguous between con-
stituting a genuine but false account and a non-account. Hence any reductive
hopes of the sort sketched must result from a cross-eyed reading which does not
appreciate this ambiguity.
For notice how, so far, we have been using the letter “A” as a stand-in for
anything a subject can do. If we read the “X” just invoked as also a stand-
in for anything a subject can do, then saying a belief about acting in Aing
amounts to a belief about Xing causing Aing is quite obviously false, since
someone can clearly believe they are doing something (like sitting handcu ed
on and to a bicycle) that causally contributes to other things they are doing
(like nearing Kathmandu) without thereby believing they are acting in doing
the latter thing.21 Metaphorically, this form of account asks the notion of causal
21This looks similar to a kind of thesis Anscombe warns against, albeit the warning is
presented as a linguistic observation and is addressed to slightly di erent concerns:
Say I go over to the window and open it. [...] Someone who hears me moving
calls out: What are you doing making that noise? I reply ‘Opening the window’.
[...] But I don’t say the words like this: ‘Let me see, what is this body bringing
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contribution to do all the work in accounting for the content of a belief about
acting, and that notion is simply not up to the task.
If, on the other hand, we read the “X” not as a stand-in for anything a
subject can do, but as ranging over some more restricted set of things a subject
can do, then until that set is specified, the thesis we are considering is not an
account of the object of practical belief, but at most a promise of an account.
This promise is not undermined by observations to the e ect that it is possible
to have a belief of the general shape “X is sitting handcu ed on this bicycle,
which promotes their approaching Kathmandu” without thereby believing X to
be acting in approaching Kathmandu. But its promise will be undelivered unless
we can form some determinate conception of which kinds of doing contribute to
someone’s doings when these are actions.
I think it is possible to deliver on this promise, but only by saying that the
doings which figure in the thought of an agent as the causes of their actions are
themselves actions. If we do not allow ourselves this, we will have to try to give
an account of the following shape:
Event-Causal Practical Belief: For N to believe that N is acting in Aing is
for N to believe that N is Xing, where this doesn’t entail acting in Xing,
and where Xing is some particular type of happening (...), and doing it
causally contributes to N’s Aing.
But it seems impossible to make any headway with this kind of account. The
trouble can be gleaned by taking a particular example. Say someone thinks
they are acting in pushing a stroller to their home. Of course such a subject
might think that they are doing other things, which they do not obviously need
to view as their actions, which contribute to their pushing of the stroller, such
as being alive, or holding the handle with enough force and friction for it not to
about? Ah yes! The opening of the window’. (Anscombe, 1963, p. 51)
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roll down a slope. If the subject is an anatomist, they might know all about the
fine details of bodily processes that support and enable their strolling, but even
if not, they might know that things inside their body make their body push
the stroller with enough force to move it. Even if some such beliefs, which pass
some di cult-to-formulate test of not representing its subject as acting, can or
must be forced into existence by the presence of a practical belief, it still seems
impossible for such beliefs to jointly make up any belief to the e ect that its
subject is acting in doing anything.
To the same extent that this is convincing, we should endorse the following
thesis:
Action-Causal Practical Belief: For N to believe that N is acting in Aing
requires N to believe that N is acting in Xing and that this causally con-
tributes to N’s Aing.
This account overcomes the di culties of the previous, and explains those di -
culties. For the type of belief that we are willing to say represents its subject as
being in a (perhaps very early) phase of acting in clenching their fist, or pumping
balloons, or pushing a stroller, is seemingly always a belief which represents its
subject as acting in doing something else that contributes to clenching, pumping
or pushing.
3.6 Practical Belief is Instrumental
Some critics of Anscombians,22 but also Anscombe herself,23 think that it is
possible to think one is acting in doing something that causally contributes to
something else which, nevertheless, one does not think of oneself as acting in
22Recently notably Paul (2011) and Bishop (2011, p. 219).
23I have in mind the passage involving someone who is pumping poison into their neighbour’s
well but does not “care tuppence” about poisoning them (Anscombe, 1963, p. 42).
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doing. If they are right, we can’t flip the above “requires” to “is”.24
It would simplify matters if we could respond to this problem by denying
its premise, and insist that viewing something as an outcome of one’s action
is viewing that too as one’s action, albeit perhaps as an outcome one doesn’t
care for or about.25 In fact it is quite easy to produce a counterexample to such
insistence: Imagine a subject knowingly acts in playing bowling, and discovers
that the ball is about to hit someone’s foot because they have suddenly stepped
into the lane. They will thereby believe they are acting in playing bowling and
that this causally contributes to someone’s foot being injured. But of course
this doesn’t make it true that the bowler thinks they are acting in generating
that foot injury. It does not seem right to insist, at this point, that the bowler is
acting in injuring, but just doesn’t like it, since the reason for our judgement is
not that the bowler is unhappy with that outcome (they might have thought it
to be a funny accident), but something we might vaguely express by saying that
the bowler doesn’t view the causal relationship between action and outcome to
be of the right sort to confer actionhood on the outcome.26
There seems to be a broader and a narrower way of thinking of the causal
contribution one action makes to another thing one does, and it seems that
only the narrower guarantees that one thinks of the other thing as one’s action.
24Following Aquinas, many think that, when some happening is merely foreseen by a subject,
this has di erent ethical implications from when it is that subject’s action. If that were true
in general, we might have been able to resolve our action-theoretic question by thinking about
di erences of ethical implication between some well-selected cases. Perhaps some are engaged
in this very project. But absent a defence of the conditional — and I can think of none —
this strategy seems flawed.
25As Paul (2011, p. 13) points out, Castañeda can seem to have said something in defence
of such view, since he has said that foreseen byproducts are “endorsed” just as much as
intended consequences (1979, p. 255). But it is not clear-cut, since he has added that though
both are endorsed, foreseeing and intending are distinct “determinates under the determinable
endorsingly thinking” (Castañeda, 1992, p. 452).
26Notice that we could not have produced such a counterexample if we were still in the grip
of a view of practical belief as a perfectively oriented, predictive belief. For on such a view
we could have replied that the subject did not make any predictions about foot injuries right
at the start, when the action was set in motion. Since by now we understand that practical
belief must be such as to accompany and be verified by its object at the time of acting, we
need to respond to the problem by thinking more carefully about what its object is.
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If a subject thinks merely that they are acting in Xing and that this causally
contributes to their Aing, they may not think of themselves as acting in Aing.
But if a subject thinks that they are doing X in order to A, they seemingly
must. This tempts us to define the object or practical belief as follows:
Instrumental Practical Belief: For N to believe that N is acting in Aing is
for N to believe that N is Xing in order to A.
This is, I think, a healthy temptation. But it can look as if we now have to
provide a definition of the connection signified by “in order to” as it figures in
the subject’s practical belief. Sarah Paul has recently charged accounts which
attempt to understand the psychological item that defines action “solely as a
kind of cognitive, belief-like grasp of what one is doing” (2011, p. 12) with a
problem of explaining the di erence between the (cognitively grasped) things
one does which are actions from those (seemingly equally cognitively grasped)
things one does which are mere foreseen side-e ects. She very briefly considers
the move, which we are presently performing, of explaining the di erence by
saying that the contents of the beliefs in question are di erent, and that foreseen
side e ects are not considered as things one does other things in order to do.
She complains of this move as follows:
But it is essential to see that it is not an answer to the problem
simply to help oneself to the notions of “aim,” “means” or “end,”
and read the structure of what we intuitively take the agent to have
done back into the agent’s thought. We are after a theory that
explains what it is to treat a state of a airs as an aim as opposed to
a byproduct. (Paul, 2011, p. 13)
If I understand Paul, the issue she raises is that though we may have an intuitive
idea of a specifically instrumental causal connection between X and A, and
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while it may be definitive of acting in Aing that a subject thinks they are doing
something in order to A (as opposed to just doing something which causes Aing),
this does not provide for a satisfying account until we can explain the nature of
such specifically instrumental connections as they figure in an agent’s thought.27
(Note the very clear a nity between this complaint and the one quoted from
Peacocke on page 71.)
How can we define the kind of causal connection a subject imagines holds
between two happenings when they are doing one in order to do the other? On
comparing cases where things cause things to happen with cases where agents
do things in order to do other things, we find no pertinent di erence in the
causal routes, or the items involved in them. Hence it seems to be a mistake to
introduce thoughts about such di erences to try to account for the di erence
between a thought about causes and one about instrumental causes. But in fact
I think our answer is in our question: When a subject does one thing in order
to do another, they act in causing one by doing the other.
Thus, if our problem was finding some way of eliminating the “in order to”
below —
Instrumental Practical Belief: For N to believe that N is acting in Aing is
for N to believe that N is Xing in order to A
— then it would seemingly be solved by the following:
Instrumental Practical Belief*: For N to believe that N is Xing in order to
A is for N to believe that N is acting in Xing so that it causally contributes
27It might be thought that there is a ready response to this, in that when someone does
X in order to A, what this comes to is that X and A constitute a “unity” which “makes an
intentional action out of them” (Thompson, 2008, p. 132). Suggestive as this sounds, and
ignoring the question of what unities-in-general are, this will have us asking which kind of
unity makes an intentional action out of its elements. Thompson seems to acknowledge that
specifying the requisite kind of unity will require a philosophical account of “the intellectual
aspect” or thought that is involved just when someone does something in order to do something
else (Thompson, 2008, p. 133). This is what I want to provide next, though admittedly there
is something bare or schematic about my specification of this thought.
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to Aing
Instrumental Practical Belief responds to Paul’s original problem of distinguish-
ing actions from foreseen side e ects: Foreseen side e ects aren’t covered by the
agent’s practical belief, since this belief represents its subject as doing some-
thing in order to do what’s done, and since nothing is done in order to produce
a side e ect. Instrumental Practical Belief * then responds to her further worry
that we have no hold of the content of that attitude: For a subject to think of
themselves as doing something in order to do what’s done just is for this subject
to think of themselves as acting in doing something that causally contributes to
that.28
Is it unhelpful to respond to Paul’s two worries by introducing two theses
that are flagrantly interdependent in this way? Since Paul’s original complaint
seemed to be a complaint about introducing analysans in analysandum, and
since it seems that we are still doing this, it can seem that Paul would not be
satisfied with the response. Since Paul is not explicit about the grounds of her
complaint, it is not obvious just why she would object to it. I can think of two
sorts of grounds for complaint: It might be that Paul is simply demanding a
reductive account of the notion of doing something in order to do something else,
which figures in a practical belief. But since this notion seems indispensable for
action theory, and since it does not seem that such an account could be given,
this does not seem to be a good demand to make. Alternatively, it might be that
Paul’s demand is not a general demand for a reductive analysis, but a version of
the more ponderous but less clear kind of worry which we set aside right at the
28“Xing so that it causally contributes to Aing” thus signifies a complex proceeding in which
N is Xing, and where N’s Xing is causally contributing (however indirectly) to Aing, as when,
for example, someone’s planting a seed is causally contributing to their improving next year’s
crops. This notion of a causal contribution, when taken on its own, is not simply a cloaked
way of referring to an instrumental connection. The suggestion is rather that thinking of
someone as acting in e ecting such a causal contribution between X and A, is thinking of
them as Xing in order to A, and vice versa. (This should not be taken as suggesting that
either notion is somehow more “basic” than the other, or that one might be reduced to the
other.)
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start: If Aing in order to B (so that Bing is not a mere unintended side e ect)
is accounted for by saying it involves believing that one is Aing in order to B,
then how are we to give an account of the content of that belief? Will this not
now be impossible? I will return to that form of objection in the fifth chapter,
but before then I want to examine the consequences of the account that has
now fallen into place.29
29The mere fact that only happenings that a subject thinks of themselves as acting in doing
can figure as happenings they think of themselves as doing in order to others should not
generate metaphysical trouble (“what is this queer and unscientific sort of causal connection
that is proper only to action?”) or epistemic trouble (“how does a subject know that they
are acting in making pancakes, since all they encounter in the world is that arms, flour, milk,
eyes, and a spatula are moving around in such-and-such a way!”). For grasping any relation,
including that signified by “... weights as much as ...”, “... is richer than ...”, or “... is made of
cucumbers and ...” requires a grasp of the kinds of item which can be related through it, and
this does not tend to make these relations, nor knowledge of them, seem mysterious. If there
is trouble, it is, I think, generated by the additional fact that grasp of the items that fit in
the “in order to”-relation requires grasp of that relation, as it probably doesn’t in the case of
the “... is made of cucumbers and ...”-relation.
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Chapter 4
Consequences
4.1 Introduction
The present chapter is devoted to examining three consequences of the account
on o er. The first consequence is that it is impossible to act without taking
some other action as a means, and thinking of that action as one’s means.
Hence the notion of a basic action, as well as the notion of a basic practical
belief, is rendered impossible. In defence of this consequence I undermine a
causal regress argument meant to secure the need for basic action, and also
some claims about the limits of an agent’s thinking which are meant to secure
the need for basic practical belief.
The second consequence of the account is that, when coupled with natural
claims about action explanation, due to Ryle and Davidson, it renders every
action explainable by appeal to an agent’s desire to do an action of that kind.
This defends, as has proven di cult to do, the Anscombian contention that the
topic of action is constitutively subject to a special mode of explanation. But
it meets with an objection, found (intertwined with others) in Nagel, to the
102
e ect that desire ascriptions could not be explanatory if their applicability is
guaranteed. But I argue that this objection is mistaken, by appealing to the
fact that there is always more complexity to someone’s desire than is revealed
by the mere fact that they are acting, so that such complexity might always be
appealed to in a genuine explanation of an action.
The third consequence of the account is that it a ords a way to combine
two thoughts which have recently been assumed to be in conflict: One thought
is that the objects of our desires are normally revealed right on the surface of
our ascriptions, but the other is that desire ascriptions are often in some sense
incomplete, revealing only part of what the agent really wants to do. I reconcile
this pair of thoughts by explaining how a desire ascription sometimes specifies
a part of an instrumental chain of desires.
4.2 Basic Action
One way of expressing the results of the previous chapter is as follows:
Simple Practical Belief For N to be acting in Aing is for N to truly believe
that N is acting in Aing, where
Instrumental Acting in Aing = Xing in order to A
Causal Xing in order to A = Acting in (Xing so that it causally contrib-
utes to Aing)
From this way of putting things, it is obvious that the present thesis gener-
ates regresses. One kind of regress runs from action to action: Acting in doing
anything requires acting in doing something else which causally contributes to
that, so acting in doing anything requires acting in doing an infinitely unfolding
set of further things, and, moreover, causal connections between all the actions
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thus performed. Another kind of regress runs from instrumental belief to in-
strumental belief: Since believing one is acting in doing anything requires truly
believing1 one is acting in doing something else which causally contributes to
that, believing one is acting in doing anything requires believing oneself to be
doing an infinitely unfolding set of further actions, and, moreover, believing in
causal connections between all the actions thus believed to be performed.
Our question now becomes whether these regresses are vicious. Some, in-
cluding Danto (1965), have argued that the first sort of regress proves vicious,
and others, including Hornsby (1980), have argued that of the second kind.
These charges have motivated, respectively, the introduction of basic action —
a kind of action which nothing is done in order to do —, and what we might call
“basic practical belief” — a belief that one is acting in doing something which
requires no conception of a means by which one is doing it.2 Either charge of
vicious regress seriously threatens the results of the previous chapter, since if
one can act in doing something, or believe one is acting in doing something,
without acting in doing something else, or believing one is, then instrumental
connections of the sort just sketched would not be definitive of action. (They
might still be definitive of an important kind of action, but reverting to that
line would raise a troublesome question of what unifies this kind with others.)
But in fact the charges of vicious regress rest on weak arguments, as I will next
argue.3
1If acting in doing something only required a belief (true or false) about doing some further
action in order to do it, then it could be argued that infinite beliefs would not be generated.
But the above thesis requires, for doing any action, that there is a true belief which represents
the doing of a further action. So it obviously does generate infinite beliefs.
2Basic action actions are reasonably thought of as those requiring only basic practical
beliefs, and basic practical beliefs as those proper to basic actions, as it would be deeply
uncomfortable (by anyone’s standards, I think) to promote only basic practical beliefs (“N
is doing X in order to A, they just have no idea — to them, it’s just a matter of acting in
Aing!”) or only basic actions (“Silly N believes N is doing X in order to A, they just happen
to be wrong about that — in fact they are doing nothing in order to A! They’re simply acting
in Aing!”)
3Though I think the issue would be worth raising, my discussion below focuses less on the
intelligibility of the basic entities introduced to stop the regresses than on the regresses that
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The first kind of vicious regress argument, and the resulting introduction of
a basic kind of action, was made prominent by Danto. But curiously Danto’s
original formulation of the regress does very little to explain why it is vicious.
Considering a case where someone named M is acting in pushing a stone, Danto
says this:
[I]n order to cause the motion of the stone, something else must be
done, or must happen, which is an event distinct from the motion of
the stone, and which stands to it as cause to e ect. Now this other
event may or may not be a basic action of M ’s. But if it is not, and
if it remains nevertheless true that moving the stone is an action of
his, then there must be something else that M does, which causes
something to happen which in turn causes the motion of the stone.
And this may be a basic action or it may not. But now this goes
on forever unless, at some point, a basic action is performed by M.
(Danto, 1965, p. 145)
Danto’s regress argument for basic action proceeds by asking, for each action
performed, whether it is caused by another “distinct” action or not, noting
that the series of actions must either be infinite or not, and reasoning from the
apparent absurdity of infinite actions to the necessity of introducing uncaused
action.
Since we understand instrumental connections so as to require causal ones,
we must construe Danto’s argument for the existence of uncaused action as
an argument for the existence of instrumentally basic action. For if (as we’re
assuming) Aing in order to B requires acting in Aing in such a way that it
causally contributes to Bing, and if (as Danto argues) some actions are not
caused by other actions, then some actions must be such that nothing is done
are supposed to motivate their introduction.
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in order to do them. And hence we can find no comfort in the following sort of
response to Danto’s argument:
Lavin, who is o cially an opponent of basicness, says that, even granting
that there is basic action in the sense of an action which poses “a limit to a series
of causal dependencies”, this does not establish that there is basic action in the
more action-theoretically crucial sense of an action which nothing is done “in
order to” do (Lavin, 2013, p. 282). As should be obvious, this is exactly the sort
of move that is unavailable to someone who, like me, thinks that instrumental
connections between actions require causal connections. But Lavin’s response
seems quite incomplete even when taken on its own terms, since it leaves us in
the dark about the conception of instrumental connections on which he thinks
they can exist without causal ones.
Lavin’s only real characterisation of an instrumental connection between
actions is this negative one: It does not require a causal connection. Lavin can
seem to expand on this point when he says that N can do something in order
to A even if N’s Aing “cannot be analyzed” (Lavin, 2013, p. 282) as a causal
consequence of something N did. But whatever this might be thought to add
to the basic negative point only makes that point more confusing: What does
it mean for N’s action to be analysable as an e ect of something N did? It
does not seem plausible to say of any action that it is an action just in virtue
of being an e ect of another action. For if we consider an episode simply as an
outcome of a subject’s action, we will never seem to have enough information
to call that episode this subject’s action.4
But perhaps Lavin does not mean to make any such suggestion about ana-
lysability. Perhaps he simply means to endorse what I called the basic negative
point: There might be causally basic actions — actions not caused by other
actions — even if there are no “teleologically basic” actions — actions not done
4Remember chapter 1.3.
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by doing other actions. Why should we think that Lavin is right on this basic
negative point? Let’s bring in one of Lavin’s supposed illustrations of the thesis.
Lavin says that a captain may, for example, be breaking a seal in order to push a
button, although the captain is doing nothing that causally contributes to their
pushing the button (Lavin, 2013, p. 282). But this is hardly a pre-theoretically
apparent example of what Lavin wants to prove. Why not say that the instru-
mental connection between breaking and pushing introduces causation? After
all, the captain’s breaking of the seal enables and facilitates encounter between
finger and button, as even Lavin (2013, p. 298, n. 19) apparently grants.
Hence it seems that the contention must stem either from some unargued
restrictiveness concerning causation (which may not be the conception which
features in Danto’s argument, so that Lavin’s response is not really responsive
to that argument)5 or from a witheld conception of the nature of instrumental
connections (which, if my argument in chapter 3.4 is successful, must be mis-
taken). In either case there is nothing in Lavin’s response which gives positive
sense to the thesis that, even if some actions are uncaused causers, all may be in-
strumental ends. So Lavin’s defence against Danto is a retreat too far, guarding
against the argument for basic action by pulling causality out of instrumental
connections, thereby leaving instrumental connections in obscurity.
Back to the question of why action should be impossible if it always required
a further and instrumentally subservient action. There is, of course, an infinite
number of potential suggestions, but it is not so easy to come up with reasonable
ones. One of the most natural suggestions is to say that, since every action taken
as means to another action needs to be taken (however slightly) before that
further action starts to be pursued, then taking infinite means-actions would
5For example, it might be Lavin’s supposition that pushing five buttons cannot be a cause
of pushing 50 if it is, in an intuitive sense, part of the pushing of the 50. I see no problem
with adopting a notion of causation which introduces such a restriction, but it is not obvious
that Danto’s argument rests on any such restricted notion of causation.
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take infinite time, which surely would make acting impossible, taking, as acting
seems to, finite time.
This might be the kind of suggestion Danto has in mind when using the word
“distinct” in the quote above. But here there seems to be nothing wrong with
denying the premise. Why think that means always must be pursued before their
ends? If someone breaks an egg in order to make an omelette, the breaking does
not start before the making. Since at least some means do not extend further
back in time than their ends, infinite instrumental connections need not extend
an action infinitely.
Once we focus our attention on the instrumental connections that reside
within the time frame of an action we invite a di erent sort of objection, raised
and dismissed by Thompson (2008, p. 109). The objection is that since every
action taken as a means needs to meet some minimal spatiotemporal threshold
(for reasons having to do with our inability to think about things moving along
very small distances or time intervals), and since, if there is an action taken as
a means to every action, some actions must be pushed below that threshold (for
reasons that are not yet entirely clear), then acting must be impossible, since
it would require agents to think about things the spatiotemporal boundaries of
which are out of their cognitive reach.
Some such inference may be valid, but there seems to be ample opportun-
ity for questioning the first, and maybe also the second premise. As Thompson
noncommittally notes, we can deny the first premise of such an argument by ad-
opting the “high road of insisting that the intuitive apprehension of trajectories
involved in continuous intentional action always involves an intuitive apprehen-
sion of all of the part[-actions taken as means to] all of them, no matter how
small” (Thompson, 2008, p. 110).
And I do not see anything wrong with the high road. If someone knows
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they’re moving their arm along a stretch — say from the side of their body
to a window — they’ll plausibly know that this stretch can be divided into
arbitrarily small further stretches. If now we take some arbitrarily tiny stretch
along which their arm is currently moving, then why couldn’t we say that they
know they are moving their arm along this tiny stretch too? There seems to be
no clear reason for supposing that such a movement, however minuscule, is out
of reach to the thoughts of such a subject.
There also seems to be room for questioning the second premise of the present
sort of argument. To see this, let’s not take the high road for the sake of
argument. Let’s assume that there are minimum spatiotemporal thresholds for
what can figure in an agent’s instrumental belief. Why should we suppose that,
if there are infinite means actions taken to every action, some of them must be
pushed below this threshold?
To try to illustrate how someone might arrive at such a thought, consider
a case where someone is acting in pushing a boulder from point A to point Z.
Suppose we keep iterating the thought that, if they’re pushing it from A to Z,
they must be doing it by pushing it from A to F, which they must be doing
by pushing it from A to C, and so on. Since in so doing we keep making the
means actions shorter, smaller and harder to circumscribe from the macroscopic
point of view, it may seem that we’re fast approaching the minimum threshold
— some stretch of pushing, say from A to B, such that the agent can no longer
think of themselves as pushing the boulder along any substretch as a means to
doing that.
Even if we go along with this, substretches are not the only place in which
we may look for instrumentally subservient actions, and it seems possible to
find other sorts of action which are performed as means to pushing the boulder
from A to B. For example, the agent might be whispering “you can do it!” to
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themselves, hoping this will help boost the pushing, or they might be breathing
athletically, or, if such things are allowed (and why not?) they might be acting
in staying on a rigid exercise routine, running back for years, for the sake of
being able to push such boulders when the need arises, or even just (still —
why not?) just in staying fit enough to make their current project so much
as conceivable. Of course the agent may not be taking any of these particular
means in the case at hand, but why suppose that they must not take some
such preparatory or promoting means, thereby extending the instrumental chain
beyond the boundaries of their pushing of the boulder?6
The second type of objection, targeting our claims about the omnipresence
of instrumental belief in action, has been made, perhaps most prominently, by
Hornsby (1980):7
Among the things a person knows how to do, some of them he must
know how to do ‘just like that’, on pain of needing to ascribe to
him indefinitely many distinct pieces of knowledge to account for
his ability[.] (Hornsby, 1980, p. 88)
The idea of Hornsby’s objection, I think, is that if we say that doing an action
requires knowledge of how to do it, and if we say that knowing how to do an
action requires knowing how to do a further action, which one takes as a means
to doing it, then we will have the absurd consequence that an acting subject
possesses “indefinitely many distinct pieces of knowledge”. Hence, according to
6Thompson does not discuss this kind of response. This is probably because he is less
interested in defending the general idea that there are infinite instrumental chains of action
wherever there is one action, than the more specific idea that, moreover, these infinite actions
are ‘organ-like parts’ of the action to which they contribute (Thompson, 2008, p. 107). An
organ-like part of an action seems to be a means taken to an action, but not performed before
that action, as egg breaking is a means to omelette making, which does not start before it. If
Thompson is only interested in finding means that are organ-like parts, within the time frame
of every action, the present sort of response does not help him. But since I do not operate
with such a restriction, it helps me.
7The objection ties into a recent discussion about the relationship between know-how and
knowledge-that (Stanley and Williamson, 2001; Hornsby and Stanley, 2005).
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this objection, we must say that some of the things a person knows how to do
do not require such knowledge of a further type of action — they are things the
agent “just knows” how to do.
It is tempting to ask of Hornsby, and others who say similar things, just
what is supposed to be the content of this knowledge, which so far has only been
characterised negatively. But that is not our present topic, as we are interested
in the charge of vicious regress itself. The question we should ask, I think,
is why it couldn’t be the case that an acting subject possesses an indefinite or
infinite number of pieces of knowledge — or as I’ll mostly keep saying, an infinite
number of true beliefs. (The di erence between true belief and knowledge still
does not matter for our purposes.)
There could be many di erent sorts of answer to this question. One answer
would be that something in the nature of believing (or knowing) makes it im-
possible to have beliefs (or pieces of knowledge) without limit. But here I think
our view should be quite the opposite:
For example, knowing how to do an appropriately delimited subset of basic
mathematics precisely does seem to require having an infinite number of basic
arithmetical beliefs, such as, for example, that 6 + 4 is the same as 10, that
both of these are the same as 9 + 2 - 1, that these, even together, are less than
139, and so on. And even if, for some reason, which I do not think I would
accept, it is judged that the number of beliefs needed to know this basic chunk
of mathematics is not infinite, it is very unclear why there should be any deep
problem about saying so.
Similar things could reasonably be proposed about basic spatiotemporal un-
derstanding: Perhaps if someone knows enough about how size works, there’s
no end to the number of comparative size judgements they’ll be able to make.
And perhaps the same thing is true about good taste, so that if someone has
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enough of it, there will be no end to the possible combinations of flavour or
notes on which they’ll be able to give reasonable verdicts.
A di erent type of objection targets the psychological realism, or maybe
even the psychological possibility, of supposing that there are infinitely many
instrumental beliefs present where an agent acts. One objection of this type
is that if someone is acting in tying their shoelaces, we cannot keep iterating
the thought that they are taking some other action as a means to tying their
sholaces, since beyond some point we will not be able to find a course of action
that seems to “pass through the mind” of the acting subject.
This is an example of a type of objection that is fairly common in philosophy.
But that sort of objection faces a standard response. For if the concern is that
infinite courses of action need not necessarily pass through the mind of someone
who is acting in tying their shoelaces, a simple response is that what passes
through someone’s mind should not be identified with what they believe.
Stanley and Williamson (2001) have recently made such defensive points,
citing the less recent example of Ginet (1975). But the defence seems to instan-
tiate Wittgenstein’s (1953) and Anscombe’s (1963) persistent warnings against
trying to understand several classes of psychological fact in terms of things being
present to consciousness as objects are to perception — against supposing that,
if someone is aware of an intention, knows a rule or language, etc., then some
thought or impression on the matter must somehow occur in their mind. Trying
to model these psychological features on perception or conscious entertaining
is mistaken, and the case of belief is a prime example of the mistake. But if,
now, a subject’s beliefs about what they’re doing need not end where their oc-
current thoughts or impressions on the matter do, absence of these occurrent
phenomena does not prove absence of belief.
There’s a di erent type of objection, which does not rest on the limits to
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what someone can occurrently think about or consciously entertain, but rather
on the limits to what is in some intuitive sense “available” to their thinking.
Even granting that beliefs must not pass through the mind, someone might ask
how it could be that someone who is acting in tying has a true belief how they
do it, if they are not even in a position to describe how, with prompting and
reflection. How can an agent count as believing something which is not, in this
vague but intuitive sense, available to them?
Here there is a possible analogy with the case of perceptual experience. For
in that case, it can be tempting to move from our di culties with articulating
the complexities of how we tell that something has, for example, the taste of
strawberry, to vague conclusions like the following: The taste of strawberry is
simply given, just impinges. Or: One knows “just like that” what that taste is
like, though one has no idea how one manages to know it.
The resulting claim is mysterious to me, just as it is mysterious to me how a
subject could know “just like that” how they are doing their actions. But even
someone who does not think there is a mystery here should be suspicious of the
inference from current inability to articulate “how we tell”, to conclusions to the
e ect that there is no way in which we tell. Churchland makes vivid that there
seemingly can be features by which someone tells that something has, say, the
taste of strawberry, even if they are not in a position to say what these features
are:
I may indeed be unable to specify any sub-dimensions whose peculiar
concatenation constitutes the sound of my brother’s voice, or the
poppy’s visual orange, or the taste of thyme, or the smell of yellow
cedar. But neither could the still-learning child specify, at least at
the outset, the taste of sweetness, the taste of creaminess, and the
taste of strawberry-ness as constituting sub-dimensions of her taste
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of the ice-cream cone, even though those elements were undoubtedly
there, and even though she subsequently came to appreciate them.
(Churchland, 2014, p. 47)
Bracketing the question of just what Churchland means by a “sub-dimension”,
his idea seems to be this: Yes, it is true that if someone experiences a voice as
being their brother’s, they may not be able to say — even with some prompting
and reflection — on the basis of what they find that it is their brother’s voice.
But no, this does not undermine the idea that, when they do experience a
voice as being their brother’s, they discriminate it as such on the basis of some
features of this voice.
Discriminating something as such-and-such’s voice on the basis of some of
its features apparently requires that these features (be it some characteristic
patterns in how the voice’s pitch is modulated, or something about its volume
or pace) are available to the discriminator. So Churchland’s point requires us
to say that, although there is perhaps an intuitive sense in which these features
are not available to the discriminator (in that they cannot easily say what the
features are, even with prompting and reflection), there is another sense in which
these features are available.
In fact this idea is not untoward, since it is not clear how we could possibly
make sense of a subject’s ability to tell whether a voice is their brother’s without
attributing to them an ability to register those features of a voice which are likely
to reveal this. Hence though we have no very detailed account of the two forms
of availability we need to make sense of Churchland’s thought, what he says
seems to be enough to show that there is nothing conclusive about an argument
like “N is experiencing something as having the taste of strawberry ice-cream,
but can’t say on the basis of which features of the ice-cream this impression
is formed, so there can be no features on the basis of which this impression is
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formed”.
Once we see that there is a sense in which something can be available to
thought which does not require its subject to be able to describe it — even with
some prompting and reflection — we’ll see that, analogously, there is nothing
conclusive about an argument of the form: “N is acting in moving their legs
(or doing something with their muscles, moving their body, making an e ort
to move their body, or another of the innumerable possible candidates for an
action done ‘just like that’), but can’t say what they are taking as their means
to so doing, so there can be nothing which they believe is their means to doing
it”.
Just as in the case of experience, someone’s inability to say how they do an
action should not be thought to undermine the thought that, when they do this
action, some conception of a means by which they do it is available to them. It
should not be a convincing case for basic action that there are cases where we
have trouble in conveying how we do our actions.
4.3 Action Explanation
4.3.1 Constitutive Explanations
Facing the question of what “distinguishes actions which are intentional” Anscombe
famously said that it is the applicability of “a certain sense of the question
‘Why?”’ (Anscombe, 1963, p. 9). She seems to have meant that part of what
it is for a subject to be acting is for what they’re doing to to belong to a kind
of occurrence which has a certain kind or form of explanation — the kind of
explanation that would answer that kind of why-question.8
8Ford (2015) develops some such understanding of Anscombe’s project, in part via a com-
parison with Frege’s work on arithmetical explanation. The material in this section is some-
what indebted to Ford, and is at least prima facie compatible with the existence of the
connections Ford draws between action and arithmetic, though I have little to say on Ford’s
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If this is what Anscombe meant, we may note that there is an important
but neglected sense in which action theorists nearly universally practice it. For
almost everyone who tries to supply an account of action more or less overtly
introduces an explanatory connection between an agent’s action and some sort
of explanans deemed essential to the occurrence of the action. The explanatory
relationships introduced may or may not be called causal, are sometimes coun-
ted “teleological”, and about equally often “normative”. The elements deemed
proper to function as explanans vary: Sometimes they are said to be psycholo-
gical items (such as an intention, a trying, a volition, a belief about the good,
or a Rylean inclination) and sometimes they are deemed to be things external
to the mind of the acting subject (a “normative reason”, on various understand-
ings of that term). For all these di erences, the overarching tendency is clear:
Introduce some element in the dual role of being a necessary part (or at least
necessarily mostly a part) of the fact that someone is acting in doing something,
and at the same time explanatory of their acting as they do.
But having noticed this neglected point of convergence, someone may object
to it: Isn’t how we explain things a di erent matter from what the explained
things are, and isn’t it true that there are many and interest-relative ways of
explaining why someone does an action, whereas, if acting has a nature, it ought
not to be relative to these contingent interests, so that it would be a mistake
to try to define action through a kind of explanation? It might be some such
worry that Smith is responding to when he spontaneously declares the following
in support of what I think of as the Anscombian assumption:
A belief-desire explanation of a bodily movement is [...], as we might
put it, a constitutive explanation of an action[.] Other explanations
of actions may be available, but they are all non-constitutive: their
contention that the supposed action explanation “for no particular reason” (when asked why
one is doodling) corresponds to the arithmetical explanation “none” (when asked how many
stones one has in one’s pocket).
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availability is not what makes our bodily movements into actions.
(Smith, 2009, p. 58)
For this idea, that (a certain kind of) explainability by appeal to a belief-desire
pair is what makes it the case that someone is acting, would of course play a part
in justifying Smith’s desire to put such explainability at the heart of his account
of what it is to act. Stoutland clarifies this contention on part of theorists like
Smith by saying that on the “causal theory [...] an intentional act just is an
act that has a certain kind of explanation” (Stoutland, 1980, p. 351). If that
contention is true, then there could be no way of avoiding introducing a certain
kind of explanatory connection in an account of what it is to act.
Ignoring the details of Smith’s own view, but employing the insight behind
his use of the term “constitutive”, we may express the strongest version of this
apparent guiding assumption of action theory as follows:
Constitutive Action Explanation
a Whenever a subject is acting in doing something, an explanation of a
particular form, with a particular kind of explanans, is true of what
they’re doing
b Whenever an explanation of a particular form, with a particular kind
of explanans, is true of what a subject is doing, then that subject is
acting in doing it
c The two forms of explanation and the two sorts of explanans mentioned
in a and b are the same
Smith expresses, and Stoutland describes, accounts which try to make good on
Constitutive Action Explanation, but the commitment is shared by many others
working in action theory, if sometimes with ambivalence.
117
To see this, note first that the kind of theorist who thinks that the possib-
ility of giving a rationalising explanation — one which exhibits a further end
or reason for doing something — proves that the agent acted for the sake of
that reason or with that end in view, goes along at least with b above. It is
true that such a theorist may take a more hesitant attitude towards a and (con-
sequently) c above, since it can seem possible to act in a way which cannot be
explained by appeal to a reason or end (as perhaps in cases involving doodling
or acting on minor odd compulsions). But even so, it lends some support to
Constitutive Action Explanation that, because this kind of theorist has not de-
scribed a kind of explanation that is omnipresent in action, they do not really
seem to possess a full account of what it is to act. Those actions which do not
seem to be performed for the sake of further ends or reasons are precisely those
which the present kind of theorist will find it di cult to incorporate in their
account of what it is to act. For what could plausibly make these marginal odd
compulsions into actions, if they do not share in the kind of explainability which
defines the primary specimens?
Then note that the kind of theorist who is liable to view action as the
sort of episode that is caused by the presence of some bit of psychology must
endorse at least a above, on the hard-to-deny assumption that “... is caused
by ...” entails “... is potentially explainable through mention of ...”. It is true
that such a theorist may then reject b, and consequently c, on the basis of
the previously considered deviant causal chain cases, where subjects seem to be
subject to the causal form of explanation invoked without acting. But again,
this can seem to lend support to Constitutive Action Explanation, since, as was
noted in the second chapter, a theorist who invokes such a bland form of causal
explainability will face what looks like insurmountable trouble in completing
their account by adding further conditions su cient for action. Again, failure to
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conform to Constitutive Action Explanation seems to lead to a failure to provide
a satisfactory account of action, suggesting that, to do better, an account must
do justice to Constitutive Action Explanation.
Below I want to show, in outline, how to formulate a conception of a kind
of explanation which is constitutive of action in the sense that Constitutive Ac-
tion Explanation describes, and which consequently occupies a Goldilocks niche
between those conceptions of action explanation which overload such explana-
tions with normative and ends-oriented thoughts, so that such explanations are
not always possible where subjects act, and those that view the explainability
at issue as a matter of basic causal relatedness, so that such explanations are
sometimes possible where no one acts. Not surprisingly, the form of explanation
I favour is one on which an agent’s actions are declared to be exercises of the
dispositions which are this agent’s desires. It thereby views the explanation of
action as a species of dispositional explanation. After defending this form of
constitutivism about action explanation, I will respond to an objection, due to
Nagel, which has it that, if it is guaranteed that an acting subject wants to do
what they’re doing, mention of such a desire can’t explain their action.
4.3.2 Dispositional Explanations
Why do I want to tell him about an intention too, as well as telling
him what I did? [B]ecause I want to tell him something aboutmyself,
which goes beyond what happened at that time. (Wittgenstein,
1953, §659)
Paraphrasing this quote, it asks what the explanatory point is of saying that
some action stems from some intention, and answers that it is to provide inform-
ation about the agent. This simple answer seems unavoidable, but it raises the
further simple question of what sort of information it is that such an explana-
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tion provides about the agent. If now we identify Wittgenstein’s intentions with
Ryle’s motives, we can see Ryle as providing a further answer to this further
question, albeit perhaps Ryle’s answer is still somewhat incomplete:
To say that he did something from that motive is to say that this
action, done in its particular circumstances, was just the sort of
thing that that was an inclination to do. It is to say ‘he would do
that’. (Ryle, 1949, pp. 92-93)
Elaborating a little, Ryle says this:
The imputation of a motive for a particular action is [...] analogous
to the explanation of reactions and actions by reflexes and habits,
or to the explanation of the fracture of the glass by reference to its
brittleness. (Ryle, 1949, p. 90)
Identifying Wittgenstein’s intentions, and now Ryle’s motives, with my desires,
we may easily see the above as suggesting that, in explaining an agent’s action by
appeal to their desire, we are making an appeal to the presence of a disposition
on the part of the agent, and a disposition to do “just the sort of thing” which
the agent is doing. Hence saying that some agent does something out of some
desire (or motive or intention) is saying that this agent is the kind of agent
that is disposed to do that type of thing, which amounts, in however a limited
sense, to explaining their action. Of course the Rylean proposal, as so far
presented, is vague in several respects. It leaves out the point that if there’s a
disposition, there must be some associated condition such that, when it obtains,
that disposition is exercised. But this point seems present in the following quote:
The statement ‘he boasted from vanity’ ought[...] to be construed as
saying ‘he boasted on meeting the stranger and his doing so satisfies
the law-like proposition that whenever he finds a chance of securing
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the admiration and envy of others, he does whatever he thinks will
produce this admiration and envy’. (Ryle, 1949, p. 89)
Here Ryle seems to say that, where there’s explanation by motive (or desire or
intention), there is an appeal to a disposition of a sort which is exercised in
some type of condition. Ryle also seems to say that the relevant condition —
the one in which a vain motive manifests — is the presence of some belief about
what might count as such a manifestation. And on both these points I think
Ryle is right.
However, the above quote also seems to introduce further claims, which are
more troublesome. Ryle’s apparent idea that one can understand “is disposed to
A in condition C” as “is such as to A whenever C obtains”, is problematic, and
especially so if the “whenever” is attributed something of the force of a law of
nature.9 Ryle, further, is not very whole-hearted about circumscribing motives-
as-such so as to form a category of explanans constitutively able to explain an
agent’s actions.10 This is natural given that Ryle’s primary interests seem to lie
in the area of action explanation, not action theory, and since he seems not to
draw a very tight connection between the two. But even in giving specifications
of individual types of motive, like vanity, in order to exhibit the general point
that motive explanations (like “he boasted from vanity” are dispositional, Ryle
only gives quite rough specifications which can seem merely provisional. (Must
someone who boasts from vanity be the sort of person Ryle describes? And could
not someone — someone who tends to talk about themselves when nervous —
be similarly disposed, and exercise the disposition, and even boast in so doing,
and yet not boast from vanity?) But these potentially problematic features,
9See chapter 2.3.2 on page 61 for the obvious objection. But see also Ryle’s brief statements
about laws contra dispositions (Ryle, 1949, p. 43) and his brief attempts to deal with excep-
tions to ability ascriptions (Ryle, 1949, pp. 123-124) for evidence against an exceptionless
reading of “whenever” in the above quote.
10As is apparent from a brief section about distinguishing motives from other types of
disposition (Ryle, 1949, p. 110), Ryle is not even very whole-hearted about sharply delimiting
the category.
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concerning Ryle’s conception of the modal force of disposition ascriptions, and
his methods of individuating the conditions and doings which single out motives-
as-such, seem inessential to the previously introduced core of his view. I mention
them only to put them aside.
Having done so, we may note how well the good parts of Ryle’s disposition-
alism about motives seem to dovetail with a further but brief pronouncement
made by the later Davidson:
If a person is constituted in such a way that if he believes that by
acting in a certain way he will crush a snail he has a tendency to act
in that way, then in this respect he di ers from most other people,
and this di erence will help explain why he acts as he does. The
special fact about how he is constituted is one of his causal powers,
a disposition to act under specified conditions in specific ways. Such
a disposition is what I mean by a pro-attitude. (Davidson, 2004, p.
108)
Now viewing Davidson’s pro-attitudes as of a piece with the other types of
attitude we’ve been considering, we can see Davidson as saying that, not only
is citing a desire to explain an action citing a disposition to do what is thereby
done, but, more specifically, that it is citing a disposition to do the type of
action at issue in conditions where the agent believes that what’s done is a way
to do that type of action.
Davidson gives these explanations a shape that must be constitutive of action
if my account of the nature of action is correct: If acting is exercising a desire to
do a type of action in conditions where there’s a belief which represents the agent
as doing that type of action, and if citing such a disposition is explanatory of an
agent’s action, then the applicability of the form of explanation which Davidson
apparently describes must be constitutive of action.
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If someone has indeterminate doubts about the cogency of such explana-
tions, these may be alleviated by noting that the form of explanation is familiar
from other places: Just as it is explanatory to appeal to a reflex, or a property
of brittleness, or a photosynthetic propensity, it is explanatory to appeal to a
desire, since all are dispositions, mentioning which functions to give a certain
kind of information about why the subjects at issue would do what they are do-
ing. Someone might, I suppose, query this proposal further, by asking whether,
even in these other cases, we have genuine examples of explanation. Perhaps
this complaint would rest on the idea that ascriptions of dispositions are not, as
such, explanatory. But that is a very large and implausible assumption, which
I will set aside.
But what about the more local complaint that, whether or not mentioning
dispositions can in general be explanatory, it could not be explanatory to explain
someone’s action by appeal to a disposition called a desire, if the presence
of a desire is entailed by doing the action? Analogously, one might question
whether brittleness can explain breaking if breaking is construed in such a way
that it entails brittleness. I will not get into any such analogous worry about
the explanatory force of entailed dispositions. But below I will examine this
type of objection, which essentially questions the idea of a dispositional and yet
constitutive form of explanation, as it pertains, specifically, to the case of action.
4.3.3 Nagellian Objections
In this spirit, Nagel has at one point sought to undermine the thesis that “a
desire of the agent must always be operative if the action is to be genuinely his”
(Nagel, 1970, p. 27). But the discussion which follows this statement of Nagel’s
target suggests that Nagel is really out to undermine two thoughts, both of
which might be described by something like the above quote, though they are
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really quite distinct.
The first thought which Nagel seems out to undermine is that the reason for
an agent’s action is always a desire on the part of this agent. At least that is
the thesis which I take Nagel’s target to be when he suggests, for example, that
where someone acts for a reason, “the presence of a desire is [not] a necessary
condition for the presence of the reason” (Nagel, 1970, p. 30).
The second thought which Nagel seems out to undermine — albeit perhaps
it is only an intermediate aim for him, is that an agent’s action is always ex-
plainable by appeal to the agent’s desire. At least that is how I interpret his
apparent claim that, where someone acts for a reason, “[having a desire to do
it] is a necessary condition of [the] e cacy [of their reason], but only a logically
necessary condition. It is not necessary either as a contributing influence, or as
a causal condition.” (Nagel, 1970, p. 30).
On the surface level, at least, these two objections seem distinct. For it
seems perfectly in order to say that every action is explainable by a desire, even
if not every action is done on the basis of a reason that is a desire. And in fact
that is precisely the line I will take. But since Nagel makes the two objections
in the same pages, and doesn’t emphasise their distinctness, it can seem that
someone who goes along with Nagel’s first objection must go along also with
his second one, either because the first objection somehow entails the second,
or because it derives its force from the second. But below I want to show that
neither is the case.
For Nagel’s objection to the idea that an agent’s reason is always constituted
by this agent’s desire seems to have the following shape:
N1 Subjects act, and when they do it is necessary that they want to do the
performed action (Nagel, 1970, p. 29).
Though Nagel does not explicitly say why he thinks this, this is a reasonable
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and, as I have argued, true claim.
N2 When someone acts, their desire to do the performed action is either based
on a reason, or it is a desire which has “simply assail[ed]” them (Nagel,
1970, p. 29).
The contrast here is one between desires formed by thinking about the reasons
there are for wanting things, and desires like hunger, which tend to have a more
arational aetiology. I do not know whether Nagel thinks desires in the second
category need be especially passionate or brute, but it does not seem necessary
to think so for making his argument. Something like a sudden desire to doodle,
touch an elbow, or make a funny remark might fit into the same category as
suddenly impinging hunger.
Nagel then suggests this:
N3 But it is not the case that, whenever someone acts, their desire to do the
performed action has simply assailed them (Nagel, 1970, p. 29).
Here it seems that Nagel thinks that, if we were not to accept N3, we would have
to endorse the absurd claim that doing something wanted is always like acting
on a sudden urge or craving, or (I suppose) like acting on a sudden impulse
to touch an elbow or make a funny remark, making impossible “motivational
action at a distance” (Nagel, 1970, p. 27).
Nagel then seems to say the following:
N4 When someone acts, and their desire to do the performed action is based
on a reason, then this reason is not always (and perhaps it is never) the
presence of a further desire (Nagel, 1970, p. 30).
At least, says Nagel, there is “no reason to believe” that every desire is adopted
on the basis of another desire, and seems much more reasonable to think that
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sometimes (or often, or maybe always), something like a consideration concern-
ing future happiness, or the welfare of others, is the reason on the basis of which
a desire is adopted (Nagel, 1970, p. 29).
Nagel then takes this further step:
N5 When someone acts, and their desire to do the performed action is based
on a reason that is not the presence of a further desire, the presence of
this desire is not this subject’s reason for this action.
Nagel fills in this last claim by saying that “[o]ften the desires which an agent
[...] experiences in acting will be motivated exactly as the action is”, and even
motivated, to make the point more explicit, “by precisely what motivates the
action” (Nagel, 1970, p. 31). He suggests that, in such cases, we should not
say that this desire is the reason for this action, but rather that the reason for
the desire is equally a reason for that action. For an example of this, we might
say that, although it might be entailed by someone’s helping their neighbour
that they want to, the reason for both the helping and the wanting to might be
something that is not a desire, such as, perhaps, the neighbour’s need for help.
And of course a single example like this is really all that Nagel needs to show
that someone can act on a reason that is not a desire, nor in any important
sense constituted by the presence of their desire.
Nagel’s argument proceeds by introducing a series of choices (is every desire
unmotivated or not? and must a motivated desire be adopted on the basis of a
further desire or not?) and arguing, in each case, for the adoption of one choice,
finally arriving at N5, and thereby rejecting views which try to construe an
agent’s reasons as always constituted by this agent’s desires. I find each of the
five claims, including N5, entirely plausible. But it is quite clear that none of
these claims introduce the idea that a desire is somehow incapable of explaining
an action.
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Still it is true that Nagel does make some such claim. And it might be
thought that the claim does in some implicit way support his argument. For it
can seem that a claim about the explanatory ineptitude of desires is supposed to
provide some support to N4. To bring out how it might be thought to support
it, consider first a possible opponent to Nagel, proposing that whenever a desire
is based on something — something we may perhaps call a “reason” for this
desire — this in fact amounts to the desire being based on a further desire.
Such an opponent would be committed to supposing that forming, say, a desire
to help someone that needs help, is really a matter of realising some fact about
one’s own desires, and adopting some further desire on the basis of that one:
“Wait, I want to help people who need help — so I want to help this person,
who I realise does need help.”
This kind of view is misguided for making practical reasoning seem oddly
insular, but Nagel’s argument, in so far as I have presented it up to now, does
not clearly explain what is misguided about it. It can then seem that some
claim about the explanatory meekness of desire is meant to perform this duty,
and thereby support N4. But if so it is very unclear how that is supposed to
work. It might be thought that when Nagel says that desire “is not necessary
either as a contributing influence, or as a causal condition” (Nagel, 1970, p. 30)
when someone acts, he simply means that desires cannot explain actions at all.
He could then make the following very simple sort of argument: Desires can’t
explain actions, but reasons can, so reasons aren’t desires. But if Nagel thought
that this was a good argument, it would be unclear why he goes through the
trouble of providing the above five-stage argument, which is quite involved.
In any case, the argument does not seem to be a very good one, since the
suggestion that desires are incapable of explaining actions is both implausible
and unargued. Hence, in sum, Nagel’s argument, against desires-as-reasons
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can be read in two ways, neither of which makes it plausible that desires can’t
explain. On one reading, the argument, successful or not, leaves it open whether
desires can explain. On another interpretation, the argument rests on the idea
that desires can’t explain, but does not really give grounds for thinking so.
To drive home how one might cling to the idea that desires can explain
without thinking of desires as an agent’s reasons, consider also Dancy’s (2000,
especially chapter 5) kindred argument, which, it seems, reinforces Nagel’s con-
clusion about reasons, without forcing any particular view of the role of desires
in explaining actions. This argument makes use of the idea of acting for a good
reason, and suggests, quite convincingly, that someone prepared to postulate
psychological items in the role of reason could not make sense of this idea.
Dancy’s argument, further, targets not only the thesis that an agent’s reasons
are always this agent’s desires, but also other forms of “psychologism” about
reasons. The core of Dancy’s argument is, I think, that psychologism is the
weakest member of this inconsistent triad:11
Psycholigism Whenever someone acts for a reason, their reason is that they
believe or desire something
Normative Constraint Sometimes when someone acts for a reason, their
reason is a good reason reason for them to so act
11I acknowledge that this formulation misses out on much of the subtlety of Dancy’s dis-
cussion. For example, it ignores his preceding discussion of the relative weaknesses of some
varieties of psychologism, opting rather to tweak his main argument in such a way that it
clearly targets all. It also reconstitutes an opaque claim, on which Dancy puts a lot of em-
phasis, that “motivating and normative reasons should be capable of being identical” (Dancy,
2000, p. 106) as the claim, below, that agents sometimes act for reasons that are good. The
intent of the two formulations is probably the same, but Dancy’s formulation has me thinking
of a set of motivating reasons, a set of normative reasons, and an intersection between them,
which seems to require some principled conception of what goes into the respective sets, in-
viting metaphysical detours about the nature of reasons. Worse, it seems to require a prior
conception of a motivating-or-normative reason which makes such intersections possible, in-
viting a charge of begging the question. Dancy seems alert to this in noting that his argument
“rests an enormous amount on” (Dancy, 2000, p. 106) the emphasised claim. I am hoping to
provide a slight dialectical improvement, below, by presenting Dancy’s normative constraint
in such a way that it does not introduce anything like his conclusion, but rather introduces
platitudes which we have no clear way of making sense of without abandoning psychologism
about reasons.
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Anti-insularity Sometimes when someone acts for a reason that is a good
reason for them to so act, their reason is not that they believe or desire
something
The two first claims undermine the third, since if reasons were always believings
or desirings, and some reasons for an undertaken action are good reasons to
so act, no good reasons for an undertaken action could be anything but its
agent’s believing or desiring something. Dancy rightly calls the resulting view
“implausible” and “extreme” (Dancy, 2000, p. 100).12
Someone endorsing psychologism is then only left with the possibility of
denying what Dancy calls the “normative constraint”. But, though Dancy (2000,
p. 106) doesn’t quite put it in those words, that is just implausible in its own
right, for reasons that have nothing specifically to do with psychologism. Why
be so sceptical as to think there is no such thing as acting for a good reason?
Consequently we should conclude that psychologism is to be denied. And I see
nothing wrong with the conclusion.
But as suggested, my issue with Dancy’s argument is not with its soundness
but with its scope. As many (including Darwall, 2003; Millar, 2004; Davis, 2005;
Setiya, 2007; Smith, 2012; Alvarez, 2009, 2010) have noted on encountering the
conclusion of Dancy’s argument, the thesis Dancy targets seems quite readily
shed (and perhaps it should never have been taken on) by those who want to
provide an account of acting, or acting for a reason, which ineliminably men-
tions its explanatory connection with desire. The resulting dialectical situation
seems to be this: Even if Nagel and Dancy are right to say that an agent’s
reason for their action need not be their desire, the theorists who are nominally
targeted by their arguments are still free to say that an agent needs to want
to do what they are acting in doing, in a sense which, for all Dancy shows by
12In fact it is hard to so much as make sense of this kind of insularity, since it is not so
clear we can coherently think of an agent who views all their reasons as facts about their own
psychology.
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the aforementioned argument, is constitutively explanatory of their action. If
there are arguments which put this kind of “psychologism” about acting to rest,
they are not instances of the present sort of argument, which only concerns
psychologism about reasons.13
Having put reasons aside, it seems that a further sort of argument or con-
tention can be discerned in the alluded-to passages of Nagel’s writing, which
is not specifically about the nature of the reasons for which people act, but
is rather meant to threaten the idea that an acting subject is constitutively
subject to a mode of explanation which mentions desire. The rough and ready
way of understanding this Nagellian contention is as follows: If the presence of
desire is guaranteed when someone acts, then mention of desire can’t amount
to a genuine explanation of why someone acts. There is something intuitively
compelling about this neglected argument. How could a description explain an
action if what it says about the acting subject is entailed by the subject’s act-
ing? But in fact this argument has a sound version with a benign conclusion
and an unsound version with a malign one. Below is the sound argument:
Consequence If N is acting in Aing, it follows from this that N wants to A
Non-Explanatory (C) If N is acting in Aing, mentioning that N wants to A
does not explain that N is acting in Aing
To avoid a muddle, note that we should not be encouraged to dismiss this Nagel-
lian argument on the basis of Davidson’s famous and swift dismissals of various
kinds of “logical connection argument” (Davidson, 2001a, p. 13-15). These
13Dancy (2004) gives a sceptical response to the idea that two kinds of explanation are
applicable when a subject is acting for a reason. But I do not really understand the reasons
for this scepticism. Much of Dancy’s criticism seems to hinge on the idea that since a causal
explanation citing beliefs and desires would be available even where there was no appropriate
“fit” between these states and the action explained, the applicability of such a purely causal
explanation could not be constitutive of action. But this objection seems to rest on a too
narrow construal of causalism, sensible versions of which should require some such “fit”. In
any case, Dancy explicitly leaves room, near the end of the article, for a dispositional form of
explanation which is constitutive of action. As it happens, that is just the sort of explanation
which I am claiming to be constitutive of action.
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hinge on the idea that one event may be the cause of another (for example, that
Jones lost weight because on hunger strike) even though we may refer to the
resulting event in a way which implicates its cause (for example, I suppose, by
giving a description like “Jones lost the kind of weight that could only be lost by
going on hunger strike”). In such an example we would have entailment from one
description to another (from “Jones lost the kind of weight that could only be
lost by going on hunger strike” to “Jones was on hunger strike”) although items
constituting the truth of the two descriptions still entered into causal relation-
ships (Jones’s hunger strike was, of course, the cause of losing whatever amount
of weight thereby lost). Hence entailment from one description to another does
not preclude the items constituting the truth of the respective descriptions from
entering into causal relationships.14
But however good Davidson’s objection is deemed to be, it does not give
us a convincing way of undermining Nagel’s quite di erent sort of “logical con-
nection argument”, which concerns explanation. An odd statement like “Jones
lost the kind of weight that could only be lost through hunger strike because...
Jones was on hunger strike!” is hardly a worthwhile explanation if “...” di-
vides explanans from explanandum, and this is not undermined by Davidson’s
observation that logical relationships don’t preclude causal ones, since one can
clearly mention a cause of something without explaining it. And though some
may miss this, the original comments Davidson makes in connection with dis-
missing logical connection arguments do not seem so much as intended to defend
the possibility that something, such as that someone acted in doing something,
may be explained by something which it entails, such as that they wanted to
do it. Davidson does say that something may be explained by something which
14Relating to an issue raised in footnote 20 on page 32 and footnote 3 on page 37, this
Davidsonian observation can perhaps be adapted so as to be acceptable even to someone
who does not view causation as a relation between events considered as particulars, but as a
relationship between things “more closely tied to the descriptions of events” (Davidson, 2001a,
p. 150), such as, for example, that Jones lost weight and that Jones was on hunger strike.
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it is entailed by, when he suggests that “It dissolved” can be explained by “It’s
water-soluble and was placed in water” (thinking the former to be entailed by
the latter, thus dismissing the whole idea of a “dispositional masker”). But he
never so much as suggests that something along the lines of “it dissolved in
water” could be explained by “it’s water-soluble” where the latter is thought to
be entailed by the former. Here he opts, instead, to suggest that there is no
such entailment (Davidson, 2001a, pp. 14-15), which of course simply evades
the present line of inquiry, which concerns whether, if there is such entailment,
it precludes explanation.
The conclusion of this excursus is only this: Davidson and others have shown
that a pair of descriptions can stand in entailment relations, although the objects
or facts which make these descriptions true can enter into causal relationships.
But this does nothing to prove that a description which entails another can ex-
plain it. The ordinary Davidsonian wisdom about logical connection arguments
is thus powerless to undermine the simple and compelling Nagellian argument
which was given above.
Further, I can see nothing wrong with the conclusion of this Nagellian ar-
gument, and think we should grant it. For what sort of insight, information or
elucidation could be provided by an explanation whose explanans was a straight
consequence of its explanandum? Someone might be impressed enough with the
structural features and possible truth of such a string of descriptions to want
to call it an explanation, but that would seem to make for an unhappy notion
of explanation, which intuitively would render it quite unimpressive to say that
action is constitutively subject to a mode of explanation which mentions desire.
We should note, however, that the above argument does not destroy every
hope of saying that action is constitutively subject to a form of explanation
which mentions desire. It only warns against a naive way of understanding that
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thesis. And there seems to be nothing about Consequence which defends that
more general and more serious claim, as can be seen by considering the below
crude argument:
Consequence If N is acting in Aing, it follows from this that N wants to A
Non-Explanatory 2 (C) If N is acting in Aing, mentioning desires on part of
N does not explain that N is acting in Aing
This argument is clearly not valid, and its conclusion is clearly false. Even if
someone’s desire to A can’t figure in a real explanation of their acting in Aing,
talk about what people want is capable of figuring in informative explanations
of action, as when someone explains someone’s going to the bank by appeal to
their desire to repay a debt.
But, in itself, this doesn’t defend constitutivism about desire explanations,
since there is nothing obviously constitutive about an explanation of someone’s
action of going to the bank which merely mentions their wanting to repay a debt.
As is likely to be noted, someone can perform such an action without such a
desire (perhaps they are there to make a deposit). Someone pushing Nagel’s line
of argument might be tempted to conclude from this that, when descriptions are
entailed, they are not explanatory, whereas when they are explanatory, they are
not entailed, and try to make use of this fact in an argument against constitutive
action explanations which mention desire.
And I think there would be something right in such an objection, although
it misunderstands and therefore misses its target. For if someone is acting
in going to the bank, this does not entail the applicability of any particular
description, apart from ones equivalent to “the subject wants to go to the bank”.
And descriptions equivalent to “the subject wants to go to the bank” are not
explanatory of someone’s doing an action of going to the bank. Saying that the
subject wants, say, to repay a debt might be explanatory, but of course it is not
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entailed, and the same thing might be said about wanting to make a deposit,
wanting to steal stationery, or whatever else might explain someone’s going to
the bank. So it seems true that no particular description is both entailed and
explanatory when someone is acting in going to the bank.
But, to remind ourselves, Constitutive Action Explanation does not require
that any particular explanation is entailed. It requires only that there’s a form
of description, mentioning a kind of explanans, such that an explanation of
that form is possible whenever someone acts. Since the above specimens are all
of a form such that they explain an agent’s action by mentioning their desire,
Constitutive Action Explanation would be safe if, though no particular desire
ascription was entailed by someone’s going to the bank (except their wanting
to go to the bank), some desire ascription, like “they want to repay a debt”,
or “they want to see how people behave in long lines” could always explain
someone’s going to the bank.
How, then, might such a thing be guaranteed? There are, after all, appar-
ently some things which a subject “just wants” to do, with no further desires
of the sort that might explain the action. Given that, in such cases, no such
further desires can figure in true explanations of the subject’s action, and given
also that, by previous reasoning, a simple desire to do what one wants can’t
figure in an explanatory description of why the action happened, it might now
seem impossible that there should be an all-encompassing notion of constitutive
action explanations which mention desire. But this complaint rests on a con-
flation of two forms of explanation. For, although it is true that there is not
always a further desire in the sense of a desire to achieve a further thing, so
that the action might be explained by appeal to a further end, there must, I
think, always be a further desire in the sense of a more specifically individuated
desire — a desire for a narrower type of outcome than that the pertinent action
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is performed.
Perhaps it is not necessary that a subject that is acting in going to a bank
has a desire to do something else thereby, such as repay a debt, but it does seem
necessary that such a subject has a more determinate desire, embodying a more
determinate grasp of a more determinate type of bank-going outcome, such as,
for example, a desire to go by foot or by train, or to do it slowly with a knife
in hand. I propose, further, that we can capture this further specificity, always
present where a subject wants to do a type of action, by using the now-familiar
connective “in order to”:
Explanatory Whenever N is acting in Aing, there is a true explanation of the
form “N is acting in Aing because N wants to X in order to Y”15
Explanatory describes a form of explanation which mentions a specific form of
explanans, but this form of explanation can be instantiated in two ways. Either
it cites a desire to take a particular means to the action at issue, or a desire
to take the action at issue towards a particular end. Hence, either the “A”
above corresponds to the “X”, or to the “Y”, with some other action taking
up the other position in either case, thereby yielding information about how
the agent represents their action and (to however a limited degree) how this
agent might be liable to act on other occasions where similar ends or means
might be available. And this thesis is not seriously challenged by the above
considerations, since even in those cases where an agent has no further end in
15It might seem that the possibility of wanting to do something in order to do something else
is not supported by the account of wanting I favour. But the idea of a desire to do something
should, as per the suggestion in chapter 2.3.2 on page 65, be identified with being disposed
to act in doing that. Hence wanting to turn left is having a disposition to do an action of
turning left. It might still seem, I suppose, as if the present account doesn’t countenance the
idea that someone can want (or be disposed) to do something in order to do something else.
But that is a natural elaboration of the account I favour: For if every action necessitates the
presence of a desire to do this type of action, and if someone can do a whole course of action
of the type “turning left in order to buy some nails”, then they seemingly must have a desire
to turn left in order to buy more nails, the exercise of which is performing this entire course
of action.
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view, so that their action can’t be explained by appeal to a desire for such a
further end, the agent must, at least, have some means in view in acting, so that
their action can be explained by appeal to a desire to take a further means.16
And it seems clear that, if a subject is acting in picking flowers, mentioning
that they want to do so in order to put them under their pillow gives information
of why that action is happening. It is true, as Nagel insists, that just on the
basis of knowing a subject is acting in picking flowers, we know that they want
to do so. But we do not know the more specific nature of this desire, which we
may then learn of in such an explanation. Once we are told that it is a desire
to pick flowers in order to put them under the subject’s pillow, we know that
the subject is disposed to do what it takes to act in picking flowers in a set
of situations more restricted than those involving encounters with flowers. For
then we know of this subject’s more specific liability to pick flowers when they
deem that doing so can contribute to putting them under their pillow.
What may seem somewhat less clear is that mention of an agent’s wanting,
say, to get their knife in order to pick flowers, is informative about their pick-
ing of flowers. But I believe this is a mistake, which again rests on conflating
explanations by desires for means with explanations by means. Someone’s get-
ting a knife in order to pick flowers doesn’t explain their picking flowers, except
perhaps in the limited sense of telling someone how they managed to do it.
But someone’s wanting to get a knife in order to pick flowers does explain their
picking flowers, since it tells us that the agent wanted to get their knife, and,
further, that they thought that was an available way of achieving the wanted
end of picking flowers. It thus gives us information about the agent, which sheds
light on why it should have happened that flowers were picked.
16Given the above discussion of basic action, such an explanation must always be available,
but even if it were deemed that basic actions (and so basic desires for means) are needed,
Explanatory would not fall down, since all it requires is that every action comes with a desire
for a mean or an end — not that every action comes with a desire for a means, or that every
desire comes with a desire for an end.
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4.4 Desire Ascription
4.4.1 An Equivocal Puzzle
Suppose that saying something like “I want to catch a fish” or “this person wants
to have lunch” is generally a matter of ascribing to the mentioned subject a desire
with a satisfaction condition that corresponds to the verb phrase employed. If we
suppose this, then saying “I want to catch a fish” or “they want to have lunch”,
ought in general to be a matter of ascribing, respectively, a desire with someone’s
catching a fish, or someone’s having lunch, as its satisfaction condition.
But now consider the everyday phenomenon, recently attended to by Fara
(2013) and Lycan (2012), that someone can generally say something like “I want
to catch a fish”, although if they should end up catching a small or otherwise
unexpectedly disappointing kind of fish, it would seem false, or at least mislead-
ingly incomplete, to say that they thereby did what they said they wanted, or
that they satisfied their ascribed desire.
In just what way does the everyday phenomenon clash with the view we just
supposed? Below I want to show that, as Fara and Lycan construe these cases,
they commit to denying the supposition that is at issue, but that, in so doing,
Fara generates insurmountable obstacles to providing any plausible account of
the meanings of desire ascriptions, whereas Lycan is forced into a mysterious
and troublesome account of what it takes to satisfy a desire.
I will then suggest a di erent way of understanding the everyday phe-
nomenon, on which it does not falsify the original supposition, but instead
highlights a neglected feature of what it is to want to do something, and a
correspondingly neglected way in which desire satisfaction can be partial or
truncated. I hope to explain both features by appeal to the idea that desires
can be instrumentally complex.
But to make clear why Fara and Lycan have bad responses to the felt tension
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between this supposition and the everyday phenomenon, and to make clear why
my response is a good response to this tension, I will first need to make explicit
just what the supposition of the first paragraph comes to.
4.4.2 On Desire Ascription
To make an explicit view out of the original supposition, while simultaneously
defending its innocence, I want to show how it is a straightforward consequence
of a pair of theses which are themselves innocent. One concerns the semantics
of desire ascription, and the other the metaphysics of desire satisfaction. There
is, I think, nothing very contentious or new in the view I will present, nor
in the thought that it rests on a combination of metaphysical and semantic
committments.17 But that is the point, since soon I want to make it explicit
that although Fara and Lycan o cially target more contentious doctrines, they
become equally committed to denying something that is close to common sense.
The semantic leg of the upcoming thesis goes as follows:
Semantic Platitude A statement of the form N wants to A is generally used
to express that the subject mentioned in place of “N” wants to do the kind
of thing mentioned in place of “A”.
This thesis should not be controversial. It only has such benign consequences as,
for example, that if “Elizabeth wants to brush her teeth” is used as such phrases
generally are used, it expresses that Elizabeth wants to brush her teeth. And
of course the example is chosen at random. It will give analogous consequences
for any statement of the form N wants to A.
17Braun, writing on the same topic, briefly outlines a view that is somewhat similar to the
view I will describe, calling it “the plausible view” (Braun, 2015, p. 141), signalling that it is
commonly held. Anticipating what I say here, Braun also notes that this view results from a
combination of semantic and metaphysical claims (Braun, 2015, p. 143). Something like the
ordinary view I will describe also seems implicit in much of the literature that views desires
as relations to propositions, and in the literature which views desire ascriptions as describing
subjects as standing in relations to propositions.
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It is important to note that it would be a mistake to replace “generally”
with “always”, or “necessarily” since it clearly is possible, and does happen,
that someone uses a statement of the form N wants to A to express something
which is not this subject’s wanting to do the mentioned kind of thing, or (per-
haps more often) their wanting something which is not precisely the mentioned
kind of thing. For example, someone could say “Elizabeth wants to brush her
teeth”, using the whole string of sounds as code for something totally di erent,
or they could be using “wants” ironically, or say a statement like that although
“Elizabeth” was a slip of the tongue, where the intended subject was really
someone named Elias Beet. As will be more pertinent to the subsequent discus-
sion, someone could also say “Elizabeth wants to brush her teeth” and thereby
express that Elizabeth wants to brush only her upper teeth, or that Elizabeth
wants to brush a prime number of teeth, or any such variation on the claim
that Elizabeth wants to do something which is a case of her brushing her teeth.
The point of “generally” is that it allows such possibilities, so that they do not
undermine the semantic platitude.
Perhaps it will now be asked what “generally” is supposed to mean. But I
will not try to answer this di cult question. I will note that the subsequent
discussion is neutral on whether “generally” is taken to mean something like
“most of the time”, or, as is perhaps more plausible, “paradigmatically” or,
or even, perhaps, something like “when it expresses the proposition that is
expressed by salient other statements of the same form, including statements
made in languages other than English”. And I will note that, however exactly
it is to be construed, “generally” cannot be dispensed with, as long as, on the
one hand, there is some unity between all the various uses of statements of the
form N wants to A, whereas, on the other hand, divergent or non-standard uses
are possible.
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The second claim, perhaps not platitudinous outside of philosophy, but reas-
onably platitudinous within it, is that a desire to A is the sort of attitude that
would be satisfied just in case its subject should end up having succeeded in
Aing. One extremely common route to some such conclusion goes via viewing
desire as a propositional attitude. It involves saying, first, that for N to want
to A is for N to stand in a relation to the proposition that N succeeds in Aing,
and, second, that this proposition is or corresponds to the satisfaction condition
of that desire (Searle, 1983; Crane, 2001). But this route to the conclusion is
apparently not safe, as there are various objections to propositionalism about
desire, several of which (I submit) don’t have ready responses (Brewer, 2006;
Thagard, 2006; Montague, 2007; Thompson, 2008; Merricks, 2009). In the next
two paragraphs I describe what I take to be an especially troublesome issue with
propositionalism about desire, which I have not seen a satisfactory proposition-
alist response to:
Thompson invites a more serious look at what it’s supposed to mean to
say that a desire to brush one’s teeth, or go to school, is really an attitude
with the object that N brushes their teeth, or that N goes to school (Thompson,
2008, pp. 127-128, including footnote 11).18 He argues that, once we do thor-
oughly consider such propositional adaptations of ordinary desire ascriptions,
we’ll discover that they assign the wrong meanings to these expressions. For
the only available ways of understanding such propositional ascriptions says
Thompson, are these: The habitual one, on which “N wants that N walks to
school” becomes equivalent to “N wants that N (is the sort of person that) walks
to school”, the progressive one, on which it amounts to the same as “N wants
18It is often remarked that there is some linguistic discomfort to saying that a desire to
brush one’s teeth is, as it were, really an attitude towards the outcome that one brushes
one’s teeth. But after being noticed, this discomfort is often ignored in the hope that such
wrinkles can be dealt with (Crane, 2001, pp. 111-112), or overruled on the grounds that there
is nothing for a desire to be, or for a desire ascription to ascribe, but a propositional attitude
(Searle, 1983, pp. 29-30). Thompson can be taken as showing the conceptual source of the
linguistic discomfort.
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it to be the case that N is walking to school”, and, finally, the perfective one,
on which it amounts to something like “N wants that N has walked to school”.
The trouble Thompson finds with propositionalism is that none of the three
available readings captures what seems to be ascribed by saying that N wants
to walk to school: The habitual reading is clearly o , the progressive one seems
compatible with indi erence about reaching the school, whereas the perfective
seems compatible with indi erence about active participation in getting there.
I suspect Thompson is right that none of these three readings of “N wants
that N walks to school” can work. But it is a tall order to prove that there
could not be another, more felicitous propositional reading. Could we not, for
example, simply introduce a special verb phrase in the relevant propositions,
signifying both active participation and ultimate success, such as, for example,
“going through with” the undertaking, or “doing it from start to finish”? Al-
lowing this, we could read “N wants to walk to school” as something along the
lines of “N wants that N goes through with walking to school”. This still looks
like an ascription of a propositional attitude, and seems to avoid the troubles of
the earlier proposals. But it could be objected that “going through with walk-
ing to school” is still not quite what is wanted where someone wants to walk
to school, or that it is merely a cumbersome way of sticking with the letter of
propositionalism while rejecting its spirit.
I do not want to make more of the present section about this objection — that
would be a long and tangential discussion — but fortunately this does not seem
necessary, since it seems possible to capture the spirit of the propositionalist’s
rationale for the near-platitude without using wording that forces us to view
the object of desire as somehow propositional. For we may say simply this: For
N to want to A is for N to have a desire with Aing as its object. For Aing to
be the object of N’s desire is for this desire to be such as to become satisfied
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just in case N ends up having A-ed. This more neutral rationale generates the
following thesis:
Metaphysical Near-Platitude For a subject, N, to want to do a kind of
thing, A, is for N to have a desire which will be satisfied just in case N
ends up having A-ed.
By way of illustration, this thesis has consequences like the following: For Eliza-
beth to want to brush all her teeth just is for her to have a desire of the sort that
will be satisfied by her brushing all her teeth. (Again, it will have analogous
consequences for any other example of wanting.)
The phrase “ends up having A-ed” is necessary to get over a hurdle about
time, but one which seems distinct from present concerns, and perhaps also
distinct from the just-bracketed concerns about propositionalism. The hurdle is
that if someone wants to bake a cake, and if they baked one yesterday, so that
it is true that they have baked a cake, this does not mean that their present
desire to bake a cake is satisfied. What we need to do justice to is that someone
only satisfies their desire if “the future take[s] some specific course” (Fara, 2003,
p. 147). But the idiomatic “ends up having A-ed” already accommodates this,
since on reflection this must come to something like “ends up having A-ed in
the future as seen from the present (by the one with the desire)”. It doesn’t
mean the same thing as “will have A-ed in the future”.19
Taken together, the platitude and the near-platitude straightforwardly entail
the following view, which must, then, be true if they are:
19There might be thought to be the further issue that, if someone wants to do something
but succeeds in doing it only after giving up on wanting to do it, their desire should not count
as satisfied. But I suspect that it should. If someone wants to smash a ball-like object that is
flying towards them, and realise too late that it is an egg, so that they no longer want to smash
it as they do, then I think it would be right to say that their desire to smash it is satisfied,
only no longer present. Such a person succeeds in doing what they wanted, albeit not in doing
what they want. Perhaps I am wrong, and a subject may only satisfy their desires if they still
have them. But if that is true, it could easily be incorporated into some amended version of
the metaphysical near-platitude, without causing any trouble for the subsequent discussion,
which does not concern the satisfaction of abandoned desires.
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Desire Ascription A statement of the form N wants to A is generally used
to express something which is true just in case the subject mentioned in
place of “N” has a desire which will be satisfied just in case they end up
having done the kind of thing mentioned in place of “A”.
And on initial appearance, this view only seems to have consequences that are
benign. It tells us, for example, that if someone says “N wants to turn left for
Kilimanjaro”, and uses the statement along general lines, and what they say is
true, then N has a desire which will be satisfied just in case N ends up having
turned left for Kilimanjaro. And it seems to tell us such things as that, wherever
there is a desire of the sort that would be satisfied by (and only by) doing some
kind of thing, like turning left, this desire can be felicitously ascribed by saying
the subject in question wants to turn left.
4.4.3 Semantic Revisionism
If someone says they want to walk towards school, then could they satisfy the
ascribed desire by doing so at a pace slow enough to miss the last lesson? Or,
suppose, instead, that someone is said to want to eat cake. Could the talked-
about desire be satisfied by this person’s eating a microscopic piece of cake?
However exactly we are to respond to such questions, we should note that
they are generally applicable, so that it seems that we should come up with a
general strategy for answering them. In fact it seems that, whenever we think
of a desire ascription, we are able to think of an outcome where the subject
in question ends up having done the thing they’ve been said to want to do,
although at the same time it can seem false, or at least somewhat misleading
or incomplete, to say that this subject has thereby satisfied the ascribed desire.
Fara and Lycan have come up with some cases like the above, and both
seem to say that, in these sorts of cases, a desire to do something is ascribed,
143
although doing the thing mentioned in this ascription is not enough to satisfy
that desire. Fara is most explicit on this point:
[W]hen Fiona says that she wants to catch a fish, she does not ex-
press a desire that becomes satisfied just in case the proposition that
she catches a fish becomes true. That proposition becomes true if
she catches a tiny minnow. But her desire does not thereby become
satisfied. Moreover—and this is the point I wish to emphasize—her
self-ascription of the desire is, despite all this, true. The desire that
makes her claim true has a more specific content than the proposi-
tion expressed by her embedded clause. (Fara, 2013, p. 254)
Fara’s o cial target is not Desire Ascription, but a related thesis, which seems
to come to this: A statement of the form N wants to A expresses that N stands
in a relation to the proposition that N As, and that N stands in that relation
to that proposition just in case that desire is satisfied in precisely those possible
worlds in which N As (Fara, 2013, pp. 252-254).20
This related thesis seems quite close to Desire Ascription — seems to be a
version of it which adds a particular brand of propositionalism to it, thereby
encountering the aforementioned problems about tense, while ignoring the issue
of futurity which I quote Fara herself as raising in the previous section. But
here I will not consider how Fara’s characterisation of the puzzle case a ects
this related thesis, since I think that thesis is a more specific but less plausible
version of Desire Ascription. I want to consider how Fara’s characterisation of
the puzzle cases a ects Desire Ascription.21
20Hence I mostly agree with Braun’s (2015, p. 147) interpretation of what Fara targets.
21The theory Fara targets “seems to be a more specific and more detailed version of the
plausible view”, notes Braun (2015, p. 147), and on this I agree. Braun does not seem to
consider the possibility that, in targeting the more specific and more detailed view, Fara might
undermine something less doctrinal and closer to common sense, but only notes that Fara’s
objections, if successful, “throw[...] some doubt onto the [less specific] view” (Braun, 2015, p.
161).
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Fara’s characterisation of the case of Fiona involves these two claims: That
Fiona speaks truly when she says “I want to catch a fish”, and that Fiona does
not have a desire of the sort that would be satisfied just in case she should
end up catching a fish (Fara, 2013, pp. 255-256). Hence Fara endorses, or is
committed to endorsing, the following pair of theses about Fiona’s case:
Truth Fiona’s statement of “I want to catch a fish” is true
Opaque Ascription Fiona’s statement of “I want to catch a fish” is not made
true by the fact that Fiona has a desire such as would be satisfied just in
case she should end up catching a fish
Of course this pair of theses entail that Fiona’s statement of “I want to catch a
fish” does not express the presence of a desire of the sort that would be satisfied
just in case Fiona should end up catching a fish. But this, taken on its own,
does not commit Fara to rejecting Desire Ascription, since there remains the
possibility that Fiona’s statement is somehow used in a deviant or non-standard
way.
But Fara does not seem to think there is anything non-standard about
Fiona’s statement, since in her discussion she takes this puzzle case to un-
dermine a thesis concerning “the relation expressed by ‘wants’” (Fara, 2013, p.
250), meaning, presumably, the relation that is in general or paradigmatically
expressed by that word, and assuming, presumably, that the word is used in
that general or paradigmatic way in Fiona’s case.
More importantly, the assumption that Fiona is using the statement along
general lines seems perfectly in order, and hard to undermine. For there is no
apparent reason to say that the imagined Fiona is using the words “I want to
catch a fish” as code for something else, or that she’s non-overtly specifying
some further aspect of the object of her desire (as someone would if they said
“I want to ride in a car”, with special emphasis, and perhaps pointing towards
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an especially fancy specimen).22
So even though it is not explicit in Fara’s writings, it seems that, on top of
the preceding, Fara should think the following:
Usualness Fiona’s statement of “I want to catch a fish” is used as statements
of the form N wants to A are generally used
This trio of theses, two of which Fara clearly is committed to, and one of which it
seems that anyone should be committed to, straightforwardly contradict Desire
Ascription. For if all the theses are true, then in Fiona’s case, a statement of
the form N wants to A is used as such statements generally are used, and this
statement is true, although this statement is not made true by the fact that
Fiona has a desire of the sort that would be satisfied just in case she should end
up having done what is mentioned in place of A in her statement. And then
this statement could not express that Fiona has such a desire.
But now I want to argue that, in characterising this case in such a way that
it falsifies Desire Ascription, Fara generates a problem which it seems she can’t
get out of. I want to do this by raising the question of what Fiona’s statement
could plausibly express, if not the presence of a correspondingly easy-to-satisfy
desire. And I will argue that there is nothing that it could plausibly express, if
not this.
Fara’s way of answering the question seems to begin with the assumption
that the psychological fact which makes Fiona’s statement true is that “Fiona
wants to catch a fish that’s big enough to make a meal” (Fara, 2013, p. 250).
Because it is extensional, this does not tell us what Fiona’s statement expresses,
though of course it sets constraints for what it could express. But the answer
is also gappy in a further respect, since it doesn’t tells us what, in Fara’s view,
22If for some reason it should be thought that there is something deviant about Fiona’s
ascription, it is also worth reiterating that it seems that Fara’s concern with this ascription
should a ect just about any ascription to the same extent — we can always think of a viscerally
unsatisfactory way in which someone can do what they’ve been truly said to want.
146
it means to say that Fiona to wants to catch a fish that is big enough to make
a meal. The only thing that Fara clearly seems to say about this is that it is
having a desire which requires for its satisfaction at least catching a fish that is
meal-sized.23
So Fara seems to think the following:
Underspecification Fiona’s statement of “I want to catch a fish” is made
true by the fact that Fiona has a desire which requires something over
and above Fiona’s catching of a fish for its satisfaction (including that the
fish is meal-sized, and perhaps also that it is not rotten, that it is alive,
and so on)
Whatever Fara’s own motivations might be for taking on such a claim, and in
spite of the fact that I will reject other elements of Fara’s view, it is worth
noting that Underspecification is an inherently attractive thesis. If Fiona has
a desire of the sort that requires for its satisfaction that she ends up catching
a fish that is above some size (and perhaps also not rotten or foul-tasting, and
perhaps indefinite further conditions need to be added here), it still seems right
that, in saying “I want to catch a fish”, Fiona is, albeit in an incomplete way,
describing this desire. And this even though Fiona’s statement does not seem
— at least not overtly — to represent anything about size, freshness, or flavour.
Hence Fara seems right to say that an account of what such a statement means
must “explain[...] how a desire report [like Fiona’s] could be true even when its
23It is not so clear whether Fara thinks, for example, that ending up catching a meal-sized
fish is su cient for satisfying Fiona’s desire. Fara never says she subscribes to anything like
our Metaphysical Near-Platitude. If she would endorse it, then she would think that wanting
to catch a meal-sized fish is to have a desire of the sort that would be satisfied just in case
one catches a meal-sized fish. Then Fara would think that, although in saying “I want to
catch a fish”, Fiona was not referring to a desire that could be satisfied by catching a tiny
minnow, she was referring to a desire that could be satisfied by catching, say, a dead, rotten
fish. This proposal makes Fiona psychologically odd, since now she is taken to care about
whether a caught fish is meal-sized, but not about whether it is otherwise meal-appropriate.
Since this odd supposition does not seem necessary for Fara’s purposes, and since I do not
think anything in the case compels us to think of Fiona in this way, I do not ascribe such a
commitment to Fara here.
147
embedded clause underspecifies the desire that makes the report true” (Fara,
2013, p. 267).
But back to the question of what Fiona’s statement could mean if not that
Fiona has a desire of the sort that would be satisfied just in case Fiona should
end up catching a fish. If we adopt Fara’s assumption that the statement is made
true not by the fact that Fiona has a correspondingly easy-to-satisfy desire, but
by the fact that Fiona has a harder-to-satisfy desire, then we must say that
Fiona’s statement means something which is consistent with it having truth
conditions as follows:
Opaque Ascription Fiona’s statement of “I want to catch a fish” is not made
true by the fact that Fiona has a desire such as would be satisfied just in
case she should end up catching a fish
Underspecification Fiona’s statement of “I want to catch a fish” is made
true by the fact that Fiona has a desire which requires something over
and above Fiona’s catching of a fish for its satisfaction (including that the
fish is meal-sized, and perhaps also that it is not rotten, that it is alive,
and so on)
In trying to say what Fiona’s statement means while making it consistent with
these desiderata, we’ll run into insurmountable problems. For a start, consider
the proposal that we simply add whatever extra conditions are supposedly re-
quired for satisfying Fiona’s desire to the meaning of her statement. Suppose,
that is, that in saying “I want to catch a fish”, Fiona just is saying that she has
a desire which requires some extra conditions, over and above her catching a
fish, for its satisfaction. That interpretation of her statement would, of course,
straightforwardly conform to the above pair of theses. But it is a non-starter,
for at least three reasons, all having to do with its over-specificity:
The first problem is that, if Fiona’s statement meant such a thing, then
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someone would need to know that Fiona’s desire wouldn’t be satisfied with
catching a tiny minnow in order to know what Fiona meant by her utterance.
But it clearly is possible for a hearer to understand what Fiona is telling them,
without knowing that. (Imagine someone is told by Fiona that she wants to
catch a fish, but that they remain unsure whether Fiona is fishing for sport,
or to make a meal, or for relaxation, or for thrills, or to catch the tiniest fish
possible to use for bait later).
The second problem is that, if Fiona meant to convey some such narrow
desire by her statement, then it is not clear how someone interested in catching
a somewhat di erent type of fish could felicitously respond “so do I”. But of
course they could. (Imagine that someone is told by Fiona that she wants to
catch a fish, and this someone is interested in catching a tiny minnow, and wants
to give expression to their shared interest).
The third and perhaps most straightforward problem is that intuitively
Fiona’s statement would stay true if Fiona’s desires should change and start
to target some di erent size of fish, or a fish of no particular size. (Imagine that
Fiona changes her mind about meal-sizedness, and wants, instead, to catch a
smaller fish, or just any fish. Her original statement still intuitively applies.)
What this shows is that it must be some quite general fact about Fiona which
gets expressed by her statement — something which can be known without
knowing too much about Fiona’s interests, and truly co-ascribed without sharing
too many of Fiona’s interests, and retained by Fiona without retaining too many
of her further interests. This observation can seem to motivate a sort of proposal
with which Fara experiments, on which Fiona’s statement is to be interpreted
by introducing open variables. Perhaps Fiona’s statement means, for example,
that she has a desire of the sort that would be satisfied only by catching a
fish of some particular type, where the type in question is not conveyed by her
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statement (Fara, 2013, pp. 257-258)?
If we take Fiona’s statement to express the thought that Fiona has a desire
of the sort that would require the catching of some particular type of fish,
then Fiona’s statement will plausibly be true where Fiona has the more specific
desire, which required meal-sizedness for satisfaction, but also true if Fiona’s
preferences should change, as in the case where she changes her mind and starts
to be interested in catching a tiny fish instead. It would also arguably make
sense of how Fiona’s desire ascription could fit another subject with di erent
size-preferences, and of how someone could know what Fiona meant without
knowing too much about her size-preferences.
But such a proposal could still not work, since, if Fiona should grow totally
indi erent to which type of fish she ends up catching, her original statement
would still intuitively be true of her, although it would not be true of Fiona
that she had a desire of the sort that requires for its satisfaction that she catch
a fish of some particular type. Even with an open type variable, the proposal
still assigns a too specific meaning to Fiona’s statement, merely in virtue of
introducing the idea that her desire is type-specific.
If it does not seem that conditions concerning types of fish figure in the
meaning of Fiona’s statement, it might still seem that there are some conditions,
over and above the catching of a fish, which do figure in it. And it might be
thought that we could provide an adequately general account of the meaning of
her statement by saying that it expresses that Fiona has a desire of the sort that
would be satisfied only if she should catch a fish in some or other condition,
albeit — still — a condition which is not conveyed by her statement.
Although Fara never considers it, this interpretation of Fiona’s statement
might be thought, as the previous one, to have the right truth conditions in
the limited sense that catching a meal-sized fish can be described as catching a
150
fish in a particular kind of condition — one where the caught fish is meal-sized.
It also would accommodate that Fiona’s statement could stay true in a future
where she becomes indi erent to which type of fish she catches. (As an added
bonus, it seems to be at least compatible with the idea that, when Fiona says
she wants to catch a fish, she expresses the presence of a desire of a sort that
would require for its satisfaction that the caught fish is not dead, rotten, or
useless in a number of other ways.)
But is it entailed by Fiona’s statement, as we intuitively understand its
meaning, that she has a desire of the sort that would be satisfied only if she
should end up catching a fish in some condition? For of course if that is not en-
tailed by Fiona’s statement, it could not mean that. In answering this question,
we must be careful. For if we read “Fiona catches a fish in some condition” as
co-entailed by “Fiona catches a fish” (thinking that, surely, anything that hap-
pens happens in some condition), then there will be no clear obstacle to saying
that Fiona’s ascribed desire is of the sort that will be satisfied just in case she
catches a fish. So this way of reading Fiona’s statement makes it conform to Un-
derspecification. But it does so at the cost of contradicting Opaque Ascription.
For on the present sort of reading, Fiona’s statement attributes to her a desire
of the sort that would be satisfied just in case Fiona should end up catching a
fish. So, even if the present reading is correct, Fara’s project, which we took as
an e ort to conform to both theses, will be undermined if that is what Fiona’s
statement means.
But as soon as we read “Fiona catches a fish in some condition” as not co-
entailed by “Fiona catches a fish”, but as requiring some more specificity from
Fiona’s desire than that statement, it will no longer clearly be true whenever
Fiona’s statement seems to be. For imagine that this statement requires, ad-
ditionally, that Fiona’s desire is targeting something somewhat more particular
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than the mere catching of a fish. Whatever extra condition is imagined here, it
seems possible for Fiona to decide that she does not care about attaining that
extra condition, although her original statement still applies. For example, we
might take the extra requirement to be that the weather is not terrible, that
the fish is not inedible or dangerous, or that things do not take too much time,
or perhaps that things go as Fiona imagines they should go. Whatever extra
condition we come up with, it seems possible for Fiona’s desire to stay true in
conditions where her desire changes so as to not target such conditions. For
example, Fiona’s statement will intuitively stay true even if all of a sudden she
starts to strive for an opposed outcome where she catches a terrible, useless fish,
of the kind that is sure to bite her finger when she takes it o  the hook, as she’s
standing in the rain and counting her disappointments.
In sum it seems that, while accepting Underspecification, the only plausible
interpretation we could find of Fiona’s statement was one which contradicted
Opaque Ascription. As soon as we tried to add anything to the meaning of
this statement about any further condition required for satisfying her desire, we
seemingly ended up with false interpretations, since it always seemed possible
for Fiona’s statement to stay true even when her desires stopped targeting such
proposed conditions. This should make us ask why, with Fara, we should accept
Opaque Ascription, which seems to preclude the only acceptable interpretation
of Fiona’s statement which we could find. Is it really as plausible, as Fara took
for granted at the start of her article, to deny that Fiona’s statement of “I want
to catch a fish” is made true by the fact that Fiona has a desire such as would
be satisfied just in case she should end up catching a fish?
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4.4.4 Metaphysical Revisionism
But someone of broadly the same persuasion as Fara might now respond by try-
ing to backtrack out of the present di culties, by denying not Opaque Ascrip-
tion, but Underspecification. The idea in such a proposal would be to say that
Fiona’s statement of “I want to catch a fish” is not made true by the fact that
Fiona has a desire such as would be satisfied just in case she should end up
catching a fish, although, at the same time, that Fiona’s statement was not in
the business of saying that Fiona’s desire requires anything further for its satis-
faction — not, for example, in the business of talking about the type of fish —
even de re — which Fiona would need to catch to satisfy her desire.
In his discussion of closely related matters, Lycan seems to end up painting
some such picture. For drawing inspiration from McDaniel and Bradley (2008),
Lycan attempts to analyse the desires of analogous puzzle as follows:
[The kind of desire present in the puzzle cases is] a relation, not
between a subject and a proposition, but between the subject and
two propositions: such a desire has both an “object” proposition and
the relevant “condition.”
The condition may be tacit and quite complex; it need not be fully
represented, [by the subject with the desire, nor by a statement
ascribing it].
If nearly every desire ascription has a vague and messy “condition”
parameter, then finally it is straightforward that our problematic
desire-ascriptions are correct but so are the protests. You want
lunch, on the condition that the pro ered lunch is decent and pleas-
ant. You want fame, on the condition that it be based on something
admirable. Absent those conditions, your desire is not satisfied, even
though it is semantically satisfied. Your assertion, “I want to have
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lunch,” was true in the context, and so was your protest that you did
not want to have the lunch I force-fed you. (Lycan, 2012, p. 209)
According to Lycan, desire is not as simple an attitude as is suggested by our
aforementioned metaphysical platitude. Ignoring the issue of whether the ob-
ject of a desire is properly thought of as a proposition, the quotes suggest that,
according to Lycan, puzzle desires require for their satisfaction both the at-
tainment of an associated object and compliance with an associated “condition
parameter”. If puzzle desires have these two components, then it becomes pos-
sible, I suppose, to say that the statements in puzzle cases are describing only
one of these components — the “object” of the pertinent desire — but that these
ascriptions are not thereby saying anything much at all about the satisfaction
condition of that desire.
And Lycan’s suggestion seems to be that this is just what is happening in our
puzzle cases: Someone says someone wants to do something, and what they say
is straightforwardly made true because it corresponds to the object of the desire,
with no hidden paramters or variables, but still the pertinent desire is not such
that it will be satisfied just in case this object is attained. For satisfaction of that
desire requires compliance with a condition that is distinct from attainment of
its object — which was “not fully represented” in the statement. Fiona says she
wants to catch a fish, and thereby straightforwardly ascribes to herself a desire
with the “object” that she ends up catching a fish. It is just that satisfaction
is not so easy to come by as attainment of a desire’s object is. In Fiona’s case,
satisfaction might require also that the fish is meal-sized, and perhaps a number
of further things.
From a logical point of view, Lycan’s proposal gives us a way to conform
to Opaque Ascription without also conforming to Underspecification, thereby
avoiding the troubles that seemed to a ect anyone with Fara’s commitments
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(as does, of course, a proposal on which Fiona’s statement is made true by some
random mathematical fact, or that Fiona wants something, or whatever else is
true). But the cost of the proposal is that it introduces a notion of a desire’s
“object” which is not so readily understood. In what sense is Fiona’s desire
“directed at” catching a fish, if catching a fish is not the satisfaction condition
of her desire? And on the other side of things, what could it be for a desire to
be satisfied, if not merely for its object to be attained?24 It is not clear that
these notions, normally tightly intertwined, have any real content once we try
to pull them apart. In any case, Lycan does little to show how to make sense
of the resulting pair of notions.
4.4.5 Deepening the Ordinary View
We should now take stock. We’ve discovered that, if we accept bothOpaque Ascrip-
tion and Underspecification, and say that statements of the form “N wants to
A” are not in general made true by the presence of desires that are as easy
to satisfy as these statements overtly suggest, then we won’t be able to assign
any plausible meaning to these statements, since the assigned meanings will
either have truth conditions that are more demanding than the intuitive truth
conditions of these statements, of, if not, will undermine Opaque Ascription.
We then considered Lycan’s more mysterious proposal, which a rmedOpaque Ascrip-
tion but did away with Underspecification, by suggesting that the statements
in puzzle cases specify objects, but not thereby satisfaction conditions, of asso-
24The only real information Lycan provides on this matter is in the form of a hint to the
e ect that the satisfaction conditions of our desires must be fixed by facts about our brains,
and perhaps by Fodorian representations somehow in these brains (Lycan, 2012, p. 211). But
I suspect that this answer could not be filled in further, since we simply have no clear hold of
the idea of a desire’s satisfaction condition which is not provided by viewing that condition
as that desire’s object. If — somehow — it could be shown that Fodorian representations in
a subject’s brain determine the type of outcome that would satisfy their desire, then it would
be overwhelmingly tempting to say that this was a representation of the object of that desire
as well. Not only that, it is not clear what could be said against this, to try to pry objects
apart from satisfaction conditions, since it is not clear what independent criterion of a desire’s
object there could be.
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ciated desires. That seemed to buy us out of the previous dilemma at the large
cost of making it very unclear what an object or a satisfaction condition of a
desire might be.
These discoveries make it overwhelmingly tempting to reject Opaque Ascrip-
tion, while maintaining Desire Ascription. Having done so, there will be no
reason to seriously doubt our Semantic Platitude and our Metaphysical Near-
Platitude, as no reason to doubt these theses has been presented which is distinct
from the insistence on Opaque Ascription. Because of this, it will no longer be
motivated to entertain the idea that what it is to want to A can come apart
from what it is to have a desire such as could be satisfied just in case one should
go on to A, nor the idea that, in standard cases, saying statements of the form
N wants to A can refer to anything but the mentioned subject’s wanting to do
what is mentioned in place of A. Hence below I will take for granted that Desire
Ascription is true, thereby also taking for granted, for example, that having a
desire that is satisfied just in case one ends up having A-ed can be described as
wanting to A.
But to make this conclusion satisfying, something needs to be said to accom-
modate the pressures which leads these authors to introduce Opaque Ascription.
What, first of all, is this pressure? To give a very provisional expression of it,
something has surely been left out if we declare that Fiona and the rest sat-
isfy their ascribed desires in the bad outcomes mentioned, and leave things at
that. Or, to approach the thought from a di erent angle, there surely is some
crucial di erence between someone who says they want to catch a fish, and
catches a tiny minnow, and someone who says they want to catch a fish, and
catches a reasonable fish of the sort that they had in mind to catch. What is
the di erence?
Part of the answer, I think, is in Underspecification. I earlier noted that this
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thesis has independent plausibility, which does not derive from Opaque Ascrip-
tion. The appeal is that as long as we are assuming that Fiona does not have
a very unusual and manic sort of desire merely to catch a fish, it seems right to
say that when Fiona says she wants to catch a fish, she is somehow referring to
a further desire, which would require more for its satisfaction than simply her
catching a fish. We want to say things like this: “Sure Fiona wants to catch a
fish — that really is an outcome that she is going for. But that isn’t all there
is to the desire she is talking about — she doesn’t merely want to catch a fish.”
But the puzzle this generates is one of reconciling our endorsement of Un-
derspecification with our denial of Opaque Ascription. How could it be that
Fiona, for example, is self-ascribing a less specific desire, and at the same time
incompletely describing a more specific desire, merely by saying “I want to catch
a fish”? To make the problem explicit, consider what we now seem committed
to, while abstracting, this time, from Fiona’s particular case:
Transparency in General In puzzle cases, a statement of the form N wants
to A is made true by the fact that the subject mentioned in place of N
wants to do what is mentioned in place of A
Underspecification in General In puzzle cases, a statement of the form N
wants to A is made true by the fact that the subject mentioned in place
of N wants to do something over and above what is mentioned in place of
A
Since it seems that there is not necessarily any “speech act pluralism” happening
in the puzzle cases, it must, moreover be that, in these cases, a single statement,
with a single meaning, manages simultaneously to require the existence of both
sorts of desire for its truth. But how could a pair of desires be metaphysically
entangled in the way they would need to be for such a thing to be possible?
Building up to a full explanation of what is happening in the puzzle cases, I
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want to make sense of such metaphysical entanglement by appeal to the following
thesis:25
Desire Divisibility Part of what it is for N want to A in order to B, is for N
to want to A, and want to B
To see what this thesis means, start by noting that it must be possible to have a
desire with the object that one does something in order to do something else.26
For example, someone can have a desire to do a whole project of the type
“pouring tea from a pot in order to fill a cup with it”. Desire Divisibility is the
claim that whenever there is a desire like this, with the object that something
is done in order to do something else, the subject with the desire wants both to
take the means and to achieve the end.
People might object: Can’t I want to get on a plane in order to get to
Brazil, but dread planes? This kind of objection is a mistake. Wanting to A is
compatible with all kinds of negative attitudes towards Aing, and I think that
very little supports the present kind of objection apart from some confusion
between wanting and what we might call “liking”, or perhaps between wanting
and “wanting + liking”. The mistake is exposed by the fact that, just as I
can want to get on a plane without liking the idea, I can want to go to Brazil
without liking the idea, or even want to get on a plane in order to go to Brazil
without liking the idea. Whatever wanting to do something is, it does not entail
enjoying the idea of achieving the kind of outcome wanted.
25The material that follows is indebted to Anscombe (1963), and also to Thompson (2008).
It is an attempt to carry over some of their insights about instrumental action to an account
of instrumental desire. I allow that, in my account of desire, I’ll end up diverging from
what Anscombe says about wanting. In the case of Thompson the di erence is more elusive.
Thompson seems to essentially identify wanting to A with being in some early stage of Aing
intentionally. I resist this identification. But much of what I say about my kind of desire seems
applicable also to what Thompson says about his kind of desire. Both exhibit means-end
structure that mirrors (in my case) or simply is (in Thompson’s case) the kind of means-end
structure that their objects — actions — exhibit.
26See note 15 on page 135 for some discussion of how the notion of a desire as a disposition
to act, together with the idea that actions can come in instrumental complexes, supports the
idea that a desire can take an instrumental complex as its object.
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And I think it is clear that any other objection to Desire Divisibility trades
on introducing analogous illicit demands on desiring. These demands are illicit
in part because they seem to threaten not just that subjects want to A and
B when they want to A in order to B, but also that subjects want to do any
of the things we seem to think they want to do. For example, one might try
the objection that a subject can want to A in order to B without wanting to
B, because Bing doesn’t “occur” to the agent. I want to be nice to my family
members in order to express that I care about them, but perhaps I don’t think
about expressing that. But of course it need not occur to me that I want to be
nice to my family members either, in the relevant sense of “occurring”, nor does
it seem like most of the things a person wants need to “occur” in the mind of
the person in that sense.
Analogously, someone could say that I can want to turn a crank in order
to grind black pepper without it being salient to me that I’m interested in in
turning the crank, or that I will not be disposed to point it out if someone asks
me what I want. But, just like the previous objection, these ones exclude too
many things from counting as objects of a subject’s desires, for none of these
conditions seem to generally apply when people want to do things. This is a clue
to the insight that wanting isn’t intimately associated with emotions, occurrent
thoughts, salience, conversational dispositions, or conscious awareness.
But what is the argument in favour of Desire Divisibility? I want to make
it plausible, and shed some light on it too, by identifying a quite bloodless and
inconspicuous attitude which a subject must have towards the relata in the in
order to-relation, guaranteed to be present wherever a desire to A in order to B
is present, and then identifying this attitude as one of desiring to do these things.
The argument is not a straight deductive argument for Desire Divisibility that
flows from independent premises, but this is to be expected, if (as Kant famously
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seemed to think about a similar claim) Desire Divisibility is an analytic truth
about desires.
That a subject wants to A in order to B seems equivalent to the subject
wanting to take the means of Aing to the end of Bing. Such a subject must
then have some kind of attitude towards Aing, which we might call “wanting
to do something by Aing”. And equally the subject must have some kind of
attitude towards that end, which we might call “wanting to do something in
order to B”. When I say that wanting to A in order to B entails wanting to A
and wanting to B, I just mean that these two resultant attitudes are desires.
And I do not know how that might be congruently denied. For if we think of
these attitudes as not involving wanting the means or the end, we’ll always, I
think, misconstrue these attitudes. Adopting A as a means to Bing is surely
more than thinking of Aing as a possible way of Bing, and what could the
di erence be if not one of wanting to A? Likewise, taking Bing as an end of
Aing is more than thinking of Bing as a possible result of Aing, but what could
this di erence be if not one of wanting to B?
Once we get this feature of desires in view, I think we’ll see that it is some-
what similar to, and no more controversial than, the feature of beliefs whereby,
for instance, believing a conjunction entails believing each conjunct. If it’s worth
calling this feature of beliefs an “analytic” truth about that kind of attitude,
I think it’s worth calling Desire Divisibility by the same word. But ignoring
analyticity, we may declare, a little more carefully, that Desire Divisibility is
not a claim about which desires tend to be formed by people, or even which
desires it would be rational for them to form. It really is a straightforwardly
metaphysical claim about what it is for someone to want to do one thing in
order to do another.
Desire Divisibility now a ords us a way to show that, in the puzzle cases, a
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statement like “I want to catch a fish” or “someone wants to wear high heels”
can be, simultaneously, an ascription of a desire with a correspondingly simple
satisfaction condition, and an underspecified description of a desire with a more
complex satisfaction condition. For we may now suppose that things are as
follows in the puzzle cases:
Instrumental Hypothesis In puzzle cases, the subject mentioned in place of
N wants to do what is mentioned in place of A in order to do something
further — B
This hypothesis clearly, neatly and generally explains how the ascriptions in
puzzle cases may simultaneously fully specify a subject’s desire, and underspe-
cify a further desire. If the hypothesis is correct, then Fara was correct in
supposing that the ascriptions in puzzle cases underspecify the objects of as-
sociated desires. For these puzzle cases were then ones where someone wanted
to take a means and thereby achieve an end, but where an ascription specified
merely the means. And this is, I think, an exceedingly natural way of thinking
of what is happening in these cases. For example, it seems right to say that
the reason why Fiona’s ascription is partial or incomplete is that she wants to
catch a fish in order, for example, to make a meal. Similarly, if a Heidi says
she wants to wear high heels, but won’t be very satisfied with wearing them on
her hands, a ready explanation is that she is really referring to a desire to wear
high heels in order to look a certain way, or make a certain impression, or walk
somewhere, or whatever.
It might be thought that this explanation is at best partial, because it might
be thought that it is possible for Fiona to catch a fish, to make a meal out of it,
and still not have satisfied her ascribed desire, because of some further badness
about this outcome. But it is plausible that the true explanation of this further
narrowness to such a desire is that there is further instrumental complexity to
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it. If catching a fish and making a meal out of it still isn’t quite satisfactory to
Fiona, that is plausibly because Fiona wanted to catch a fish, in order to make
a meal, in order to eat it, but ended up with something inedible, or because
she wanted to make a meal in order to impress someone, but the dinner was
not impressive, or something along such instrumental lines. So it still seems
intuitive that the present account of the desires in the puzzle cases provides
a full explanation of the narrowness of these desires, though ultimately this
approach may require introducing quite long chains of instrumental desires:
Fiona wants to catch a fish in order to make a meal in order to eat it in order
to be healthy and taste something nice in order to ..., and so on.
It turns out to be very hard to think of a case where there is no such in-
strumental complexity, although the case at hand is clearly a puzzle case in
of the sort that is described by Neatness-in-General and Underspecification-in-
General. Try to imagine, for example, that Fiona just wants to catch a fish, but
not in order to do anything further. If this is really what Fiona wants, then it
is hard to make sense of the suggestion that somehow, the ascription “I want
to catch a fish” is an underspecification of any of her desires. If Fiona does not
want to catch a fish in order to do something, then it seems right to say that
she really just wants to catch a fish, in the simplest sense of that statement that
we can imagine. Or try to imagine that Fiona, for example, just wants to catch
a meal-sized fish, although all she says is that she wants to catch a fish. Now
it no longer seems plausible that, in so doing, Fiona ascribes to herself a desire
merely to catch a fish, which again precludes the case from being a puzzle case
in the sense considered here.
Desires can take complexes of means and ends as their objects, where the
means and ends are wanted in virtue of wanting the complex. Once we see
this, we se that there is no need to set up a dilemma, as Fara and Lycan
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implicitly seemed to do, between saying that ordinary desire ascriptions are
first approximations to some deeper psychological truth about a subject, and
saying that these ascriptions wear psychological truths on their sleeves. For if
desires are complex in the way I suggest, both such claims are straightforwardly
shown to be true together.
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Chapter 5
Circles
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter I consider objections to accounts which say that acting requires
a belief about acting. I consider three kinds of objection to the substance of
this account, and one more troublesome worry about the shape of the account.
First, I consider charges of chauvinism: Could not animals and small chil-
dren, for example, act without believing it? I argue that, properly developed,
such charges are either deeply inconclusive, because they do not say why we
could not attribute such notions to such subjects, or simply question-begging,
because in trying to make it an empirical question whether such subjects have
these notions, they already suppose that acting without such notions is possible.
Second, I consider an objection to the e ect that the present kind of account
makes for an infinite series of beliefs about beliefs whenever someone is acting,
and thereby places an impossible psychological demand on an acting subject.
I respond to such objections by appeal, among among other things, to the
idea that infinite nested beliefs about acting need not make for correspondingly
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infinite demands on the psychology of the acting subject.
Third, I consider an objection to the e ect that, because the present kind
of belief requires adoption for truth, it violates some notion of what it is for
a belief to be objectively true, so that on the account no one could believe, or
objectively believe, that they’re acting. I respond to this objection by rejecting
those conceptions of objective truth which seem to underpin it.
After these objections, I consider a di erent kind of objection which, al-
though it admits that the account might be true, questions its informativeness,
by suggesting that there is an inherent and unavoidable opacity to it. In reply
to this, I adopt a hint from Anscombe, and argue that, since believing one is
doing an action is believing one is doing another action in order to do it, no
question about what it is to believe one is doing an action need ever be left
unanswered.
5.2 Objections to Reflexive Belief
5.2.1 Chauvinism Charges
The view I have taken on acting might seem to generate committments that
are objectionable because chauvinistic. Here I lay out two such commitments,
and consider two types of chauvinism objection, extracted from some work of
Mele’s.
In deriving the targeted committments, consider that I claimed that for N to
act in Aing requires N to be in possession of a bit of psychology which represents
N as acting in Aing. It does not seem far-fetched to infer from this that for
N to act in Aing requires N to understand what it is to act in Aing. Name
this the first consequence of my account. Going further, if the original claim
is taken together with this consequence of it, they seem to generate a further
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consequence. For assuming that acting in Aing requires understanding what
that comes to, and, as we started out saying, that part of what it comes to is
possession of the aforementioned bit of psychology, it is hard to avoid inferring
that for N to act in Aing requires N to believe that N is in possession of a bit
of psychology required for acting. Name this the second consequence.
It might seem desirable, for someone with a certain set of philosophical
instincts, to accept the original claim while circumventing one or both con-
sequences. Such a theorist would need to introduce some way of blocking the
first or second inference, and, to make a really satisfying case, some way of
showing — as it were — that there’s some smudge on an ordinary human’s
introspective lens which makes it possible for us to believe that we’re acting,
although without understanding just what that comes to, or, alternatively, to
understand that we’re acting, without believing that this involves our believing
it. To the extent that such a theorist would be successful in maintaining my
sort of view without going along with one or both consequences, they would
apparently evade the charges raised below, since these seem to target these con-
sequences more than my original stance. But I don’t want to take this evasive
line since, to me, the inferences of the previous paragraph seem in order, and
the two consequences unobjectionable.
I should confess I have some trouble understanding just what such a semi-
transparency view would come to (hence the slightly discouraging metaphor in-
volving smudge on a lens in lieu of a clear statement of how semi-transparency
might arise). To circumvent the first consequence, one might try invoking a
vague or hazy kind of belief, such that someone can believe that p without
understanding just what p comes to (thereby explaining how people can be-
lieve they are acting without understanding just what it is for them to act).
To circumvent the second inference, one might try introducing materials from
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the literatures on Frege puzzles and de re belief (thereby — somehow — al-
lowing people to count as believing that they’re acting without believing some
necessary consequences of that). I see no compelling reason to convince such
a theorist to buy into my view so that they might see the need to respond to
Mele’s upcoming objections. On the other hand, if my response below should
be deemed appropriate, so that there is no deep problem with systematically at-
tributing action-theoretic and psychological knowledge to acting subjects, these
semi-transparency approaches may appear correspondingly devalued.
Mele (1999) criticises what looks like the first consequence in a brief dis-
cussion of Wilson (1989) and Ginet (1990). The central disagreement between
Mele and these authors seems to be that they attribute to acting subjects a
conception of what it is to act, whereas Mele thinks that, given certain facts
about the “conceptual resources” of some agents, we cannot in general demand
such understanding from an acting subject.1 This makes it look like Mele’s
argument is a straightforward appeal to counterexample: Not all agents must
understand what acting is, since some agents could not. But in explaining why
the set of agents outstrips the set of things that understand what acting is,
Mele only really says that it seems “implausible” (Mele, 1999, p. 429) because
“any notion of intentional action” attributable, for example, to children, must
be “pretty thin” (Mele, 1999, p. 425), which just looks like a vaguer restatement
of the negative thesis at issue.
Mele’s (1987) criticism of what looks like the second consequence has more to
it, and this criticism can be adapted so as to a ect also the first consequence. It
emerges in his discussion of a thesis that is, at least, closely related to the second
consequence, seemingly endorsed by Harman (1976, p. 441) and Searle (1983,
1Mele also says that we can only attribute a bit of psychology representing the agent
as acting as the agent conceives of acting — where this conception might be mistaken or
incomplete (Mele, 1999, p. 427). But the purpose of this replacement doctrine is unclear
to me. Perhaps he wants to preserve something he regards as an insight in the criticised
proposals.
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p. 85). For Harman and Searle have said that it is a condition on N’s acting in
Aing that N has an intention with the object that this very intention causes N
to A.2 Mele’s objection starts familiarly and innocently enough by noting that
“[a]gents capable of intentional action are beings with cognitive capacities and
limitations[ who] can intend only what their cognitive capacities permit them
to intend” (Mele, 1987, p. 315). It proceeds by suggesting that representing
intentions is more likely to lie beyond a subject’s cognitive limitations than
acting is, so that it would be reckless, in some epistemic sense, to make the
former a necessary condition for the latter:
It is doubtful that very young children, dogs, and many other beings
capable of intentional action [...]have the cognitive capacity to intend
that an intention of theirs be executed. When my eight-month-old
daughter intentionally crawls toward me upon seeing me enter the
room, does she intend to crawl toward me by way of carrying out
her pertinent intention[...]? (Mele, 1987, p. 315)
I suspect [...] not. But, in any case, we have not as yet encountered
a convincing reason for endorsing the empirical thesis [...] that all
intenders-to-A have a representation of the state or event that is their
intention and of its resulting in their A-ing. And if the empirical
thesis is not manifestly false, it is at least su ciently uncertain that
the safest course is to leave the matter open. In short, the very fact
that the [theory] commits us to a stand on the matter is a strike
against it - provided that there is a reasonable alternative that does
not force us to come down on one side or the other of the empirical
question. (Mele, 1987, p. 316)
2Here Searle apparently goes further than Harman, since his favoured condition is that the
acting subject has an intention with the object that this subject “perform the action” of Aing
(Searle, 1983, p. 85).
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As is indicated by Mele’s presentation, what he says here would be far from
conclusive if taken as a straightforward argument from counterexample. Mele
does not give us a compelling reason for denying that dogs and young children
believe they are in whatever psychological states are required for them to act.
But from how he elaborates on the matter, it seems that, though he grants
Harman (1976, p. 441, n. 5) that “it is not clear what the test is for saying
that the child has a concept of intention”, he thinks that the test is at any rate
empirical, and that it is, for some reason, implausible that agents will always
pass it, so that it is unparsimonious or otherwise epistemically unsafe to go on
supposing that the test may always be passed by an acting subject. I think,
then, that Mele’s argument has something like this shape:
M1 Dogs and young children are capable of acting
M2 There is only a slim empirical possibility that dogs and young children
are capable of conceiving of whatever psychological facts are necessary for
them to act
M3 (C) If an account makes it a requirement for acting that the acting subject
conceives of the psychological facts which are necessary for this subject to
act, this account is held hostage to a slim empirical possibility
If this exhibits the gist of Mele’s objection, that objection has nothing specific-
ally to do with intentions, nor with the possibility of “self-referential” intentions.
The worry concerns the general thesis that the psychological features which fig-
ure in the true account of what it is to act need to figure also in the thought of
the acting subject. What is supposed to threaten this thesis is not that there are
straightforward examples of subjects who can act but can’t have the requisite
conceptions, but the empirical precariousness of supposing that there could be
no such subjects. Having seen Mele’s second objection in this light, we might
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try to view the first one in the same light. It might then amount to something
like the following argument:
M1 Dogs and young children are capable of acting
M2* There is only a slim empirical possibility that dogs and young children
are capable of conceiving of what it is to act
M3* (C) If an account makes it a requirement for acting that the acting sub-
ject conceives of what it is to act, this account is held hostage to a slim
empirical possibility
The second argument seems to be a generalised version of the first, since it says
that an acting subject needs to understand what acting is, which, disregarding
semi-transparency views, entails knowing about whatever psychological aspects
acting has.
In assessing this pair of arguments, very much hinges on how we interpret
M2 and M2*. And in assessing this pair of premises, we need to decide on
a reading of “slim empirical possibility”. On a reasonably clear reading, the
possibilities at issue are epistemic, so that the two key premises are saying that
the capacities in question are not, for all we know, attributable to dogs and
young children (or that we do not have good reason to believe they are, or that
subjective probabilities that they are should be kept low).
The obvious problem with the argument, read in this way, is that the two
key premises can easily be denied by those targeted by the argument. It would
seem perfectly consistent, and, I think, reasonable, for Mele’s opponents to agree
that dogs and young children can act, and to infer from this, in accordance with
their view, that these subjects have the representational capacities in question,
and to deny M2 and M2* on grounds of this conviction.
If, at this point, someone pushing Mele’s line of argument should insist
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on preserving M2 and M2*, perhaps on the grounds that we have no certain
knowledge about the contents of a dog’s mind, it still seems perfectly in order for
someone like Searle and Harman to accept these premises, but, on the grounds
of this lack of conviction in the capacities of dogs and young children, to take
back their endorsement of M1.
To illustrate the point, note that the arguments we’re presently considering
it have the following shape:
P1 p
P2 probably (for all we know) not-q
(C) probably (for all we know) not-(pæq)
Suppose that this form of argument is valid. It still is not clear how, on its own,
such an argument could reasonably sway anyone to accept its conclusion. “Here
is a potato”, says someone. “That thing doesn’t seem to contain any starch”,
says another. However convincing a case might be mounted for the second
statement, it would not seem reasonable for the first person to infer from it
that potatoes probably don’t contain starch. For there remains the perfectly
reasonable stance of taking back the original judgement: “If this doesn’t contain
any starch, I guess it is not a potato — perhaps it’s a toy, or a di erent odd
vegetable, then.” Mele does not explain why the corresponding stance should
not be open to someone who starts out thinking practical belief is definitive of
action, but then becomes convinced to be a sceptic about about the reflective
lives of dogs: If some very good case could be mounted for the case that dogs
are probably too dumb to understand that they act, and, as a result, too dumb
to understand that they possess the psychological features necessary for acting,
then why should it not be supposed that dogs can’t act, or probably can’t?
Perhaps the reader will feel that the stance is less plausible in the present case
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than in that involving potatoes. But all I am saying is that Mele’s argument,
on the present conception, makes no progress in proving that. There might
be thought to be a more head-on approach of revising the arguments so as to
introduce premises to the e ect that, although dogs and young children can
act, it would be possible to make the empirical discovery that they lack the
representational capacities at issue. But as soon as this happens the arguments
become question-begging. For it to be possible to empirically discover that a dog
is incapable of conceiving of action or intention even though the dog is capable
of acting is for there to be no deep connection between the former capacity and
the latter of the sort which Mele’s opponents suppose there to be.
Perhaps what really needs to be undermined is the general sympathy for
Mele-style scepticism, which renders people all too ready to grant that, in prin-
ciple, it would be possible for dogs and young children to act without having
these capacities for thought about their actions. But since I don’t fully under-
stand the sources of this kind of scepticism, I do not know how to undermine
it in any conclusive way. Awaiting a conclusive showdown, perhaps it will help
to take note of the following simple sort of dilemma for people pushing such
scepticism:
Very young children of some particular description either can or can’t believe
things (in the broadest sense) about what they’re doing (in the broadest sense).
If we decide that they can’t, it starts to look mistaken to say that they can act
in doing these things, and then they do not provide Mele with a case in point.
But if we decide that such children can have beliefs about what they’re in fact
acting in doing, then what could be a better candidate for such a belief than
one to the e ect that what’s done is due to the child in the way that actions are
due to an agent?
172
5.2.2 Possibility Protest
On encountering the thesis that a certain kind of attitude is required for acting,
which, further, represents its subject as acting, we may start to suspect that this
thesis makes acting impossible, since the object of this attitude would have to
include an infinite nested series of representations of representations of acting,
rendering it “inaccessible to a finite act of thinking” (Kapitan, 1995).3
To give clearer voice to the suspicion, we should ask what it could mean to
say that the amount of “complexity” of the supposed representations renders
them “inaccessible” to ordinary subjects. And to do this, we first need to lay
bare what this complexity is supposed to consist in. I think that it must be a
kind of complexity introduced by the following argument:
Self-Awareness For N to be acting requires N to believe that N is acting
Transparency For N to believe that N is acting requires N to believe that
whatever is necessary for N to be acting is the case
Infinite Self-Awareness (C) For N to be acting requires N to believe that N
believes that N believes (and so on forever) that N is acting
Someone could, of course, try to stop the inference by denying Transparency.
But as before, I know of no clear way of making sense of semi-transparency views
concerning beliefs about acting. Hence rather than stopping the inference to
3There are analogous theses in in other areas of philosophy, to which analogous objections
might be made. An obvious example is the “KK principle”, on which knowing something
requires knowing that one knows it. Though the query does not seem to have gained much
prominence, one might ask, how, if infinite pieces of knowledge are required wherever there is
knowledge, anyone could know anything. A recently more prominent objection targets a con-
ception of knowledge how, on which knowledge how to do something requires contemplation
of a proposition about how to do it, which — presumably — would require further contempla-
tion of a proposition about how to do that, and so on. Stanley and Williamson (2001, p. 414)
attribute an objection to this e ect to Ryle (1949), and seek to undermine it. My upcom-
ing response to the present thesis about action is, however, di erent from their response to
the Rylean claim, but corresponds, roughly, to a response which they raise without pursuing
(on the aforementioned page): That the episodes of contemplation and the propositions that
are generated by the Rylean regress argument are “not distinct” from whatever episodes of
contemplation and propositions this argument presupposes.
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Infinite Self-Awareness, I want to ask why this thesis should make it impossible
to act. Why is that kind of infinitely nested representation supposed to be out
of reach to an ordinary subject?
It might be proposed that Infinite Self-Awareness requires someone to con-
template infinite propositions — one for every belief — and that this is im-
possible. But this seems misguided if it means that they must in some sense
entertain the propositions. If, on the other hand, it just means that they must
in some sense be “related” to each of these propositions, in the sense that any
belief might be thought to require a relation to a proposition, then it is not clear
why that should be thought problematic. Or it might be suggested that Infin-
ite Self-Awareness requires infinite occurrent thoughts. But as was suggested in
chapter 4.2 on page 112, there’s a mistake in requiring that the object of a belief
must in this sense be present to mind. If, on the other hand, the proposal is
merely that there are infinite beliefs, then it is not clear why that should place
an impossible demand on a subject.
Hence it remains to be shown that Infinite Self-Awareness somehow gen-
erates an impossible psychological demand. On the basis of these examples it
can rather seem that, where Infinite Self-Awareness generates an apparent in-
finity, this presents no real psychological di culty for a subject, whereas, where
someone thinks that there is some infinite psychological demand generated by
infinite nested beliefs about acting, that demand, impossible as it might be, is
not really generated by this thesis. None of this is to say that the notion of be-
lieving something does not place some demands or constraints on the believing
subject. If someone believes something, they must not be dead, they must not
be a tree, and they must perhaps have been causally in touch with the objects
of the belief. (Very much more could be thought of here.) But there is no clear
way in which any of these requirements — real as they are — could somehow
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be infinitely multiplied by a thesis like Infinite Self-Awareness.
5.2.3 Objectivity Objection
A di erent sort of worry could be described as belonging to metaphysics. This
worry is that, since we’ve characterised acting as involving a belief about acting,
whereas it is a mark of objective truth that it obtains independently of human
belief, it can never be objectively true that a subject is acting. Various versions
of the independence premise will secure the worrying inference. The perhaps
most attractively lean version figures in the following argument:4
Self-Awareness For N to be acting requires N to believe N is acting
Mind-Independence If some candidate for truth p is objectively true, p must
be true independently of whether anyone believes that p
Irrealism (C) It is impossible for it to be objectively true that N is acting
Identifying truth as objective truth would lead to the further bind of making
it impossible for it to be true that N is acting, but the argument is worrying
enough as it stands, since even if non-objective truths are allowed, it does not
seem a happy arrangement to put facts about acting in that category. And
worrying as its conclusion is, the argument does seem to me perfectly valid. So
4There are other ways of construing objectivity as mind-independence, which do not spe-
cifically mention the truth at hand, but say, instead, that p is objectively true only if it is true
regardless of whether anyone believes anything, or, yet more generally, that an objective truth
is one which holds independently of whether anyone has any attitude concerning anything, or
perhaps even independently of any fact about human subjects. These kinds of conceptions
of objective truth threaten just about any account of action, but as has often been noted,
they also undermine the very idea that there could be psychological truths (see Haack (1987,
p. 281), Sober (1982, p. 371) and (Devitt, 1997, p. 16)), and hence such theses are seldom
accepted in unqualified form. (Even eliminativists about psychology seem to prefer arguing
for their position in less immediate ways than by simply bulldozing over it with the premise
that objective truth obtains independently of human psychology — human psychology being,
presumably, dependent on itself, so that no objective truths could obtain about it.) About
the premise I have adopted below, it might be argued that it too precludes objective truths
about beliefs, since it might be argued that if someone believes that p, they must believe that
they believe that. I leave this question open, though I think the claim has some plausibility.
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it will be no surprise that I respond to it by saying that Mind-Independence, at
least in its fully unqualified form, should be deemed false.
Though it is di cult to decide on a standard by which to assess Mind-
Independence, it seems that the point of endorsing it must be defending a kind of
realism fit to make truth (as we want to say) non-arbitrary. But there is no clear
sense of arbitrariness in which Reflexivity makes it an arbitrary question whether
someone is acting in doing something. So whatever checks against arbitrariness
realism is meant to secure, they seem achievable just as well by, for example,
endorsing the thesis that an objective truth obtains independently of whether,
for some subject, they believe it (as someone clearly can be acting in Aing
independently of whether someone else thinks so), or else, in an admittedly less
elegant way, by restricting the scope of Mind-Independence so that it concerns
some restricted domain of reality — that which is in principle describable by a
certain kind of non-psychologising science, perhaps.
5.3 Objection to Reflexive Accounts
In this section I return to the ponderous problem which we’ve encountered a
few times, and especially at the end of the third chapter. The problem has been
raised, and briefly discussed, by a smallish number of contemporary philosoph-
ers, (Ford, 2011; Haddock, 2012; Thompson, 2008, pp. 176-177, n. 14), but the
sharpest formulation of it seems due to Anscombe:
We have the following situation about a type of concept. Let ‘M’ be
a concept of such a type. [...] If an M-ing takes place, in that A M’s,
it is an essential constituent of the M-ing that A thinks (believes)
he is M-ing. [...] Our trouble lay in the impossibility of explaining
the content of the thought, and in the consequent impossibility of
saying what it is for an M-ing to take place, not in any implication
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that the content of the thought must in a way be conceived to be
repeated ad infinitum. (Anscombe, 1969, pp. 64-65)
We are clearly in an Anscombian situation, since we have said acting is a type
of concept instantiation of which requires the agent to believe they are acting.
But what is the problem which Anscombe thinks this generates?
The problem seems distinct from all previously considered problems, which
either targeted the realism of introducing such a situation, or the possibility of
it. Anscombe does consider and dismiss one or two objections in the vicinity of
these (Anscombe, 1969, p. 65), and does not seem concerned with the others.
Her real worry seems to be that an account describing an Anscombian situation
is useless not on pain of falsity, but on pain of not “saying” what its subject
matter is at all. Though, as we’ll see, it is very di cult to adequately express
this worry, it is also very easy to feel its force, by considering, for example,
the following piece of philosophical dialogue: Someone asks what it is to act,
and gets (as part of) the answer that it involves a belief about acting. Then
they ask: What sort of belief is that? Since presumably the belief needs to be
understood by specifying its object, and its object is acting, there’s a visceral
sense that this interlocutor’s inquiry is going nowhere.
The reason why it is di cult to express this worry, of course, is that we have
no clear way of articulating when a putative account ‘says’ or explains what its
subject matter is, or as I’ll put it, when an account is informative. Hence our
problem is not simply a problem of meeting some specified demand, but also
one of specifying the demand in a tolerably clear way. Having noted this, we
may think the ideal methodology would be to proceed with a crisp and general
account of informative accounts against which to test various proposals for ways
of “saying” or “explaining” what a practical belief is. But this supposedly ideal
strategy does not seem available, as the following paragraph is meant to make
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plausible.
There are very many examples of accounts which are obviously uninformat-
ive, of which we’ve mentioned some. “For N to be acting in Aing is for it to be
true that N is acting in Aing” is one, “For N to be acting in Aing is for N to have
a true belief that N is acting in Aing” is another. As was important for my argu-
ment in a previous chapter, “For N to be acting in Aing is for N’s desire to cause
N to A in a sense of ‘cause’ that is characteristic of acting” seemed uninform-
ative too. Luckily there are also examples of accounts which seem informative.
Aside from those reductive accounts which identify knowledge, science, love or
colour through putatively independent concepts, there also seem to be accounts
which combine circularity with informativeness. These include such accounts
as specify a “state of knowing” as one standing in justificatory relations in a
“space of reasons”, where presumably what’s at the other end of these relations
is other states of knowing or knowledge-informed perceiving (Sellars, 1956; Mc-
Dowell, 1996), or ones specifying beliefs as states figuring in internally coherent
systems of further beliefs (Quine, 1960; Davidson, 2001b). These accounts seem
informative, but why is an elusive question: They are no less circular than the
uninformative specimens, they are equally liable to introduce semantic notions,
and — contrary to a popular way of speaking of “good circularity” they seem
to tra c in pretty “small” circles.
Here it might be suggested that one feature is shared by the informative but
circular accounts. But I don’t know how to describe it in a way that stands
up to prolonged critical nudging. We might — vaguely and weakly — call the
shared feature “holism”. One account says that believing something is believing
other things in a system of beliefs characterised by coherence. The other says
that knowing something is knowing other things in a space of known things
characterised by justificatory relations. But I don’t know how to specify a clear
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criterion for this feature of holism, and anyway I am not sure that it is the only
way for an account to escape uninformativeness. Still, it is worth noting that
what we’ll end up saying about action will have something like this feature,
since part of the response to the charge of uninformativeness will rely on the
idea that an action exists in a context of further actions, as a belief about action
must exist in a context of further instrumental beliefs.
Because the supposedly ideal strategy is not available, we will pursue a lower
road below. Rather than beginning with a conception of informative accounts,
and trying to show that our present account fits or can be configured to fit
into that mould, we’re going to begin with a test which exposes the kind of
uninformativeness which Anscombe is worried by, and show how some of what
we’ve already said about the nature of practical belief allows us to avoid that
kind of uninformativeness. The test is inspired by the feature of the imaginary
piece of dialogue mentioned above, and goes as follows:
Test If there’s an account of something, X, which itself mentions X, then if
there’s a question, “what is X?”, which this account can only answer in a
way which invites the same question again, then this account is uninform-
ative, in the specific sense we’re after.
This test does not say that an account is uninformative whenever it is circular,
in the sense that its elucidandum figures in its elucidans. Rather, the test says
that an account is uninformative whenever there’s a question which it can only
answer in a way which invites the same question again.
The former approach would pre-judge, in a quite incredible way, the question
of whether there could be a benign form of circular account, declating futile the
ambitions of various thinkers, including Strawson (1992, pp. 19-20), and, in an
admittedly more remote philosophical setting, Dummett (1991, pp. 201-202),
who have wanted to specify ways in which an account can be circular while
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informative.5 It also would ignore Keefe’s (2002, pp. 291-292) interesting view
that, though benign circularity is possible, a strict account of it is not.6
Proceeding with our adopted test in the hope of yielding satisfying results,
the first thing to note about it is that it can apply however many extra elements
are introduced in a circular account. If someone says “acting is doing what
figures in a belief that one is acting, and wanting to, and p and q”, then their
account provides whatever insight is provided by these extra conditions, but
the di culty about uninformativeness remains at the heart of the account, as
someone would still be in a position to ask: “What is is the relevant belief about,
over and above wanting to do something, and p and q?” Likewise, introducing
practical committments, takings as reasons, or even qualifying the kind of belief
at issue by calling it a “causal” or “self-referential” or a presentation of an action
under the aspect of the good, would still leave the same opacity at the centre
of the account.
Noting this shows, I think, that a family of accounts of action or cognate
notions (Harman, 1976; Searle, 1983; Velleman, 1989; Setiya, 2007), all set on
introducing a kind of attitude with a kind of object which requires that kind
of attitude, are uninformative despite their introduction of such extra elements.
To see this, note, for example, what Searle says about acting in raising one’s
arm:
The [...] content of my intention [to raise my arm ]must be at least
[...]that I perform the action of raising my arm by way of carrying
5It is true that these authors don’t say enough to provide us with a clear criterion.
Strawson’s remarks on the matter are sketchy (constituting, I think, some version of the
claim that largeness plus some other virtue can make a circle virtuous), and Dummett’s are
not clearly and directly applicable to our own case (involving, as it does, the idea that a logical
law can be relied on, while not asserted, in exhibiting its own validity).
6Our less ambitious test sidesteps this discussion, since it is not intended as a perfectly
general test of uninformativeness, but only as a way of lassoing a particular manifestation of it.
On the other hand it is compatible with ambitions towards greater generality, since maybe the
test can integrated into a clear and general account of the elusive informative/uninformative
distinction.
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out this intention. (Searle, 1983, p. 85)
If we suppose this to be a proposal for an account of acting (Searle does not
explicitly say this),7 it is, first of all, clear that it describes an Anscombian
situation: There’s a kind of attitude (an intention on part of Searle) and a kind
of doing (that Searle performs the action of raising his arm by way of carrying
it out), where the former is necessary for the latter and the latter is the former’s
object. And my point about Searle is that his formulation of the view clearly
allows an interlocutor to keep asking: What is the content of this intention
to raise your arm? For the answer that its content involves “carrying out” this
intention presumably means that what is done must accord with this intention’s
content — which is what, again? The interlocutor will not be helped by the
idea, whatever it comes to, that self-reference is involved, or that, as Searle
adds, this self-reference is “causal”. These additions do nothing to solve the
infinitely recurring question of what we’re supposed to take as the content of
this supposedly causally self-referential intention.
For another example, Setiya, concerned with specifying an attitude of “tak-
ing as a reason” he thinks essential to acting for a reason, says the following:
[T]he attitude of taking p as my reason to act must present itself as
part of what motivates my action. The content of taking-as-one’s-
reason is thus self-referential: in acting [for the reason that] p, I take
p to be a consideration belief in which motivates me to „ because I
so take it. (Setiya, 2007, p. 45)8
One might think that Setiya’s proposal does not place us in an Anscombian
7Searle can be taken as saying that he is taking both action and intention for granted, and
wants only to account for the way in which they relate. Since the way in which they relate
involves satisfying an intention, which involves acting, the charge of uninformativeness below
does, I think, a ect even this ambition.
8I prefer this formulation, since Setiya’s final refinement of the view replaces the “because
I so take it” bit with “hereby”, which seems to hide the self-referential aspect of the attitude
from view.
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situation since he does not explicitly say that this intricate attitude, required
for acting for a reason, represents someone as acting for a reason. Actually,
Setiya says in a footnote, perhaps out of some desire to avoid worries about
circularity, that “in taking p as one’s reason for doing „, one believes something
whose truth entails that one is acting for that reason — not [...] the very
proposition that one is doing „ for the reason that p” (Setiya, 2007, p. 46, n.
39). I’ve said that I do not find such claims readily acceptable. For what could it
be to believe something that entails that one acts for a reason, without believing
that one acts for a reason? But we need not get bogged down in this matter,
for it is clear that the self-reference involved in Setiya’s proposal generates an
Anscombian situation in a closely related but subtly di erent way.
Setiya clearly does say that the attitude of taking p as a reason is satisfied
in part by the fact that p is taken as a reason. In fact it seems to be a large
part of the point of Setiya’s view to introduce an attitude of taking something
— p — as one’s reason, and to say that this attitude represents one as being
motivated by the fact that one takes p as one’s reason. This manner of speaking
makes it clear that a case of taking-as-one’s-reason requires a representation of
a case of taking-as-one’s-reason. Now it seems equally clear that our test of
uninformativeness applies, since nothing in this proposal answers the question
of just how a subject thinks of p when they are taking themselves (as taking
themselves as taking themselves... and so on forever) to take p as the reason for
their action. The worry is not alleviated by allowing, as is important for Setiya
(2007, pp. 44-45) that taking oneself to take p as one’s reason involves taking
p as motivational in a causal sense.9
9Curiously, Setiya raises a reminiscent point about circularity against an account given by
Marcus (2012):
The problem with this account is its patent circularity. What it is to act because
p is to know that one is acting because p: the explanatory relation figures in
a statement of its own nature. No-one who accepts as substantive the need to
explain necessary truths can tolerate circularity of this kind in accounts of what
it is to „. (Setiya, 2013, p. 511)
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The above hopefully shows that, if a theorist introduces a situation that
fits Anscombe’s description, then this theorist can’t respond to the charge of
uninformativeness simply by adding descriptions — even if they are necessary
or essential — of the kind of thing that is the object of the attitude introduced.
But all this will, of course, have us wondering how an account describing an
Anscombian situation could possibly escape the charge of uninformativeness:
How could an account be circular in the way Anscombe describes and still not
invite the same question again and again? What we’ve learned so far is this:
In giving our account, we can’t just keep mentioning the object of the attitude,
since that reintroduces the attitude, which reintroduces its object, and so on
forever, and we can’t just keep characterising that object in a partial way which
doesn’t reintroduce this object, since that never fully answers the question. But
what else could we say?
My idea is that, to ward o  the appearance that there is some question our
account leaves unanswered, we need an insight about its object which allows us
to give a new answer whenever a question of the form “what is X?” is introduced.
And I think that we have such an insight in a previously discovered thesis about
the instrumental organisation of a thought about acting. For I earlier defended
the following three-way equivalence:
Equivalence N believes N is acting in Aing = N believes N is Xing in order
to A = N believes N is acting in (Xing in such a way that it causally
contributes to Aing)
Our present concern about informativeness seems to a ect Marcus and Setiya equally. In
fact I am not sure why Setiya’s worry about circularity shouldn’t a ect both accounts as
well. For even if Setiya is not committed to saying that acting for the reason that p involves
believing one is acting for the reason that p, he clearly seems to introduce the “explanatory
connection” he thinks proper to action in his account of it, since to him that explanatory
connection (involving, as it does, taking something as one’s reason) involves thought about
that explanatory connection. Perhaps what’s supposed to save Setiya and not Marcus is that
Setiya’s account is not “immediate”. But it is not clear to me what makes it less immediate,
nor just what makes immediacy a virtue.
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In this we’ve given an account of acting in Aing, among the conditions of which
appears the statement that the subject must believe they are acting in Aing.
Imagine that an interlocutor bent on charging us with uninformativeness asks:
“But what’s that?”. It is quite clear that the above thesis allows us now to
generate a new answer, which is not simply a partial characterisation of the
object of the belief. For may say: Believing you’re acting in Aing is believing
you’re doing something else — Xing — in order to A. And now we see quite
clearly a way in which this piece of dialogue could keep going. The interlocutor
might now ask what’s thought about in a belief about Xing in order to A. But
here again we have an answer: “It’s acting in Xing, you see”, and if a further
question of the same sort is pressed, a further answer of the same sort could
be given. The thesis above allows the dialogue to go on in such a way that no
question ever needs to remain unanswered. And if there is no question which
need be left unanswered by the account, it is hard to see how it could be right
to say that this account fails to say what its subject matter is.
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